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PREFACE
The purpose of this study is to define cosmic 
toryism and briefly to indicate some of its sources and 
influence as a prelude to a larger study and history of 
the idea. The third Earl of Shaftesbury is the best 
known and clearest exponent of cosmic toryism and hence 
his works are the focal point of my work— a status they 
will continue to hold in the larger work. Cosmic tory­
ism was a world-view that competed with the new science 
and philosophy of Newton and Locke at the end of the 
seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries.
Its foundations are both similar to and at variance with 
the better-known beliefs. It was a philosophy designed 
for those who could not accept the cold implications of 
empiricism, but who, nonetheless, accepted rationalism.
It is a backward-looking philosophy which, seeing the 
apogee of civilization in classical times, was determined 
to bring the contemporary world to that peak of civiliza­
tion. As such, it was influential and gained many promin­
ent adherents at a time when Newtonianism was not, as so 
often believed, universally accepted. It was, however,
v i
ultimately a failure— along with much of the Enlighten­
ment, But its failure does not discount its importance 
for its adherents in their struggle to understand the 
contemporary world.
Vll
"If such be the will of God, 




Grandson of Dryden’s "Achitopel,” Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, was born in his grand­
father's London residence on the 26th of February, 1671.1 
The first Earl immediately placed his hopes for the future 
of the family-line in his grandson, for his own son, whom 
Dryden characterized as a "shapeless lump," was a man of
In o biography of Shaftesbury exists, although I 
understand Professor Robert Voitle of the University of 
North Carolina is working on one. Shaftesbury's son wrote 
a sketch of his life to prefix to posthumous editions of 
the Characteristics : it remains the primary source of
biographical information on the third Earl. Manuscripts 
of the sketch are in the third Earl's papers in the 
Shaftesbury Archive, Public Record Office, PRO 21/225 
and 21/226. The sketch, never included in the Character- 
istics, was published by Benjamin Rand, ed.. The Life, 
Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, 
Ëarl of Shaftesbury (London: 19Ô0), pp. xvii-xxxi. Other 
sketches of Shaftesbury's life, occasionally adding to 
the fourth Earl's account, can be found in Leslie Stephen's 
article on Shaftesbury in the Dictionary of National Bi­
ography , vol. IV; Thomas Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 
(London: 1882); and R. L. Brett, The Third Earl of
Shaftesbury: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Literary
Theory (London : 1&51), as well as in the following pages.
few parts and a weak constitution;^ thus in 1674 the first 
Earl formally assumed guardianship of young Shaftesbury^ 
and immediately entrusted his upbringing to John Locke, 
his secretary and confidant. Locke recommended that Mrs. 
Elizabeth Birch,^ the daughter of an Oxford schoolmaster, 
who was fluent in Greek and Latin should take charge of 
the boy and begin his education. Mrs. Birch was clearly 
successful for, according to the fourth Earl, "my father 
made so good a progress in his learning that he could read 
with ease both the Latin and Greek tongues when eleven 
years old. Shaftesbury himself commented that he and 
his six brothers and sisters were "from the earliest in­
fancy" governed by Mr. Locke "according to his own princi­
ples (since published by him®). . . .  I was his more
2
Heretofore everyone has said that the cause of the 
second Earl’s illness is unknown; however, I have encount­
ered a letter that indicates that he was afflicted with 
gout by his mid-teens, which certainly would account for 
at least part of his ailments. In a letter to John Locke, 
the family physician, the second Earl's mother-in-law. Lady 
Rutland, mentioned his gout. 10 March 1671. PRO 4/ 210.
®PRO 20/2. Although technically Shaftesbury is only 
Lord Ashley until 1699 when he inherited the Earldom, I 
have chosen to refer to him as Shaftesbury throughout to 
avoid confusion.
^Nothing is known about Mrs. Birch but what the 
fourth Earl tells us. Rand, p. xix.
®Rand, p. xix.
^Thoughts Concerning Education, 1693.
peculiar charge, being the eldest son taken by my grand­
father and bred under his immediate care, Mr. Locke hav­
ing the absolute direction of my education. . . .
It is worth noting that young Shaftesbury's education 
does not appear to have been wholly in accord with Locke's 
precepts for the education of a gentleman. Locke felt 
that a gentleman should display four characteristics as a 
result of his education: virtue, wisdom, breeding, and
learning.8 These characteristics were to be achieved by 
a careful upbringing guided by a tutor-governor in con­
junction with the parents.
The great work of a governor is to fashion 
the carriage and form the mind; to settle in his 
pupil good habits and the principles of virtue 
and wisdom; to give him by little and little a 
view of mankind, and work him into a love and 
imitation of what is excellent and praiseworthy; 
and, in the prosecution of it, to give him vigor, 
activity, and industry. The studies which he 
sets him upon are but, as it were, the exercises 
of his faculties, and employment of his time, 
to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to 
teach him application and accustom him to take 
pains, and to give him some little taste of 
what his own industry must perfect. For who 
expects that under a tutor a young gentleman 
should be an accomplished critic, orator, or 
logician? go to the bottom of metaphysics, 
natural philosophy, or mathematics, or be a
^Letter to Le Clerc, 8 February 1705. PRO 22/2.
O
John Locke, On Politics and Education, ed. by 
Howard R. Penniman (New York: 1947), p. 319. Also
Maurice Cranston, John Locke : a biography (London: 1957),
pp. 239-245.
master in history or chronology? though some­
thing of each of these is to be taught him.
But it is only to open the door, that he may 
look in, and as it were begin an acquaintance, 
but not to dwell there. And a governor would 
be much blamed that should keep his pupil too 
long and lead him too far in most of them.
But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, 
virtue, industry, and a love of reputation, 
he cannot have too much; and if he have these 
he will not long want what he needs or de­
sires of the other.y
The pupil should be reared in a Spartan atmosphere, which 
encouraged manliness, avoiding all effeminacy, but without 
beatings or cruelty. The principle task was to instill 
virtue, wisdom and good breeding: learning is "the least
part" of the education. Schools were to be avoided: it
is not "worth while to hazard your son’s innocence and 
virtue for a little Greek and Latin."10 In terms of formal 
learning, Locke stressed the need to gain a thorough com­
mand of English first; then the pupil should acquire an 
equally thorough knowledge of French and Latin by conver­
sational methods. He considered Greek to be of use only 
to a scholar: another reason for avoiding schools, where
"much ado is made about a little Latin and G r e e k . F i n ­
ally Locke objected to the custom of the grand tour which 
usually occurred between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one;
^Locke, pp. 281-82, 
l^Locke, p. 253. 
l^Locke, p. 331.
5at an age when a young man is too eager to secure and en­
joy his freedom to benefit from travel. It would be better
to go as a boy under sixteen with a tutor or else alone
1 2when over twenty-one.
While practically none of the details of Shaftes­
bury's education, such as what he read, are known, several 
facts indicate that Locke’s principles were not adhered to 
as rigidly as Shaftesbury suggests. In his later life he 
certainly showed that Locke's stress on virtue and good 
breeding was successful. The third Earl was nothing if not 
a virtuous man and the main thrust of his writings was to 
disseminate virtue to the world at large. Also censure of 
effeminacy appears constantly in his works as being con­
trary to virtue. Still major deviations from the theory 
occurred. The first and perhaps most notable one in light 
of Locke's repeated disdainful remarks about the study of 
Greek was Shaftesbury's early mastery of the language— a 
mastery which colored his entire career. Secondly, the 
first Earl withdrew his grandson from Mrs. Birch's tutelage 
and sent him to a private school at the age of eleven.
After his grandfather's death in 1683 Shaftesbury's father 
sent him to Winchester: he remained there for three years.
l^Locke, pp. 384-85.
ISlndeed Shaftesbury would later caustically comment 
on Locke's lack of knowledge of the Greeks. PRO 22/7. 
Below, Chapter IV.
6apparently miserable due to the taunts of his schoolmates, 
who insulted him "on his grandfather's account, whose mem­
ory was very odious to the zealots for despotic power. 
Thirdly, Shaftesbury embarked on a grand tour at the age 
of fifteen which lasted for three years; most of his time 
was spent in France and Italy, although he also visited 
Locke in Rotterdam. The tour, however, was not wasted as 
Locke feared such tours might be, for Shaftesbury acquired 
such a thorough knowledge of French that "in France he was 
often taken for a native" and in Italy he developed a strong 
affection for Italian culture, particularly that of the 
Renaissance. Finally, his youth apparently was not Spartan: 
in a letter of 1704 he recalled that "the most contagious 
of all airs has been my natural one: the worst of nourish­
ments has fed my mind from its first rise. Courts formed 
it: courts and the pleasures of courts were its early milk,
its very essence. Ambition was the best ingredient, the 
soundest part of such a soul. Effeminacy, luxury and those 
other sirens drew the remaining part, and were the counter­
springs of so disordered and wretched a m a c h i n e . L o c k e  
did not intend his principles to be applied uniformly— he
l^Rand, p. xix.
^^PRO 22/7. This lengthy letter to "Teresias" (an 
unknown figure, who seems to have been a monk or some other 
clerical personage judging from the remarks in the letter) 
is a candid statement of Shaftesbury's intellectual devel­
opment. It was clearly not intended for publication, as 
his remarks to Le Clerc on Locke were.
7 ,
expected variations according to the individual. He may 
well have recognized Shaftesbury's scholarly traits early 
and encouraged them, and he certainly did not have the 
influence over Shaftesbury's father that he had with his 
grandfather. The fact remains that Shaftesbury was never 
a disciple of Locke— as has often been noted— and the de­
viations in the educational pattern may partially account 
for the intellectual estrangement of the two.
Shaftesbury returned from his grand tour in 1689.
The next five years of his life are almost a total blank.
His son tells us that he was offered a seat in Parliament, 
but chose instead to devote himself entirely to study.
Again, most unfortunately, there is nothing to indicate 
what he studied. Given his later interests, one must as­
sume, however, that much time was spent on the Greek and 
Latin classics, particularly the Stoics, and on the Cam­
bridge Platonists. He may also have done some writing, 
for as his son notes his major ethical treatise. An In­
quiry concerning Virtue, was drafted "when he was but twenty 
years of age."^®
In 1695 Shaftesbury entered the House of Commons as 
a member from Poole, Dorset, one of the seats in which the 
family had an interest. His entry into Parliament marked 
the beginning of his active interest in politics. Although
IGRand, p. xxiii.
8ill health prevented him from serving in Parliament for 
more than a few years, Shaftesbury maintained a strong 
interest in politics until his death. His correspondence 
is full of letters commenting on political affairs and 
letters concerning the choice of representatives for seats 
in which the family had interests, Poole, Weymouth, and 
S h a f t e s b u r y . H e  was active in the Commons until the 
Parliament's dissolution in 1698 and is credited, by his 
son at least, with playing an important role in the passage 
of the Treason Act of 1695.1® The strain of constant at­
tendance, however, adversely affected his health; Shaftes­
bury, like Locke, was an asthmatic and found the smoke of 
London intolerable. Therefore he withdrew from parlia­
mentary politics after the dissolution and went to Rotter­
dam to recuperate. Henceforth Shaftesbury's weakened 
constitution would plague him.
In Rotterdam, where he spent a year, Shaftesbury 
lodged at the home of an English Quaker merchant, Benjamin
17pR0 Bundles 20 and 21 passim.
l®Rand, p. xxi. According to his son, Shaftesbury 
carefully prepared his maiden speech on this subject but 
was so overwhelmed by the occasion that he was unable to 
deliver it. Finally he stammered, to the effect, if I who 
am prepared cannot speak, what must be the position of the 
person fighting for his life under the charge of treason? 
These impromtu remarks swung the House in favor of the bill. 
The story may be apocryphal, for it was also told of Charles 
Montagu, later Earl of Halifax.
9Furly.19 Furly had played host to John Locke during his 
last two years of e x i l e h e  also hosted a literary and 
philosophical circle, which included Pierre Bayle, the 
most renowned sceptic of the age and author of the Diction­
naire historique et critique; Jean Le Clerc, a professor 
of philosophy at the Remonstrant seminary in Amsterdam^! 
and critic who edited three influential journals. Biblio­
thèque universelle et historique. Bibliothèque choisie, 
and Bibliothèque ancienne et moderne; and Philipp van 
Limborch, a Remonstrant theologian.^2 Shaftesbury immedi­
ately joined this circle, becoming intimately acquainted 
with Bayle and Le Clerc, although he was disguised as a
19See William I. Hull, Benjamin Furly and Quakerism 
in Rotterdam (Swarthmore, Penn.; 1Ô41), esp. pp^ 101-5.
Hull asserts that Shaftesbury made an "incognito" visit to 
Furly's house in 1691 (p. 101). No other accounts of 
Shaftesbury's life mention this visit, which would have 
occurred during his "period of study." Shaftesbury did 
visit Locke during his grand tour in 1687 and perhaps again 
late in 1688 or early in 1689: perhaps one of these visits
is the one Hull is referring to. The 1687 visit is attested 
to by a list of books left "with Mr. Lock at Rotterdam 
November 5, 1687." Bodleian Library, MSS Locke, c. 7, fol. 
80.
BOcranston, pp. 280ff.
2lThe Remonstrants were liberal nonconformists com­
mitted to a rational theology and a minimal creed. The 
sect was founded early in the seventeenth century: it was 
never a popular sect, but included many influential intel­
lectuals. Cranston, p. 233.
^^Hull includes brief sketches of each of these men, 
pp. 128ff.
10
"student of physic" in order to be able to devote himself 
to studying.23 Sometime either shortly before this journey 
or during it he composed a preface for an edition of the 
sermons of Benjamin Whichcote, which he published in 1698—  
his first publication.24 Since Whichcote was a well-known 
Cambridge Platonist, this work indicates Shaftesbury's 
knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists and his sympathy with 
the rational theology of his Rotterdam compatriots.
According to his son, during Shaftesbury's visit John 
Toland, the deist, who received a small stipend from the 
Earl, surreptitiously published an unauthorized edition of 
An Inquiry concerning Virtue from the draft written some 
years earlier. "He /the third Ea r l /  was greatly chagrined 
at this, and immediately bought up the whole impression 
before many of the books were sold. . . ."25 when Shaftes­
bury finally published An Inquiry in 1711 in the Character­
istics , he described it as "formerly printed from an im­
perfect copy; now corrected and published entire." All 
this would seem to indicate that he did not want the treatise
23Rand, p. xxii.
24?wo copies of this work, the 1698 edition and a 1742 
reprint, are in the British Museum. Two MS volumes of ser­
mons by Whichcote are in the Shaftesbury papers, PRO 24/16 
and 24/17. See William E. Alderman, "The Significance of 




known at this time: yet it was known and circulated in 
manuscript about 1699, for in 1700 a Robert Day published 
a critical commentary on it.^® Furthermore, in 1701 
Shaftesbury asked Pierre Des Maizeaux^^ to translate An 
Inquiry into French. It is doubtful that Des Maizeaux 
ever finished the translation for in 1705 he was still
OQ
working on it and no copies are known today. Other evi­
dence to indicate that An Inquiry was known before its 
inclusion in the Characteristics is the long section of 
The Moralists defending the essay, which Shaftesbury in­
serted into the 1709 edition of that work. Thus the 
fourth Earl's account appears somewhat dubious.
His health being somwhat restored, Shaftesbury re­
turned to England in the fall of 1699 and in November of 
that year inherited the Earldom. He did not immediately
^®Alfred Owen Aldridge, "Two Versions of Shaftes­
bury's Inquiry Concerning Virtue," The Huntington Library 
Quarterly, XIII (1949-50) 209, and Alfred Owen Aldridge, 
"Shaftesbury's Earliest Critic," Modern Philology, XLIV 
(1946), 10-22, ;
2?Des Maizeaux (1673-1745), a French Protestant liv­
ing in Holland, was introduced to Shaftesbury by Bayle and 
returned to England with Shaftesbury in 1699. He published 
numerous books including A Collection of several pieces of 
Locke (1720) and Recueil de diverses pièces sur la philoso­
phie, la religion naturelle, &c, par Leibnitz, Clarke, 
Newton (1Ÿ2Ô). hand, p. 30Ÿ.
BBgeveral letters dated from July 1701 to February 
1705 between Des Maizeaux and Shaftesbury testify to the 
intended translation. PRO 27/17.
12
take his seat in the Lords, for the problems of his newly 
acquired estate— centered at Wimborne St. Giles, Dorset—  
occupied him for about a year. His interest in the Parlia­
ment of 1699-1700, however, is shown by his correspondence
with Furly and Thomas Freke, M.P. from Dorset, during this 
29period.  ^ In the Parliament beginning in February 1701, 
however, Shaftesbury began active participation, which con­
tinued, as his health permitted, until William's death in 
1702. Shaftesbury was a supporter of the W h i g s , b a c k i n g  
Lord John Somers in the debates on the Partition Treaty—  
at one point during the debates he made an extraordinary 
journey from Somerset to London in one day to be able to 
vote with Somers.31 He was active in securing passage of 
the Act of Settlement late in the same Parliament. Later, 
to obtain a Parliament which would actively support William's 
war policies— which Shaftesbury stoutly defended throughout 
the course of Anne's reign^^— he "almost alone" urged dis-
-•'E.g., PRO 20/13 - 20/49. Shaftesbury carried on a 
regular and extensive correspondence with Furly about Eng­
lish politics until his death. A major portion of it was 
edited by a relation of Furly's, Thomas Forster, The Ori­
ginal Letters of Locke, /Algernon/Sidney, and Shaftesbury 
(n.p.: 1830).
30shaftesbury was nominally a Whig; given his back­
ground and family he had to be. Still, as I propose to dis­
cuss in Chapter III, the simple classification of Whig is 
inadequate.
SlRand, p. xxiv.
32pRO Bundles 20 and 21, passim, especially letters 
to Furly, but also letters to John Molesworth and General 
Stanhope.
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solution and, after the dissolution, his efforts to secure 
the election of friendly MPs led William to offer him the 
place of Secretary of S t a t e . H i s  son also credits him 
with ’’the greatest share" in composing William's last 
speech of December 31, 1701.34 Continuing his fervent sup­
port of William’s war policies, he wrote a political pam­
phlet, Paradoxes of State, published in 1702, which argued 
that there was no difference of party in face of the French 
threat: all England must be united in defense of the revo­
lution settlement and the Protestant church. This entailed 
support of Holland, the Austrian interests in Spain, and 
the Act of Settlement. "To conclude. Since we have a Prince 
to whom we ow /s~ic7 that Religion and Liberty of which we 
are yet possess! . . .  if we are any way wanting at this 
Time in supporting him . . .  we must justly bear the . . . 
Brand of being the worst of Subjects and of English-men 
. . . the most detestable, and, in a word, the most ungrate­
ful of M e n . "35 With Anne's accession to the throne, Shaftes-
^^Letter to Furly, 29 December 1701, PRO 20/49 and 
Rand, p. xxiv.
34Rand, p. xxiv. Somers is usually given credit for 
urging the dissolution and for composing the King’s speech.
I have not attempted to verify Shaftesbury’s role in these 
activities.
35paradoxes of State, Relating to the Present Juncture 
of Affairs in England and the rest of Europe: Chiefly ground­
ed on his Majesty’s Princely, Pious, and most Gracious Speech 
(London: l702). PRO 20/68. It was published anonymously, 
but proof of Shaftesbury’s authorship is found in two letters 
to Furly dated 6 January 1702 and 30 January 1702, PRO 20/52
14
bury's active political career ended: his "reward” for
his vigorous support of William was to lose his only state 
office, the Vice-Admiralty of Dorset.
Shaftesbury's health was permanently ruined by his 
vigorous political activity and the remainder of his life 
was spent in semi-retirement. Also bis political activi­
ties seemingly affected his fortune adversely. After ask­
ing Furly to find him a house where he could live in abso­
lute privacy "for my health's sake and on the account of 
my private circumstances," he returned to Rotterdam in mid- 
1703 for a stay of just over a year. It is from letters 
written during this visit to his steward, John Wheelock, 
that we discover the extent to which Shaftesbury believed 
his fortune to have declined:
I am sorry to hear all things are so low and 
tenants so disheartened. The greater must be 
my frugality and care to repair the great 
wounds I have made in my estate. I shall 
keep in my compass of fc200 for the year that 
I stay here, and if this does not do it shall 
be yet less, and the time longer, for 1 will 
never return to be as I was of late richly 
poor ; that is to say, to live with the part 
of a rich man, a family and house such as I 
have, and yet in debt and unable to do any 
charity or bestow money in any degree.
Again, from a second letter:
I hope by your good management for me I may be 
able (if I live) to support myself at St. Giles's
and 20/55 respectively. See also David Ogg, England in the 
Reigns of James II and William III (London: 1969, first
published 1055), p. 473.
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but it must be after a very different way of 
living. I should have been glad to have lived 
in the way that is called hospitable in my 
country, but experience has but too well shown 
me that I cannot do it. Nor will I ever live 
again as I have done and spend to the full of 
my estate in house and a table.36
It is doubtful that things were as bad as Shaftesbury be­
lieved— or else Wheelock was an extraordinary financial 
manager— for an account book dated 1704-19 shows that 
Shaftesbury had a potential income of about fcTOOO per 
annum and an actual income of about b4000.3? A "Family- 
Book" for St. Giles's, 1704-07, indicates that the house­
hold at St. Giles’s consisted of twenty-nine persons dur­
ing this period.38
Beyond noting his concern for his estate, little 
definite can be said about Shaftesbury’s last visit to 
Rotterdam. His relationship with Pierre Bayle must have 
matured into one between intellectual peers, however. Pre­
viously he had passed himself off as a student and had be­
come acquainted with Bayle under these circumstances.^®
36pR0 20/78 and 20/79.
37pR0 22/6. This set of records is a compilation of 
Wheelock’s accounts for the years 1704-19 made for probate 
purposes after the third Earl’s death. It includes a list 
of all the manors, estates, etc., held by the third Earl as 
well as yearly records of rents owed, paid, arrears, etc. 
The figures tally with those given by K.H.D. Haley, The 
First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford: 1968), p. 20, about the 
first Earl’s inheritance and potential annual income.
38pRO 22/3.
3®Rand, p. x x i i .
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They had corresponded in the interval between Shaftesbury's 
visits and Bayle had sent Shaftesbury copies of his Dic­
tionnaire as it was printed. None of this indicates, 
though, a relationship about which Shaftesbury could write 
after Bayle's death:
. . . I must own my private loss makes me think 
less of that which the public has sustained by 
the death of so great a man. This weakness 
friendship may excuse, for whatever benefit the 
world in general may have received from him, I 
am sure no one in particular owed more to him 
than I, or knew his merit better. . . .  I know 
very well that it is in religion and philosophy, 
as in most things, that different opinions usual­
ly create not only dislike, but animosity and 
hatred. It was far otherwise between Mons. Bayle 
and myself, for whilst we agreed in fundamental 
rules of moral practice and believed ourselves 
true to these, the continual differences in opin­
ions and the constant disputes that were between 
us, served to improve our friendship. I had the 
happiness to see that they lost me nothing of his; 
and I know my own increasing every day as my ad­
vantages increased by his improving conversation.
I may well say improving in every respect, even 
as to principles in which the enemies of Mons.
Bayle would least of all allow him the character 
of a promoter. But if to be confirmed in any 
good principle be by debate and argument, after 
thorough scrutiny, to re-admit what was first 
implanted by prevention, I may then say, in 
truth, that whatever is most valuable to me of 
this kind has been owing in great measure to 
this our friend whom the world called sceptical. 
Whatever opinion of mine stood not the test of 
his piercing reason, I learned by degrees either 
to discard as frivolous, or not to rely on with 
that boldness as before; but that which bore the 
trial I prized as purest gold. ®
40pR0 22/4. Letter to Mons. Basagne, a mutual friend, 
who was writing a memoir of Bayle, who died in 1706.
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In another letter written two years later Shaftesbury again 
speaks of his association with Bayle, more clearly defining 
it :
. . . Whatever his opinions might be, either in 
politics or philosophy (for no two ever disagreed 
more in these than he and I), yet we lived and 
corresponded as entire friends. . . . Nor was 
there ever a fairer reasoner, or a civiler, pol­
iter, wittier man in conversation. His learning 
the world knows well enough by his books. But 
this I know of him by a long and intimate ac­
quaintance, and living under one roof with him, 
which made me a nearer witness as to his inte­
grity and worth, for which he was yet far more 
valuable to me than for all his wit and learning.
The two men clearly became intimate, probably having daily
conversations. Unfortunately the question of intellectual
influence is one that cannot be answered, though.^2
41pR0 22/4. Letter to "Mr. Darby," 2 February 1709.
(Mr. Darby possibly is Shaftesbury's own publisher, Derby, 
but I have no definite evidence of this.) Darby's original 
letter asked permission for an unspecified author to dedi­
cate a biographical sketch of Bayle to Shaftesbury. Shaftes­
bury denied permission in this letter. A work entitled 
"The Life of Mr. Bayle in a letter to a Peer of Great Britain" 
had been published in 1708. It is generally assumed that 
Shaftesbury was the peer; the author was Des Maizeaux.
Des Maizeaux says that he wrote the work at the request of 
Shaftesbury; whether the two works are the same or not is 
a question I cannot answer. See "The Life of Mr. Bayle,"
The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter /Pierre/ 
Bayle. The Second Edition. To which is prefixed. The 
Life of the Author by Mr. Des Maizeaux (London: IT'S4-37),
p"! m  Also, Alfred Owen Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and the 
Deist Manifesto," Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, New Series, vol. 4l, part 2, l95l, p. 371 and Leo 
Pierre Courtines, Bayle's Relations with England and the 
English (New York: l9SS), p. 136\
42See below. Chapter IV. Also Courtines, p. 134.
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Much of Shaftesbury's time in Rotterdam, as through­
out the remainder of his life, was probably spent in writ­
ing. Since an edition of The Moralists, with the title 
The Sociable Enthusiast, was circulated privately and 
anonymously within a year after his return to England, it 
is likely that it was written during his stay in Rotterdam.^3 
This work demonstrates Shaftesbury's admiration for Plato, 
for it is written in dialogue and given a classical, albeit 
Roman rather than Greek, setting. It has also been seen 
as a conversation between Shaftesbury and Bayle, in which 
Philocles (Bayle) is persuaded to give up his sceptical 
pose by Theocles (Shaftesbury).^4 Perhaps it grew out of 
the conversations between the two men.^S
Shortly after Shaftesbury's return to England in 1704, 
his former tutor, John Locke, died and he was asked by Jean 
Le Clerc to contribute information concerning Locke's life
long letter to Lord S s ^ o m e r ^ 7  dated 20 Octo­
ber 1705 accompanied Shaftesbury's anonymous presentation 
of the work to Somers. In the letter Shaftesbury comments 
on his reluctance to dedicate the work to Somers since 
Swift had recently dedicated A Tale of a Tub to him. (Shaftes­
bury's feelings about Swift are nicely summed up in another 
letter: " . . .  that detestable writing of that most detest­
able author of the Tale of a Tub . . ." PRO 23/9.) He goes 
on to discuss the reason for writing the book— to try to 
bring statesmen back to a study and understanding of philos­
ophy. PRO 22/4.
^^Aldridge, "Deist Manifesto," pp. 322-23.
45The contents of The Moralists will be discussed in 
Chapter II.
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in the Shaftesbury household for a memorial to Locke that 
Le Clerc planned to write. This Shaftesbury did,46 but 
only after insistent prodding by Le Clerc: Shaftesbury's
health had been again upset by his return voyage and his 
recovery was so slow that some six months later he told 
Le Clerc that "I am scarce yet got up." Le Clerc's "Eloge 
Historique de feu M. Locke" was published in his Biblio­
thèque choisie in 1705 and translated into English in 1706: 
it has served as a basis for most subsequent biographies 
of Locke.
Shaftesbury never regained his health: his letters
from 1705 onwards continually lament his ill health.47 
Thus, he seldom visited London again, alternating his resi­
dence between Wimborne St. Giles, a small house in Chelsea 
(a distant suburb of London!), and Surrey, where he some­
times stayed with an old friend. Sir John Cropley, at 
Betchworth, and at another small house he took in 1709 in 
Reigate. That he retained his interest in politics, his
Several copies of Shaftesbury's letter remain in 
his papers at the PRO, including PRO 22/2 and 28/114 (an 
offprint from a published version in Notes and Queries,
III (February 8, 1851), 97-99. Le Clerc's "Life and Char- 
acter of Mr. John Locke. . . ," 1706, is item 47/27 among 
the Locke papers included in the Shaftesbury Archive.
4^A Doctor Pitt provided an analysis of Shaftesbury's 
ailments in May 1705. (PRO 22/100) This document is fascin­
ating, not only because it diagnoses Shaftesbury's problems, 
but also because it provides an insight into medical prac­
tices of the day. The diagnosis is, by modern standards, 
reasonably acute: the prescribed treatment is antiquated.
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letters to Furly continue to show, for they provide a run­
ning commentary on the political situation for Furly and 
other Rotterdam friends. Being out of favor at court, how­
ever, created at least one difficulty: Shaftesbury had
received a promise from William just before his death that 
a young protege of his, Thomas Micklethwayte, would re­
ceive a place at court. The change of monarch and Shaftes­
bury's subsequent loss of favor prevented his pursuing the 
request for a few years, but in 1707 he began, again, his 
efforts to get William’s promise fulfilled. This led to 
a lengthy correspondence between Shaftesbury arid Sidney
Godolphin and to the accreditation of the Earl as a private
48advisor to Godolphin. Micklethwayte received a minor 
office in the Treasury, which, interestingly, he kept through 
the change of ministry in 1710: perhaps this was due to
Shaftesbury's influence again, for he was on good terms with 
H a r l e y .49 Micklethwayte assumed the responsibility of 
being Shaftesbury's literary agent and executor when the 
Earl retired to Naples in 1711 and was responsible for the
48powler, p. 27, and Letters from the Right Honourable 
the Late Earl of Shaftesbury, to Robert Molesworth, Esq.;
Now the Lord Viscount of that Name. With Two Letters written 
by the late Sir John Cropley. To which is prefix'd a large 
Introduction by the Editor /John Toland/ (London: 1721),
pp. x-xi.
49There is no direct evidence that Shaftesbury used 
his influence with Harley in Micklethwayte's behalf. His 
good relationship with Harley, however, is to be seen from 
several letters, notably one dated 29 March 1711, in which 
Shaftesbury congratulated Harley on his elevation to the
21
publication of the second edition of the Characteristics.
Micklethwayte was only one of a number of young men 
to whom Shaftesbury was a patron, Shaftesbury made a point 
of seeking out able youngsters on his estates and providing 
for their education; two may be mentioned. Henry Wilkin­
son was sent to Rotterdam to be apprenticed to Benjamin 
Furly in his counting-house. After he had served his ap­
prenticeship, Wilkinson remained in Rotterdam and became a 
wine m e r c h a n t . M i c h a e l  Ainsworth clearly occupied an 
important part of Shaftesbury's affections: he was sent
to Oxford and Shaftesbury's letters to him at Oxford were 
always addressed "Good Michael" or "Honest Michael" and 
contained many other signs of sincere affection, as well 
as much advice about study and conduct.51 Ainsworth de­
sired to join the clergy and Shaftesbury secured him a 
post through his friend, Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salis­
bury. It was in a letter to Ainsworth that Shaftesbury 
first acknowledged his philosophical estrangement with 
Locke, noting that "'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all
Earldom of Oxford, recalling their close ties as youths 
and his early support of Oxford's "interest, which I thought 
of greater moment to the public, than my own or family's 
could ever be." PRO 25/22.
SOr u II, p. 102.
SlShaftesbury's letters to Ainsworth were published 
in 1716 as Several Letters written by a Noble Lord to a 
Young Man at the University.
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fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, 
and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as 
those of God) unnatural, and without foundation in our 
m i n d s . "52 Shaftesbury's rejection of Locke will be dis­
cussed later; all that needs be noted now is that Shaftes­
bury thought enough of Ainsworth to discuss philosophy 
with him— something that he did not often do in his letters. 
It has already been noted that Shaftesbury provided 
John Toland with a small pension. Although the pension was 
apparently ended during Shaftesbury's period of economy in 
1703-4, the two men continued to correspond and after 
Shaftesbury's death Toland talked as though they remained 
intimate to the end.53 Another friend and recipient of 
an annuity from Shaftesbury was Pierre Coste, a French 
Protestant who took refuge in Holland after the Revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes. There he met Locke, who brought 
him to England and introduced him to Shaftesbury. Before 
and after Locke's death Coste translated several of Locke's 
works into French, later doing the same for Newton's 
Opticks and Shaftesbury's Letter concerning Enthusiasm. 
Coste was chosen to act as the tutor to Shaftesbury's only
52pRQ 20/143 (MS copies of the letters to Ainsworth) 
and 25/22 (a printed copy of the letters).
53see Toland's introduction to Letters . . . Shaftes- 
bury . . . Molesworth.
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child.54 He also acted as a commentator on several of 
Shaftesbury's essays, sent a copy of the Characteristics 
to Leibniz for comment, and published Shaftesbury's Judg­
ment of Hercules, his only essay in aesthetics to be pub­
lished.55 Coste, like Ainsworth, received letters from 
Shaftesbury concerning philosophy: two of the most in­
teresting contain a "course" of reading in Horace that 
the Earl prescribed for Coste.56 These letters not only 
confirm Shaftesbury's knowledge of and love for Horace, 
but they also clearly indicate how Shaftesbury interpreted 
and understood the Latin poet. Finally, mention must be 
made of a young Pole, Crell,^? whom Furly introduced to 
the Earl. After being educated at Leiden and Cambridge 
at Shaftesbury's expense, Crell became his secretary and 
amanuensis and received a small life-annuity in Shaftes­
bury's will.
In 1709 Shaftesbury decided that he had to marry to 
preserve the family line; he had been counting on his 
brother, Maurice, to marry and propagate the line, but by
54Letter to Sir John Cropley, 2 December 1711, PRO
23/8.
55correspondence between Shaftesbury and Coste, 1711- 
1713, PRO Bundles 21, 22, 23, and 45/80 passim.
55PRO 27/20 and 22/118.
57i have never encountered Crell's Christian name.
He is always referred to, in both primary and secondary 
sources, as Mr. Crell or simply Crell. E.g., Hull, p. 102, 
and Brett, p. 53.
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that year it had become clear that he was not going to do 
so. The Earl's health and general lack of inclination had 
prevented him from marrying sooner. His thoroughly busi­
ness-like approach to the question seems somewhat out of 
character: that it indeed was is confirmed by his unex­
pected happiness with the outcome. He began by negotiating 
with a family of substance and name— what family is not 
known— but when the negotiations failed, the Earl commented 
that he was determined to "pursue my intentions for my 
family's sake without further delay, being resolved in my 
circumstances of health . . .  to have no other regard in 
the choice I made, than merely that of a good family, a 
good character, and such an education as might best suit 
a lady's temper to my circumstances and way of life."58 
The lady chosen was Jane Ewer, a distant relation. She 
proved to be an admirable and devoted choice, which 
Shaftesbury himself acknowledged on several occasions, 
often sounding like a delighted child: ". . . 1  should
in reality think I did wonders in extolling the happiness 
of my new state, and the merit of my wife in particular, 
by saying, that I verily thought myself as happy a man now 
as ever."59 Their only child, Anthony Ashley Cooper, was 
born in February, 1711.
58pR0 22/4; also Letters . . . Shaftesbury . . . Moles­
worth.
59PRO 22/4; also Letters . . . Shaftesbury . . . Moles-
worth.
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Between 1708 and 1711 Shaftesbury published his 
major works: all were dedicated to Lord Somers, to whom
Shaftesbury wrote a lengthy letter discussing each work 
as it appeared.GO Each was published anonymously, although 
the Characteristics carried an anagram of initials to indi­
cate the author.G1 The first work, A Letter concerning 
Enthusiasm, came out in 1708 in response to the "French 
Prophets," a group of fanatical French Protestants who had 
emigrated to England. The Letter denounces enthusiasm 
(fanatical religion) and argues that raillery is the best 
antidote for such "madness." Shaftesbury also laid the 
groundwork for his later and more serious philosophical 
works by indicating that there is such a thing as valid 
enthusiasm, which a person understanding true beauty or 
goodness will possess. The Letter was probably the most 
commented on and the most popular work of Shaftesbury’s—  
even in 1768 another translation of it into German was 
made.GZ it occasioned such comment that Shaftesbury was
GOa h  are in PRO 22/4.
G1"A.A.C.A.N.A.AE.C.
M.D.C.L.X.X.I."
(Anthony Ashley Cooper, Armiger, Natus Anno Aetatis Christi 
1671). Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of 
Men, Manners, Opinions, Times in Three Volumes. Fifth Edi­
tion, Corrected with the addition of a Letter concerning 
Design (/London/: 1732), I, p. iv.
G^see the review in Allgemine deutsche Bibliothek, Bund 
II, Pt. I (Berlin, 1770), 2701 I am indebted to t)r. R.W.
Home for finding this review.
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obliged to write a second work, Sensus Communis: An Essay
on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, published in 1709, to 
defend his use of raillery when discussing religion. A 
revised edition of The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody, 
formerly circulated privately under the title. The Sociable
CO
Enthusiast: A Philosophical Adventure, also appeared in
1709. It was Shaftesbury's first serious philosophical 
treatise, written in dialogue, expounding his cosmological 
views. In 1710 Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author was pub­
lished. It is a work in literary criticism and is his 
first excursion into aesthetics. Finally, in 1711, these 
miscellaneous essays were collected together into a three 
volume work entitled Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opin­
ions, Times. The Characteristics also included a revised 
version of An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit and a 
group of newly written Miscellaneous Reflections on the 
Preceding Treatises, etc. An Inquiry was Shaftesbury's 
most complete statement of his ethical philosophy and in­
troduced the phrase "moral sense" into ethical theory.
The Characteristics quickly became a popular work and 
elicited considerable comment. In Shaftesbury's view the 
two most significant commentators were General James Stan­
hope, later the first Earl of Stanhope, and Gottfried 
Wilhelm von Leibniz. Stanhope and Shaftesbury began cor-
®^See above, p. 18.
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responding on philosophical subjects sometime before 1709,
for in 1709 Shaftesbury ventured to tell Stanhope "the
greatest confidence in the world," his rejection of Locke's
philosophical p r i n c i p l e s . ^4 After the Characteristics
appeared Stanhope wrote a number of letters to Shaftesbury
and Micklethwayte praising the work:
Stanhope says the Characteristics will sell 
mightily as soon as we have a peace. Learn­
ing will come in fashion and philosophy will 
be necessary. That it is the only book in 
our language where either is truly to be found.
That it is from thence our noble and generous 
young men must form themselves and learn vir­
tue; that for himself he is the wiser and hon- 
ester for having read it and that it has put 
him upon reading the ancients. That he has 
read over Horace and Virgil twice and also Demos­
thenes and Plutarch and Tully /Cicero/ and sev­
eral others, but could not get Homer“ in Spain.
That he shall never read (as he swore to me) 
any book but the Characteristics and the ancients 
for the future part of his life. . . .  I should
have told you before that Mr. St e ^tanhope/
has translated a great part of the Inquiry con­
cerning fee, into Latin and designs going on
with it in his country retirement this winter.
.65
Apparently Stanhope never finished the translation of An 
Inquiry ; at least it was never published.
Pierre Coste sent Leibniz a copy of the Character­
istics for comment without identifying the author. Leibniz 
responded with an extraordinary, often page by page, cri­
tique of the work, giving it an extremely favorable review.
21 /216 .
64pR0 22/7.
^^Micklethwayte to Shaftesbury, 29 August 1712, PRO
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although he carefully pointed out the weak parts of Shaftes­
bury's philosophy. Several of Leibniz's comments are 
worthy of quotation not only as illustrative of his cri­
tique, but also to indicate the similarity of his and 
Shaftesbury's thought: the two philosophers worked totally
independently, but, as Leibniz's comments show, many of 
their sources were common.®®
The Letter concerning Enthusiasm contains a 
great many fine thoughts; raillery is I be­
lieve a good preservative from this distemper, 
but not very likely to cure those who are al­
ready infected. . . .  I question too whether 
the ridicule is a good touchstone, since the 
best and most important things in the world 
are liable to it. And truth, wnich is gener­
ally hid from the eyes Of the vulgar, is not 
always sure to have the laughers on its side:
I have said that raillery always carries scorn 
in it, and it is injustice to take pains to 
expose anything to contempt, which does not
really deserve it. . . .
Turning to the Essay on Freedom of Wit and Humour Leibniz
notes that Bayle first made certain remarks that both he
and Shaftesbury agree with. He then objected to the use
of common sense as a basis for morals, saying that such a
basis is derived from the principles of Hobbes and Locke,
which his Theodicy has, he hopes, demonstrated incorrect.
Shaftesbury surely resented being compared to Hobbes and
Locke, for most of his writings were in opposition to them.
®®PRO 26/9. This is an English translation of Leibniz's 
comments; a transcript of his comments in the original 
French is item 26/8.
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Unfortunately he did not comment on this part of the cri­
tique .
Leibniz says that An Inquiry concerning Virtue "is 
wholly systematical, and contains very solid thoughts upon 
the nature of virtue," which show that virtue is derived 
from "the affections which nature has given up," that is, 
from natural or innate affections. Such is consistent with 
"my own opinion."
Yet, while Shaftesbury begins by inquiring into the 
nature of deity, "this divinity with which the discourse 
opens is not enough employed in the course of the work." 
Granted the author is trying to show that even atheists 
"are obliged to follow virtue," by showing that virtue is 
derived from the natural affections alone, this is not 
enough, for morality is carried to "its highest pitch" by 
considering the immorality of the soul and this necessi­
tates consideration of "the providence of God." Again, 
Shaftesbury must have been appalled by this argument, for 
An Inquiry is largely designed to refute the notion that 
a belief in God is necessary for morality. Clearly he was 
not successful in convincing Leibniz.
Leibniz had, however, reserved his most effusive praise
for The Moralists:
I thought I had long before penetrated the sen­
timents of our noble author, till coming to his 
treatise too modestly called a Rhapsody /The 
Moralist£7j I perceived I had been entertained 
only in his outward apartments, and I was sur-
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prised to find myself now in his cabinet, or to 
speak more properly in the Sacrarium of his most 
sublime philosophy, in which I was as much charm­
ed as his Philocles in the company of Theocles 
and Palemon. The turn of the discourse, the style, 
the dialogue, the new Platonism, the manner of 
arguing by interrogations, but above all the great­
ness and beauty of his ideas, the bright enthusiasm, 
the apostrophe to the deity, raised me to an extasy. 
At the conclusion of the book I returned to myself, 
and had the leisure to make reflections of what I 
had read. I at once found there almost my whole 
Theodicee, (but more agreeably turned) before it 
had come abroad. The harmony, the disappearing of 
real Evil especially with regard to the whole, the 
unity of true substance, the great unity of the 
supreme substance, of which the others are but 
emanations and imitations, are there placed in the 
most agreeable light imaginable. Scarce anything 
is wanting except my pre-established harmony, my 
banishment of death, and my reduction of matters 
or of multitude to unity or to Simple Substances 
ÆonadsZ. I expected only to have found a philos- 
ophy like that of Mr. Lock, but I was led beyond 
even Plato and Des Cartes. If I had seen this 
book before the publishing of my Theodicee, I 
should have made that use of it I ought to have 
done, and have borrowed from thence very consider­
able passages; and I am only sorry that this trea­
tise does not fill a whole volume. . . .
To conclude, I wish for the benefit of foreigners, 
that all the treatises contained in these three 
volumes were translated into French, as well as 
the first p i e c e s , 67 for there are few works in 
which solidity and elegance are so well united.
Shaftesbury was properly flattered by Leibniz's re­
sponse, although he objected to his censure of raillery, 
seeming to miss the more serious criticisms:
. . . I have now to thank you for the most 
agreeable present you have made to me in the
G7coste had translated the two essays on raillery—  
the Letter concerning Enthusiasm and the Essay on the Free- 
dom of Wit and Humour— into French in 1710.
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transcript of the criticism of the worthy and 
learned Mr. Leibniz on Characteristics. You 
may safely in the author's name acknowledge 
the honour he thinks he has received by it, 
and the satisfaction he finds in the candour 
and justness of his censure; particularly in 
what relates to the too great concessions of 
that author in favour of Raillery and the way 
of Humour. Does not the author himself se­
cretly confess as much in his work? . . . For 
our author's part I dare declare for him that 
he takes even this censure of Mr. Leibniz as 
a real honour done to him and (what is far 
more) as a just testimony rendered to truth 
and virtue. How much must he therefore of 
necessity be by the encomiums afforded him 
from so eminent a hand? . . .
I must confess that these and other approba­
tions from those of the highest merit and best 
judgment®® make me conceive so much a higher 
value than I could have presupposed of those 
works, and, such an opinion of the good they 
may possibly do in the world, that if Mr. Leib­
nitz's critical encomium could with his leave 
and on account of his great name and just char­
acter be thought worth the being inserted in 
Mr. Le Clerc's Bibliothèque Choisie I should 
be very much pleased; especially since it serves 
to support Mr. Le Clerc's favourable judgment 
of that author.®®
Not all reaction to the Characteristics was as fav­
orable as that of Stanhope and Leibniz. The work was con­
sidered by many to be a "manifesto" of deism, and "with 
few exceptions, Shaftesbury was attacked by nearly every 
anti-deist of the century."7® The major attacks on
®®He is referring to General Stanhope as well as
Leibniz. 
69Letter to Coste, 25 July 1712, PRO 23/9.
7®The question of whether Shaftesbury was a deist 
or not has been debated for over 250 years. I do not pro-
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Shaftesbury came after his death, although the Letter con­
cerning Enthusiasm occasioned much controversy as soon as 
it was published.71 Bernard Mandeville led the attacks 
on the Characteristics in his Fable of the Bees (1723) ; 
he was followed by Pope’s Dunciad (1729), Bishop Berkeley’s 
Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), and John 
Leland’s A View of the Principal Deistical Writers (1754).
In the main, however, reaction to Shaftesbury was favor­
able throughout the course of the eighteenth century: the
fact that the Characteristics went through eleven English
editions from 1711 to 1790 is sufficient indication of its 
72
popularity. His influence was varied and widespread: 
deists such as Matthew Tindal used Shaftesbury as a source 
of authority; churchmen such as Bishops Hoadly and Butler 
adopted his arguments for virtue; poets such as James 
Thomson and Mark Akenside praised and used his concepts 
of beauty and virtue; even a former critic, Pope, adopted 
his cosmic toryism, albeit indirectly through B o l i n g b r o k e . 7 3
pose to get involved in the controversy, since it is irrele­
vant to my study; whether he was a deist or a Christian, he 
believed in a deity, and that is all that we need to know 
in seeking the origins of his cosmic toryism. One of the 
latest arguments for Shaftesbury as a deist is Aldrige, 
"Deist Manifesto," especially p. 297.
71 See below, pp. 36-7 for Shaftesbury’s own comments.
^^The dates of the editions are: 1711, 1714, 1723,
1727, 1732, 1733, 1737, 1744, 1749, 1773, 1790. Editions 
also appeared in France and Germany.
73 C. A. Moore, "Shaftesbury and the Ethical Poets in
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His influence on the French Enlightenment remains a de­
bated subject. One of Diderot's first publications was 
a free translation of An Inquiry and his Pensees Philos­
ophiques (1746) was a development of Shaftesbury's scepti­
cism and was burnt by the Parlement of P a r i s . Voltaire 
repeatedly cited Shaftesbury in his works, originally in 
a favorable vein, but after he had given up his own opti­
mistic philosophy, the references became u n f a v o r a b l e .
It is even possible to make a case showing Shaftesbury's 
influence on Rousseau and the origins of the Romantic 
movement. In terms of pure philosophy, Shaftesbury 
founded a new school of ethics and ethical theory, the 
moral sense school, which flourished as a major part of 
the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.
His first disciple, Francis H u t c h e s o n , w a s  responsible 
for transmitting his ethical ideas to Scotland, where 
they were picked up and expounded upon by Adam Smith, 
David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Thomas Reid.
England," PMLA, XXXI (1916), 300-308. Also Chapter V 
below.
''^Leslie Stephen, "Cooper, Anthony Ashley, third 
Earl of Shaftesbury," DNB, vol. 4, p. 1057.
T^Dorothy B. Schlegel, Shaftesbury and the French 
Deists (Chapel Hill: 1956), chaps. II, III passim.
76Schlegel; C . A. Moore; Alderman.
7?See Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.
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A paradox, however, arises out of any discussion of 
Shaftesbury's influence; as can easily be seen he was a 
well-known figure in the eighteenth century, yet his re­
putation died with the century. Since 1800 he has been 
strictly a subject for historians. The explanation lies, 
it seems to me, in the set of ideas he was advancing.
They were intended to promote a world-view contrary to 
the one generally held by the end of the eighteenth cen­
tury. The empiricism of Newton and his successors pre­
vailed in science and philosophy: the great political
revolutions established democratic thought at the expense 
of the aristocracy. In a word, the Earl's notions had 
become outmoded and quaint.
To return to Shaftesbury's life, in July 1711 he 
was forced to abandon England and its cool, damp climate 
for Naples. He was granted passes through the war zone 
by Louis XIV^B and travelled through the Alps in the late 
fall. The trip almost killed him, so fragile was his 
condition. He did, however, make it to Naples with his 
wife, Crell, and a nephew of John Wheelock, Bryan Wheelock. 
By the summer of 1712 he had made a fair recovery from the 
ordeal of the journey and had some hopes of remaining alive
78These passports and Shaftesbury's correspondence 
with the Duke of Berwick, the general in command of the 
French troops in Piedmont, are preserved in PRO 21/190 and 
22/7.
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for a reasonable period.
Shaftesbury's life in Naples was occupied with three 
activities; preparing the Characteristics for a second 
edition, his "virtuoso" studies, and his continuing commen­
taries on political events. Thomas Micklethwayte had been 
left in charge of the English arrangments for the second 
edition and Shaftesbury sent him copious instructions con­
cerning corrections, particularly of the Miscellaneous 
Reflections ; the other essays having been revised pre­
viously. Shaftesbury had also commissioned Simon Gribelin, 
"the most famous of contemporary e n g r a v e r s , "80 to design 
a set of allegorical engravings to serve as frontispieces 
to each treatise and volume of the second edition. The 
engravings— emblems— were to depict the content of each 
work pictorially. Hence, he also sent detailed and ex­
acting instructions to Gribelin via Micklethwayte for 
these.
In one of his letters of instruction to Micklethwayte 
he added comments on the English reception of the first 
edition. The comments are notable for they indicate 
Shaftesbury's own understanding of the nature of the 
Characteristics and hence merit quoting in full:
79a l L of Shaftesbury's letters from Naples comment 
on his state of health. Thus it is quite easy to follow 
the course of his final illness. PRO 22/7, 23/8, and 23/9,
BOgrett, p. 53.
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I will add only a bold word on our author's 
side, which I could not do, till I had occasion 
to know how the foreign as well as our home- 
world judged of this production. 'That tho the 
times should continue ill, they will not hinder
Char cks from growing stil^l in vogue.' This
is good news for Mr. D— y /Derby, his publisher/, 
provided he can have the necessary faith. And 
this, methinks, is no hard demand from such a 
disinterested author and frank bestower as he 
has had to deal with. Besides that he never 
yet found this author overpresumptious in the 
opinion of success, but rather backward, as by 
the happy event in the several treatises has 
appeared.
One seeming demonstration, however, I have had 
in my head, and, methinks, am able to give you 
of this future event. 'Tis plain how the small­
est work which comes abroad is now-a-days can­
vassed and noised about by friends, enemies, ex­
aminers, and critics. 'Tis plain again how 
strongly this very work itself was attacked 
when only the Letter on Enth. &c, its little 
finger, first appeared. The body at last fol­
lowed, and showed itself daringly in the very 
worst time. Open defiance was bid to the whole 
part and opposite tribe. And what ensued?—
Perfect stillness and quiet— The book however 
gained ground: and still gains, as I presume:
yet all is put up. Not a murmer or a mutter 
abroad in print from any single party-man, or 
author of note. And why this?— Consider, and 
you will perhaps find some sparks of reason from 
a small hint.
Whatever matter of least note arises at present 
in Great Britain is immediately made a party- 
affair. And the parties, each of them, are well 
embodyed and act in a sort of discipline, under 
their heads. But more especially the Tory-party. 
They all wait the word and watch the eye. Many 
a longing tooth, many a sharp stomach there has 
been towards it: many talons whetted, many throats
prepared. But the word was Hush ! —  'The author has 
a name and character. He is not yet made desparate, 
His being fallen upon and forced to declare him­
self may urge such a spirit as his to make mad 
work. Whereas if we contain ourselves, and let 
him alone, he will either be wholly quiet, or at
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least go no further than those tolerably de­
cent bounds which reach not the vulgar. And 
for this he has in a manner given us his word.'
On the other side the Whig pen-men, by tacit 
agreement, give no offence or provacation.
They preserve also a deep silence. They neither 
recommend the book (whatever hints they take 
from it) in any of their prints or pamphlets, 
nor will they venture at this season and with­
out necessity to take so dangerous a weight 
upon them. But should any considerable hand 
amongst them offer at this (as I heartily wish 
no-one yet may) the truce being broken, the 
author will begin to be tightly canvassed and 
thoroughly dissected; to the great advantage 
of the bookseller and (I am fully persuaded) 
to no less advantage of the work itself ; which 
I hope we shall be able to fit for bearing 
the very sharpest criticism.81
The import of this letter is not that Shaftesbury was dis­
appointed with the lack of controversy, but that he saw 
the Characteristics as a political work. At first glance 
one does not think of it as a political work, as support­
ing either a Whig or Tory point-of-view; indeed, I can 
discover no secondary author, comtemporary or modern, 
who speaks of it in these terms. Yet Shaftesbury clearly 
did. He saw it as a work supporting his political stance, 
nominally Whig, but actually more complicated than that.82 
Shaftesbury wanted an educated elite of politicians, fol­
lowing in the steps of Cicero, who could be counted upon 
to be virtuous and who would work for the best interests
Blhetter to Micklethwayte, 1 September 1712, PRO
2 6 /1 .
Q O
See below, Chapter III.
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of the whole: "There was once a time when statesmen and
such as governed in the Senate and in the field thought 
it no disgrace to them to give many spare-hours to philos­
ophy. . . . Philosophy has not the honour Æ o w 7  to be 
owned by men of note or breeding, . . . Reason, wit, and 
letters are no longer a security to great men's understand­
ings. They betray themselves on every occasion of their 
private lives, and are no more able to regulate their 
opinions or conduct in what relates to their happiness 
/Fnd the happiness of the whole? than the merest of the 
vulgar whom they d e s p i s e . S i n c e  the Characteristics, 
among other things, sets forth the way to virtue, it 
becomes possible to see how Shaftesbury could consider 
it as a political work.
In his letters from Naples, he also discusses his 
"virtuoso" studies with Micklethwayte, who encouraged 
him to publish them. These "virtuoso" studies dealt with 
art and aesthetic theory: Shaftesbury was planning a
second major work which would extend his philosophical 
views into aesthetics. Two of the essays were completed 
by his death. The Judgment of Hercules and a Letter on 
Design. The Judgment of Hercules was published first in
S^Letter to Lord Somers, 20 October 1705, accompany­
ing the first edition of The Moralists. PRO 22/4.
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a French translation by Coste in 1712 and in English in 
1713. The Letter on Design was first published in the 
fifth edition of the Characteristics (1732) . Benjamin 
Rand collected the published essays and outlines and 
notes for other essays into a single volume, which he 
entitled Second Characters and which was printed in 1914—  
the first appearance of all Shaftesbury's aesthetic 
writings. Shaftesbury also acted as an agent for Sir 
John Cropley, his life-long friend, and purchased several 
paintings for him during this period.
The letters to Furly discussing politics— particu­
larly the state of the war and Tory efforts to gain a 
peace— continued unabated. One interesting letter indi­
cates that Shaftesbury feared his mail was being opened
and gave Furly instructions for including his mail in
84diplomatic pouches. A correspondence was established 
with John Molesworth, the son of his friend Viscount 
(Robert) Molesworth, who was the English Plenipotentiary 
in Tuscany. Molesworth provided Shaftesbury with current 
information on the events in England, and they exchanged 
views on the events. Also General Stanhope and his aid, 
Arent Furly, son of Benjamin, briefed Shaftesbury on the 
Spanish campaign. Hence Shaftesbury did not feel as iso­
lated in Naples as he feared he would be, and thus his
84pR0 23 /9 ,
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stay was as pleasant as possible in his circumstances.
Winter came early in 1712 and quickly destroyed 
what residue of moderate health Shaftesbury had built up 
during the summer. By late December he knew he was going 
to die and began making arrangements for its occurrence.
On January 10, 1713, he wrote his last letters to Cropley, 
Micklethwayte, and Wheelock, and on February 15, 1713, 
he died at the age of forty-one.
Shaftesbury has been called "the greatest Greek of 
modern times''®^ and the best known portrait of him, by 
John Closterman, depicts him in classical robes standing 
beside books of Xenophon and other Greek authors in a 
classical landscape. His favorite authors were Plato, 
Epictetus, Cebes, and Xenophon; the Stoic tradition was 
his forte. Of Latin authors, Marcus Aurelius and Horace 
were his choices. "Perhaps no modern ever turn’d the 
Antients more into sap and blood, as they say, than he. 
Their Doctrines he understood as well as themselves, and 
their Virtues he practis'd better."®® Shaftesbury's 
life was devoted to Virtue, that is, the attainment of
®®Second Characters, or the Language of Forms: By
the Right Honourable Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Author 
of Characteristics. Edl by Benjamin Rand (Cambridge: 
i9l4), introduction.
®®Toland, introduction to Letters . . . Shaftesbury 
. . . Molesworth, p. vii.
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the Good— a Platonic ideal— in this life: his writings
were designed to show the way to Virtue; his public life 
and commentaries on it showed that he strove to create 
the conditions necessary for the practice of Virtue; his 
private life was wholly unblemished by any hint of im­
propriety or selfishness. He had before him what he took 




Post-Revolution England— the Augustan Age— was an 
era pervaded by feelings of accomplishment and contentment. 
Strife in religion, in the social order, in politics, in 
natural philosophy was a thing of the past. The Church 
had been defended and toleration removed potential sources 
of conflict. The aristocratic social order had been con­
firmed and the "vulgar” remained content with their lot. 
"Political stability" advanced and the nation achieved 
greatness and prosperity. The universe had been explained 
and natural law reigned supreme. The major problems con­
fronting Englishmen had been solved leaving only the fin­
ishing touches to be applied. Philosophy, literature, 
and the arts once again began to enjoy their rightful 
places in the culture of England: many felt that a new
Elizabethan Era was unfolding. It was, in short, an en­
lightened age.
Such was the milieu in which Shaftesbury flourished. 
His thought both reflected and stood apart from the times. 
It was the first major statement of the cosmic tory world­
view, a system which combined the contentment of the age
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with a deep reverence for classical culture. A cosmic 
tory, such as Shaftesbury, attempted to explain the pre­
sent by using the classical philosophies of Platonism and 
Stoicism. Several important literary figures, notably 
Addison, Pope, and Thomson, carried cosmic toryism beyond 
the philosophical realm. Shaftesbury served as the 
fountainhead for each.
Because cosmic toryism, as an idea, has seldom been 
studied, a fairly explicit definition of the term must be 
given.^ For it one may turn to contemporary religious 
understanding. As the seventeenth century with its almost 
interminable warfare, religious and philosophical conflict 
drew to a close, men began to lose their interest in the
spiritual world— organized religion— and its explanations
2for many phenomena. One of these was the problem of 
evil. The traditional Christian doctrine of the Fall was
^Basil Willey, so far as I know, coined the phrase 
"cosmic toryism" and gave an extensive definition of it in 
his book The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on
the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period (London: 
1Ô46) , pp"] 43-56. I have generally followed Willey’s line 
of reasoning in the following pages. Willey, however, 
cites Soame Jenyns (1757) as the first major proponent of 
the notion. I see the notion as coming much earlier, 
specifically with the writings of Shaftesbury.
^Charles H. Vereker, Eighteenth-Century Optimism:
A Study of the Interrelations of Moral and Social Theory 
in English and French Thought between 1689 and 1789 (Liver­
pool ; 1967) , P t . Ti Vereker discusses developing secular­
ization and particularly the problem of evil.
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inadequate for an increasingly secularized intelligentsia. 
But if the doctrine is dropped, the obvious evil in the 
world— a world governed by immutable natural law— assumes 
a role of greater consequence, for evil violates, or ap­
pears to violate, natural law. Hence it must be explained. 
A variety of explanations resulted: some are significant
for our purposes, because they underlie a world-view that 
was attractive to the age.
Pierre Bayle, the sceptic, was much concerned with 
the problem and provided a "rational" answer to it. He 
was more concerned to discomfort the Christians than to 
uphold the results of natural philosophy, and hence he 
turned to the ancient Manichean arguments for a "system 
of two principles"— a principle of good and a principle 
of evil which govern the world in competition and thus 
explain both that which is good and that which is bad.^ 
Bayle's was an extreme position and was not generally 
accepted: its importance lies in the fact that many, in­
cluding Shaftesbury, who adopted other explanations felt 
compelled to refute Bayle's thesis in the process of 
stating their own.
A more common solution was the one which the later
^The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter 
/Pierre/ Bayle: The Second Édition, to which is prefixed,
The Life of the Author by Mr. Des Maizeaux (London: 1734-
37), "Manichees."
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eighteenth century knew as optimism.^ In the late seven­
teenth century several variations on the theme "this is the 
best of worlds" were composed: optimism was the best-
known. Natural law indicates a world which works accord­
ing to eternal principles and yields a universal order 
and unity. Not everything, however, fits into the pattern 
of harmony: anomalies— evil or ill— occur which need ex­
planation. Somehow evil has to be made to conform with 
the universal order. And therein lies the solution.
Evil is only an apparent violation of natural law. God, 
who is omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent, fashioned 
a universe which, taken as a whole, is good. It is 
wholly harmonious: all is ordered and unified. Evil or 
ill is only apparent, for in the sight of God, who sees 
the Whole, it conforms to the universal order. That is, 
what appears to mere mortals to violate natural law or 
to be not good needs be seen in the context of the Whole 
where it will be understood to be compatible with natural 
law and good. Thus, in this best of worlds, evil does 
not exist: it only appears to exist because man's under­
standing is finite. Those things which seem to us to be 
ill are actually contributing to the good of the Whole.
^The Oxford English Dictionary gives the date 1737 
as the first usage of the term in referring to Leibniz's 
"best of possible worlds" doctrine.
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The world, then, is good: all things are in their proper
order. Even man is not vile, but precisely what he should 
be, for everything, including man, contributes to the good 
of the Whole. The status quo is what God intended.
At the same time as empirical natural law was coming 
to dominate natural philosophy, metaphysical idealism ex­
perienced a revival. The cosmological theories of Plato, 
notably those of the Timaeus, were revived to confirm the 
goodness of the world. Plato solved the problem of the 
One and the Many— how the unchanging One generated the 
Many, the imperfect world of corruptibles— by asserting 
that the One is "Good" and hence it desired to share its 
goodness, which it could do by bestowing existence on the 
not-itself. Because the One is Good, in its self-over- 
flowing, it could not deny existence to any possible kind 
of being. Thus the paradox occurs that the One, which is 
Good, generated things which, even in its own sight, are 
imperfect or evil. Indeed anything less than the One 
itself must be imperfect, and, in its degree of imper­
fection, evil. However, goodness in the Whole necessi­
tates that all possible things have existence. Hence a 
"full" universe is the greatest of all "goods." This ex­
planation had been used by theologians such as Thomas 
Aquinas, and it led, by the seventeenth century, to the 
widely accepted doctrine of "the great chain of being.
^See Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A
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It was revived by the Cambridge Platonists and became a 
fairly widely accepted explanation for the general goodness 
of the world. Shaftesbury, for instance, used it in his 
derivation of a cosmic tory world-view. Again, the world 
is good in its totality. The status quo is what God 
intended.
Cosmic toryism was a world-view which used the lat­
ter two explanations of evil as its philsophical basis, 
because they seemed to demonstrate that the world as it 
stood in the Augustan Age was as perfect as could reason­
ably be expected. Historians have usually dealt with 
these ideas by using the term "optimism" and have gener­
ally seen them as coming from Leibniz's Theodicy and 
finding their fruition in the French Enlightenment. My 
thesis is that a somewhat similar set of ideas arose in 
England, largely independent of and in advance of Con­
tinental thought, during the Augustan Age, and that the 
English version— as developed by Shaftesbury— encompassed 
the political as well as the philosophical world.
The third Earl of Shaftesbury was the first® major 
proponent of the cosmic tory world-view.? The precise
Study of the History of an Idea (New York: 1960, first pub-
lished 1Ô36) .
®He was not, however, the first’Englishman" to publish 
the basic notion. That honor goes to Archbishop William King 
of Dublin, whose De Origine Mali appeared in 1702.
?It must be noted immediately that Shaftesbury did not 
use the term, and that the unity I propose to indicate in his
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origins of his cosmic toryism cannot be determined, al­
though they undoubtedly lie in the Stoic philosophy of 
Marcus Aurelius, in Platonic idealism, and in his own 
background.8 His philosophical writings are predicated 
on the belief that the world taken as a whole is good, 
using both the ’’optimistic” and the Platonic justifica­
tions to corroborate his belief. His life was spent in 
the milieu of comfortable aristocratic society, and his 
above average education added a thorough understanding 
of classical thought, which bolstered his natural belief 
in aristocratic superiority and satisfaction with the 
prevailing social and intellectual order. He was, in a 
real sense, an archetypal cosmic tory.
Cosmic toryism, then, may be said to have three 
defining characteristics: the belief that the world as
a whole is good; the belief that evil or ill is only 
apparent, since apparent evil actually contributes to 
the good of the Whole, although it may affect individuals 
adversely; and satisfaction with the status quo as being 
what God intended. Furthermore, cosmic toryism set itself 
against the ’’progressive” notions derived from Lockean 
epistemology; thus cosmic toryism does not contain the 
element of hopefulness that is usually associated with
thought is not readily apparent in his writings. It is, 
nonetheless, there.
8I shall discuss the origins of Shaftesbury's thought 
in detail in Chapter IV.
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the term "optimism." It was a world-view suited to its 
age.
Since the perfection of the universe and of the 
existing social order could be taken as established, the 
main business of a philosopher, such as Shaftesbury, was 
to vindicate these ideas against criticism and to demon­
strate the means by which one should live in this sort of 
world. The remainder of this chapter will show how Shaftes­
bury accomplished these tasks.
Among the third Earl's papers in the Shaftesbury 
Archive at the Public Record Office is an extensive series 
of notebooks. They fall into three classes: first, there
is a set which contain materials on a variety of philosoph­
ical subjects dating from his two extended visits to Rot­
terdam, in 1698 and 1703-04; second, there are several 
consisting of drafts of translations from Greek and Latin 
made by Shaftesbury but never published; and third, those 
containing his researches into and drafts of projected 
treatises on aesthetic subjects. The first group ranges 
from a tiny vellum book of notes, mostly in Greek, kept 
on his return voyage in 1704® to a semi-formal two-volume
®PRO 27 /11
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octavo set comprised of essays written during both visits 
to R o t t e r d a m . 10 The other notebooks in this group con­
tain odd philosophical comments rather than sustained 
discussions, but one also finds in them reading notes 
on Plato's dialogues and lists of books purchased in Hol­
land. In the second group are found a "Design for a 
Socratick History"H— an outline for a life of Socrates 
based on those of Xenophon and Plato— and drafts and, in­
dexes for a translation of Arrian's life of Epictetus.1^
The third group dates from his residence in Naples and 
consists of several notebooks, subsequently published by 
Rand as Second Characters.13 Most of the notebooks are 
in Shaftesbury's hand, although some have been copied in 
a fair hand. These notebooks are of interest for they 
indicate the direction and development of Shaftesbury's 
thought and, more significantly, they give an insight into 
the origins of that thought. They provide conclusive 
evidence of the influence of the classics on Shaftesbury. 
They show that his philosophical interests developed from 
a more worldly concern with ethics to a more spiritual con­
cern with aesthetics, indicating that Platonic idealism
lOpRO 27/10. 
llpRO 27/14.
l^PRO 27/16, 24, 25, 26.
^^PRO 26/1, 2, 3, and 27/15, 27. For a full citation 
of Rand's Second Characters, see above, p. 40n.
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increasingly molded his thought.
For this study the first group of notebooks, those 
dating from Shaftesbury's visits to Rotterdam, are of 
prime importance, particularly the two-volume set of 
philosophical e s s a y s . The essays carry such titles as 
"Deity," "Good and 111," "Human Affairs," "Self," "Passions," 
"Character," "Opinion and Precepts," "Life," and "Philos­
ophy." Shaftesbury entitled this set of notebooks "Exer­
cises," a considerably more apt title than Rand's title, 
"Regimen," for he used the notebooks to test ideas and 
arguments rather than as a regulatory guide to philosophy. 
Indeed to call these works "essays" as I have been doing 
is perhaps misleading, since the term "essay" usually 
connotes a degree of formality that is not to be found in 
most of them; many are little more than random jottings, 
while others are fairly systematic containing sustained 
arguments. Thus I shall henceforth refer to this set of 
notebooks and its contents by the same term Shaftesbury 
used— "exercises."
Most of the exercises are dated 1698, with additions 
dated mainly 1703-04, although a few originated during the 
second trip. Thus, for the most part, they predate his
l^This notebook has been published by Rand with total­
ly inadequate identification, however. It forms the portion 
of his Life . . . entitled Philosophical Regimen.
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published works and give us a clear indication of his 
thought in its formative stages. Happily, marginal notes 
indicate the source of many of the ideas Shaftesbury ex­
presses; the most frequent citations are to Marcus Aurel­
ius, Horace, and Epictetus, showing the predominant Stoic 
influence on this stage of his career. Unfortunately, 
he did not cite contemporary sources in the same manner; 
nonetheless, ideas from Descartes, Hobbes, and the Cam­
bridge Platonists can be discerned, showing that he was 
not solely concerned with the classics.
Cosmic toryism is a theme that runs throughout the 
exercises. It is a theme that is not fully developed in 
any single one, but its ubiquity demonstrates its seminal 
role in Shaftesbury's philosophy. The most explicit 
statements of it are found in the exercise entitled "Deity," 
which is the longest of the series. Here Shaftesbury 
tests several arguments for the existence of a deity: 
almost all involve or are predicated upon the principles 
of cosmic toryism.
The exercise opens with the assertion that all things 
in the world are united. As the branch is united with the 
tree, so is the tree with the earth, air, and water which 
feed it and with the flies, worms and insects which feed 
on it. "For these are made to it, and as much as the mold 
is fitted to the tree, as much as the strong and upright
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trunk of the oak or elm is fitted to the twining and cling­
ing branches of the vine or ivy, so much are the leaves, 
the seeds, the fruits of these trees fitted to other ani­
mals, and they, again, to one another. All hold to one 
s t o c k . "15 Now consider the system of the macrocosm and 
note the relation and mutual dependence of one thing on 
another, for instance, the earth and the planets on the 
sun. Here, too, there is "order, symmetry, regularity, 
union, and coherence of the whole."
From this postulation of unity, Shaftesbury con­
cludes that "as the plant or tree has a nature, the world 
or universe must have a nature," and asks the questions, 
"What sort of a nature should this be?" (Shaftesbury's 
italics) The universal nature is the deity; thus the 
question becomes, how can we comprehend the existence of 
the deity? To this question Shaftesbury provides several 
answers in the form of short arguments. The first is the 
most comprehensive; the later arguments are supplementary.
There are three types of nature in the world—  
vegetative, sensitive, and rational. The universal nature 
is surely not merely vegetative, as plants, nor sensitive.
l^This and all subsequent quotations from the exer­
cises are my transcriptions of PRO 27/10, which I have 
verified with Rand’s edition. Since all the materials in 
the remainder of this section come from PRO 27/10— which 
is not paginated— I will not give any further citations to 
this notebook, other than to identify the exercise being 
discussed in the text.
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as animals, nor imperfectly rational, as men. Should not
the universal nature
which exhibits reason in all that we see; 
which practices reason by a consummate art 
and prudence in the organization and struc­
ture of things; and (what is more) which 
produces principles of reason and raises up 
intelligences and perceptions of several de­
grees in the beings that are but of a mo­
ment's duration, that start out of it, as it 
were, and sink into it immediately; should 
not this sovereign nature of the whole be a 
principle itself of much greater understand­
ing and capacity than any else? Should not 
the most extensive sight or knowledge with 
which we are acquainted and the highest wis­
dom which we admire, be as nothing in com­
parison with that original one from whom all 
is derived? And should not that affection,^® 
which we see in all natures towards their 
offspring and productions, towards what is 
more remotely united to them, or what is 
strictly any part of themselves, be much 
inferior to that affection of the Supreme 
Nature towards all and to what is produced 
and administered, by it, as everything is?
And what is this in one word, but that God 
is; that He is one and simple, infinitely 
wise and perfectly good?
Thus God is a universal nature of a higher order than the
worldly natures, but nonetheless one that comprehends them.
Next it must be asked, what is the nature of the
Whole, that which is comprised of all that exists? It
cannot be merely a vegetative or sensitive nature, for
then it could not produce things with reason or intelli-
l^Affection is a technical term for Shaftesbury. He 
defines it in the exercise "Natural Affection" as feeling 
or love according to the design and will of nature. See 
below, pp. 64-67.
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gence. Therefore the nature of the universe is intelli­
gent. One philosopher^? agrees that there is intelligence 
in the nature of things, but the Whole is not united and 
thus there is not just one intelligence. But can this be?
Are not the small fibers of this root conspir­
ing together and united? They are; but, with 
what? With the plant; and the plant with what?
With the earth and other plants. And the earth 
and other plants with what? With air, water, 
animals, and other things around; the animals 
themselves with one another and the elements 
in which they live and to which they are fit­
ted, as either by wings for the air, by fins 
for the water, and other things of that kind.
In short, all these conspire together and so 
all other things, whatever they may be, in 
this world. And is it not the same with the 
world itself in respect of the sun and the 
planets?
It is clear, therefore, that all things cohere and conspire; 
all things are in one, the Whole, and are included in the 
nature of the universe. Since that nature must be able to 
produce intelligent things, it is itself intelligent, and 
therefore there is a universal intelligent and provident 
principle.
l?Perhaps Spinoza. I have been unable to determine 
whether or not Shaftesbury read Spinoza; it seems likely 
though that Bayle would have introduced him to the Jewish 
philosopher, if he had not already read him. Cryptic re­
ferences, such as this, throughout his writings seem to 
refer to Spinoza, although they may merely be references 
to early Stoics. The fact that no marginal note identifies 
the source, however, suggests that the person is contempor­
ary. John Robertson, in his edition of the Characteristics 
(London: 1900), I, pp. 240-303 passim, sees much similarity 
between An Inquiry and Spinoza's Ethics, but does nothing 
more than point to the similarity in his notes. He does 
not provide any evidence that Shaftesbury actually read 
him.
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But if it be denied that the universe is one or has
one nature, surely it will not be denied that a stalk of
grass has such a unitary nature. If the stalk of grass
does, then by the argument above, the whole earth has it
and so too the whole system of the world. Hence, either
this system is one whole and is united or ’'what is strange
to imagine" there is incoherence in the great Whole. If
the latter, either there are no other unified worlds or
they are independent. Now if there are independent worlds,
there must be intelligences and eternal principles which
make each of them united and whole. "But since it is
unreasonable and unaccountable thus to multiply principles,
as, for instance, to say that of the motion that is in
the world, there should not be one and the same principle
but several; so with respect to what is intelligent, it
must be unreasonable to think that there is any more than
18one common principle of intelligence." Thus it follows 
that there is one common principle of intelligence and 
wisdom— one eternal and infinite mind— which acts as the 
unifying principle of the universe.
Shaftesbury, then, varies the argument for order 
and specifically introduces the basic principle of cosmic
IBobviously this is an application of the Principle 
of Simplicity or Ockham's Razor. The analogy to motion is 
extremely apt, for one of the supreme arguments in favor 
of Newtonian mechanics was its adherence to the Principle 
of Simplicity.
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toryism, the goodness of the Whole. This time he begins 
by declaring that either what we see is order, proportion 
and harmony, or it is not. If neither the frame of the 
heavens nor the body of man demonstrate order, what else 
could order be? If what we see is order, how could dis­
order have produced it? Clearly it could not; hence, 
order must be a principle in things and be proper and 
natural to them. If it is natural to some things, then 
surely it is to all things; if to all things, then all 
things are united and have one nature. That nature, 
then, must be a nature more perfect than that of the 
particulars contained in it; if so, it is a wise and in­
telligent nature. Furthermore, it must order everything 
for its own good, and since that which is best for the 
universe is both the most wise and just, it follows that 
the supreme nature is perfectly wise and just.
"All things stand together or exist together by one 
necessity, one reason, one law: therefore there is one 
nature of all things, common to all. Nothing is out of 
the whole, nor nothing happens but according to the laws 
of the whole." Every particular nature, at all times, 
produces what is good for itself, "unless something for­
eign molest and hinder it, either by overpowering and 
corrupting it within, or by violence from without." In 
such a case the nature of the thing "strives to throw
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off the distemper.” "What are all weaknesses, distortions, 
sicknesses, imperfect births and seeming contradictions 
or crossnesses of nature, but merely this? And how ignor­
ant must one be of all natural operations who thinks that 
any of these things happen by a miscarriage of the parti­
cular nature, and not by the force of some foreign nature 
that overpowers it?" Therefore,
every nature is constantly and never-failingly 
true to itself, and certain to produce only 
what is good to itself and to its own right 
state. And if every particular nature do this, 
shall not the nature of the whole do it? or 
shall that alone miscarry and fail? or is 
there anything foreign that shall do violence 
to it, or force it out of its way? If not, 
then all that it produces is for its own good, 
the good of all in general; and that which is 
for the good of all in general is just and 
good. If so, rest satisfied, and not only 
rest satisfied, but be pleased and rejoiced 
with what happens, knowing from whence it 
comes and to what it contributes.
Shaftesbury here has not only specifically introduced 
the basic principle of cosmic toryism, but he also borders 
on violating it. He established the goodness of the Whole; 
he then had to account for deviations from that goodness. 
Using an analogy to inertia^® he argued that a foreign 
force overpowers the particular nature thereby causing it 
to deviate from its true course. But such foreign forces 
cannot be generalized, for if they are generalized and 
used to operate against the nature of the Whole, another
l^This analogy is used again in The Moralists.
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universal nature is introduced into the system, thereby 
destroying the unity of the Whole. Indeed, a system an­
alogous to Bayle's Manicheanism would be created, and, as 
we shall see, Shaftesbury strongly opposes such a system 
in The Moralists. This is not to say that Shaftesbury 
has gone so far as to create a system of two principles, 
but it is to point out how close he came to doing so and 
thus how easy it is to do so within the general framework 
of cosmic toryism.
His final argument for an intelligent universal
nature— deity— is basically the Cartesian argument for
the existence of God. We know that we, as human beings,
have a mind because we are conscious of it.^® But we can
be conscious of no other mind outside our own or, indeed,
that there is any-such thing as a mind besides our own.
If we believe that there is no other mind outside our
21own, we can go no further. If, however, we believe that 
a mind exists outside ourselves, what are the grounds for 
such a belief? "It must be this, or nothing: when there
is a consent and harmony of parts, a regular conduct for 
the good of the whole, a steady management suitable to 
one end and design." If there be an economy of the whole
20"Cogito ergo sum." "I think, therefore I am." 
Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1637.
^^It leads to the position of solipsism, the posi­
tion argued by Berkeley to show the limitations of Lockean 
epistemology.
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and a mind, would you expect to see it, as you do a man?—  
certainly not. What then will satisfy you of the existence 
of this mind?— the effects of such a mind: order, agree­
ment, unity, subserviency of inferior things to superior, 
all making them operate towards a general good. But is 
this not the way things are?— certainly. Then there must 
be a mind outside our own— a universal mind.
Shaftesbury has, to his satisfaction at least, demon­
strated the existence of an intelligent deity which provides 
for the unity and goodness of the world as a Whole. His 
deity is, by necessity, "present with all things, knows 
all things, and is provident over all," that is, it is 
omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent.
The cosmological discussion ends with a poetic, al­
most mystical, plea for man to understand his place in 
the cosmic tory scheme of things and with a similarly 
poetic recapitulation of the system. "Yesterday thou 
wert entertained with the contemplation of several natural 
things." You noted the wisdom and wonder of the order of 
the heavens, the completeness and perfection of man's 
anatomy. You praised the ability of Providence to do 
these wonderous things. "These were thy thoughts yester­
day. Today it is an earthquake . . .  a slight infection 
of the air which hurt some cattle, or which affected 
thyself." Today you reproach Providence. The world is
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all wrong, all is disorder, "But was not all this owned 
possible, and even natural, but yesterday?— It was.—  
Which is it, then, that is wrong and disordered? the 
world, or thyself?" Consider the heavens. See the de­
sign. "Think, in the midst of this ocean of being, what 
the earth and a little part of its surface is; and what 
a few animals are, which there have being." Embrace 
with your imagination those "spacious orbs" and place 
yourself in the midst of this divine architecture.
Consider other orders of being, other schemes, 
other designs, other executions, other faces 
of things, other respects, other proportions 
and harmony. Be deep in this imagination and 
feeling, so as to enter into what is done, so 
as to admire that grace and majesty of things 
so great and noble, and so as to accompany with 
thy mind that order, and those concurrent in­
terests of things glorious and immense. For 
here, surely, of anywhere, there is majesty, 
beauty, and glory. Bring thyself as oft as 
thou canst into this sense and apprehension; 
not like the children, admiring only what be­
longs to their play; but considering and ad­
miring what is chiefly beautiful, splendid and 
great in things. And now, in this disposition, 
and in this situation of mind, see if for a 
cut-finger, or what is all one, for the distemper 
and ails of a few animals thou canst accuse the 
universe.
The good of the Whole, then, is paramount: man must
understand his role in the Whole and accept minor dis­
orders. For if there be an order and economy for the 
good of the Whole, then nothing can happen to you but 
from that economy, which has provided the best that is 
possible for you. If you believe this, then you must
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love whatever happens to you from that economy. If you 
try to change the economy, you destroy, insofar as an 
individual can, that economy, which prevents the universe 
from being perpetually ill. "Nature has done her part. 
Nature has been kind in this and in that, in affording 
a passage out of life, in putting an end to misery. Na­
ture has provided. Nature has taken care."
Man needs to believe in the deity so that he will 
not oppose the design of the world. "If there be deity, 
there is no chance of contrary ill design. If all be 
from one wise and good design, then all is to one and the 
same end, and nothing is supernumerary or unnecessary."
Hence, if any one part be removed or perish, all perishes
22and disorder and confusion must take over. "If there
be a supreme reason of the whole, then everything happens
according to that reason." Violation of the reason of
the Whole causes it to perish.
Thus does it follow as a necessary consequence 
from the opinion of deity ^belief in deity/, 
that whatsoever happens in the world, or what­
ever is appointed to me in particular, should 
be kindly affected, esteemed and beloved by me, 
be it hardship, poverty, sickness, death. For 
what else should I choose, or what else esteem 
and love, but that which tends to the good and 
perfection of the whole in which I am included?
^^While Shaftesbury does not specifically mention it 
at this point, or indeed anywhere in this exercise, this 
argument is predicated on the notion of a chain of being 
and a full universe or a plenum. See Lovejoy.
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Now, if the whole be perfect, everything that 
happens in the whole is such.
Either the whole is perfect or imperfect. If 
it be an imperfect whole, how can there be a 
deity? If, therefore, it be a perfect whole, 
what is there in it besides what is just, equal, 
necessary, good? How can anything be altered, 
and not the whole be rendered imperfect? See, 
therefore, that neither on thy own, or any other 
account, thou desire ever to correct anything 
in the order of things. For, what is this but, 
as much as in thee lies, to destroy the per­
fection, happiness, and security of the whole, 
and consequently also thy own?
Man is an integral part of the system of the Whole: man
must understand that system and contribute to it according 
to the plan of the Whole.
Shaftesbury used the exercise "Deity" to set forth 
a cosmological system. In many ways it served as a pre­
lude to The Moralists, for there he adopted the same cos­
mological system and repeated many of the arguments. The 
system is the one which necessarily underlies cosmic 
toryism: the ideas that the whole is good and that ills
are only apparent and fairly well spelled out; the notion 
of the acceptance of the status quo is there, but not 
in its final form; and, of course, only philosophical 
ideas are discussed— the ethical and political conse­
quences are omitted. The incompleteness is totally justi­
fied, though, for Shaftesbury’s concern in this exercise 
is not to state cosmic toryism— indeed, he never gives a 
complete statement of it at any one time— but to show the
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necessity of a deity to account for the world as it is 
normally understood.
The problem that most concerns Shaftesbury in other 
exercises is one that must concern anyone adopting a 
cosmological system of the nature outlined in "Deity"—  
what is the relationship of the individual to the system 
of the Whole? Shaftesbury devotes several of the exer­
cises to finding the answer to this question. Perhaps 
the most systematic answer is found in "Natural Affec­
tion." Here he shows how the conscious individual re­
lates to the deity. He begins by defining the technical 
term "natural affection." "What is it to have natural 
affection? Not that which is only towards relations, 
but towards all mankind— to be truly a lover of men."
But is that all? No. "To have natural affection is to 
affect according to nature or the design and will of 
nature." Without the design and will of nature nothing 
can be said to affect naturally. Is it natural for a 
parent to love its offspring or for any creature to af­
fect its own kind? If this is natural, is it not simply 
that the preservation and support of a species is de­
signed by nature in this manner? "This therefore is the 
design and will of nature, that by the natural and good 
affection of creatures towards their own species the 
species should be preserved and be prosperous." Now
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either this design of nature is wise and good and it is
to man's good to follow it, or he must live by some other
rule. If there be another rule, let us see how men live
without natural affection.
Which are the happiest, or in the best state, 
those that live orderly and obey these affec­
tions, or those that are hardened against na­
ture and have all of this kind unnatural and 
in disorder? Of this there has been enough 
said e l s e w h e r e , 23 Nor is anything more evi­
dently demonstrable than this, that the only 
means and rule of happiness (even amongst 
these other creatures, as far as they are 
capable of happiness) is to follow nature, 
and whether knowingly or unknowingly, to act 
in pursuance of this design, and under the 
power of such affections as these.
Hence natural affection— living according to the will or 
design of nature— leads to happiness.
So much for ordinary creatures and man using only 
common reason; but what of the man who comprehends the 
Whole— what it is, how it is governed, that it is wise 
and good— for such a man is in a higher degree rational.
In this instance, what has been called natural affection 
and what has been shown of the order of nature shows 
that "it is from an all-powerful, wise and perfect design," 
It follows that, besides the relation to a species— that 
is, natural affection for the species— "there is a fur­
ther relation which every creature has, viz., to the
22presumably a reference to Hobbes and his descrip­
tion of the state of nature.
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whole of things as administered by that supreme will or 
law which regulates all things according to the highest 
good." Hence a creature who is in that higher degree 
rational, who considers the good of the Whole, and who 
considers himself regulated by the Whole, must feel him­
self under an obligation to the interest and good of the 
Whole superseding the interest of his species. Thus a 
superior affection exists. "Now if it has been made the 
good and happiness even of unknowing and irrational 
creatures to follow that private and inferior affection 
which is only towards a species and part of the whole, 
how can it be but much more the good of every knowing and 
rational creature to live according to that affection which 
is the highest and most perfect?" Natural affection is 
the reward of every creature for it preserves the creatures 
in its most perfect state; a "right and deserving affection” 
towards nature and the Whole likewise generates the happi­
ness and good of a rational creature.
What, then, is this right and deserving affection? 
Ordinary natural affection causes man to sacrifice himself 
in any necessary manner if a father, friends, or country 
be in danger.
If there be a supreme parent, a common father 
of men and all other beings, and if all things 
happen according to the will of this first par­
ent, it follows that everything is to be kindly 
and well accepted; no murmuring, no complaining.
If all things in the universe are for the good
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of one another, all united and conspiring to 
one end, all alike subject to one wise and 
perfect rule, all alike produced from one 
original and fountain: it follows that I
must in a certain manner be reconciled to 
all things, love all things, and absolutely 
hate or abhor nothing whatsoever that has 
being in the world. If the universe be as 
one city, and the laws of that city perfect 
and just, it follows that whatsoever happens, 
according to the laws of that city, must be 
accepted and esteemed. And since there is 
nothing but what is according to those laws, 
there is nothing that happens but what I ought 
highly to applaud, and to accompany with my 
mind and sincerest affection. And if I do 
otherwise I am impious, unjust, unnatural, 
ungrateful, an apostate from reason, and 
vicious in a higher order and degree.
The natural affection of a rational creature is, then, the 
apotheosis of cosmic toryism. It is the understanding of 
nature, of the good and of the Whole. It is learning how 
"to submit"^^ all lesser affections to the rule and gov­
ernment of the Whole, how to accompany that supreme and 
perfect mind and reason of the universe. "This is to live 
according to Nature, to follow Nature, and to own and obey 
Deity." It is, again, "to affect according to nature or 
the design and will of nature."
The cosmic tory system requires not just a united 
and a good universe; it requires that rational beings—  
men— accept that universe and order their lives according 
to it. Nature has a will and a design. Man lives in a
'^^ A phrase later used by Addison and Pope in defining 
the relationship of man to their cosmic tory systems.
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determinist system to the extent that his happiness is 
achieved by submitting to the system. This is not to 
say that man does not have free will, for he does indeed 
have free will. He can choose between submitting to the 
government of the Whole or not; if he does not he will 
be unhappy, for he will either not understand or accept 
natural goodness and hence will be subject to the apparent 
ills of the world. This will lead him to be angry, bit­
ter, and discontented. On the other hand, if he chooses 
to submit to the government of the Whole, he will under­
stand that all things work towards the good of the Whole 
and "this only can afford us happiness and content; bestow 
peace, serenity, calm; make us to live in friendship with 
men and with due acknowledgement and reverence and piety 
towards God."
In an exercise composed during his second stay in 
Rotterdam, 1703-04, Shaftesbury continues the discussion 
of man's free will in conjunction with natural affection. 
The exercise "Providence" raises the important question, 
why cannot an individual know before he has acted the con­
sequences of his actions taken in accordance with divine 
will? "Nothing can be wiser than that order of Providence: 
that the same things it has placed out of our power it 
should also have placed out of our knowledge." If we knew 
the consequences beforehand we might not be willing to
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act according to natural affection. By not knowing before­
hand, "I cease not to act still and affect according to 
nature." "And thus I affect both according to nature and 
with nature. According to nature, as willing the good 
of my relations, and country, primarily, chiefly, and as 
most eligible; but not absolutely e . , according to 
the lesser degree of natural affection?. With nature, as 
yielding to Providence, and accompanying Providence when 
its will is declared /i.e., according to the higher degree 
of natural affection?." Such is the harmony between an 
individual and Providence when the individual knows wherein 
Providence has placed his good and ill. He knows that it 
is in his own power to choose the things that are his good. 
He knows that he cannot blame Providence if he chooses 
wrongly.
Again, only one thing is impossible for an individual
to affect— that is his real ill, for Providence has made
it impossible for him to do so. That is. Providence has
made it an impossible case that there should be anything
in the whole course of nature to oppose the individual's
good. "There is not, and cannot be, any such thing in
Providence; for what is really my good. Providence has
placed within my power to obtain; what ill, to avoid."
Providence has given me means to know both it 
and myself, and to be conscious for what and 
to what I was born. If I use these I am a man, 
and as such Providence will use me. If I use
70
them not I am a mere animal (let my shape be 
ever so much of a man), and as an animal Provi­
dence will use me, even as we men use other 
animals, making them willingly or unwillingly 
serve our purposes.
Knowledge of and harmony with the deity makes an individual 
a full man: he must use his reason to understand the na­
ture of things. Having done this, man achieves natural 
affection, which enables him to operate in conjunction 
with the will and design of nature and of the Whole. By 
doing so, he chooses his own good— that is, his good coin­
cides with the good of the Whole. The good is clearly 
more than immediate pleasure. Immediate pleasure, as 
Shaftesbury indicates e l s e w h e r e , i s  ephemeral. True 
good, the good that appeals to the rational man, is this 
harmony with Providence. Hence, man has free will to 
choose or not to choose the rational course: once the
choice is made, he loses his free will, for now he either 
voluntarily acts in harmony with Providence or his actions 
are at the pleasure of Providence.
In the exercise entitled "Nature" Shaftesbury de­
fends nature's design of man and shows the absurdity of 
wanting to change it. From this analysis he indicates 
man's role in the immediate world, which will ultimately 
lead to cosmic toryism in ethics and politics. "Nature"
25gee above, pp. 60-63 and below, pp. 73-79 .
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opens by noting that other creatures have strength and 
hardiness denied to man and asks why they have been denied. 
"Say as well, why not wings for man?" If man had wings, 
what changes in his physique would have to be made? Look 
at a bird; is not its whole structure fashioned for the 
end of flying? Is it not in a manner all wings? How 
else could it perform such a motion if all other parts 
were not subordinated to the wings? If man were enabled 
to fly "must not the other members and parts be starved 
to feed these new ones?" Must not man's feet and hands 
be starved? "And how, pray, as to the brain? Must not 
the brain also starve?" See how it is even now with man: 
does not the mathematician or other student who thinks 
intensely starve the body and parts for the benefit of 
the brain? On the other hand, does not the wrestler, 
rider, or dancer starve the brain for the benefit of the 
body? "If the balance be so just and even here, if so 
nicely held by nature that the least thing breaks it, in 
creatures of the same frame and order, what would it be to 
change the order quite, and make some essential alteration 
in the frame?— What would it be indeed but monstrous? for 
what else is a monster?" Therefore it would be better 
for a person desirous of a strong constitution to ask not 
'Why was I not made as strong as a horse?' but 'Why was I 
not made a horse?' The design of man, then, is of a unit;
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one part cannot be exaggerated without loss to another 
part. But is not the design of nature the same?— cer­
tainly .
Such is the admirable distribution of nature, 
its adapting and adjusting not only of the 
stuff of matter to the shape and form, and of 
the shape and form to the circumstance, place, 
element, region; but also of the affections, 
appetites, sensations, instincts, passions, 
mutually to each other as well as to the mat­
ter, form, action, and all besides. All man­
aged for the best: with perfect frugality, 
and just reserve;^® with perfect liberality too 
and utmost bounty.
Just reserve may be seen in all creatures, for there 
is nothing superfluous in their structures. Again, note 
the birds: their structure is wholly designed for flight.
Thought and reason are primary in man, hence, his brain 
dominates and his other organs are subordinate. But do 
not beasts have instincts, which man does not have?—
True. "And can anything more commend the order of nature 
than this very thing? Is not this according to that ad­
mirable economy, that wise, equal, and just reserve, which 
we have spoken of just now?" The females of beasts know 
instinctively how to care for their young without the need 
of lessons. But why do not humans have this instinct?
For they have sagacity of another kind— reason and dis­
course— which teaches them these things. To be sure a 
human infant is the most helpless and weak of creatures.
^^The last phrases were adopted by Pope in his An 
Essay on Man,
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but it is for a purpose. "Does not this refer man yet 
more strongly to society, and force him to own that he 
is purposely and not by accident made rational and soci­
able, and cannot otherwise increase or subsist but in and 
by society?" Man, in short, is a social animal; this is 
the role he is fitted for by his brain. It is the part 
nature has destined him to play in the Whole. Hence it 
is absurd to try to change man, to try to emphasize those 
parts that must be subordinated to the brain. Man must 
exist in society to survive: this his brain fits him to
do.
Another exercise, "The End," continues the theme of 
man as a social animal and illustrates for the first time 
Shaftesbury's determined opposition to Hobbes. Either 
man is made with design or without design. If without, 
then there is no end either in the whole or in any part 
of man; the muscles, the eyes, the heart are without pur­
pose or end. But surely this is false. If, then, the 
parts have an end, there must be an end for man as a whole. 
Sight, taste, hearing are not the ultimate end but are 
means to a further end. So if the pleasure of sight or 
tastes is not the end, then pleasure in general is not 
the end.
What is it, then, that we call the end? To 
eat, drink, sleep, copulate, and the pleasures 
which belong either to eating, drinking, sleep­
ing, or copulating are all of them only means.
74
and refer to something further. If we can 
find nothing beyond, then all that we can say 
is, that the end of man is only to be in such 
a certain sound and perfect state of body; and 
such as serves to generate similiar bodies.
But if besides what has been mentioned, there 
are any certain dispositions of mind such as 
plainly refer to a species and society, and 
to the enjoyment of converse, mutual alliance, 
and friendship, then it is the end of man's 
society. Therefore to be such as to serve to 
that end of society (which is to be good or
virtuous) is that to which everything in man
is lastly referred, and which is properly his 
end. And where his end or perfection is, there 
certainly must be his good.
The end or design of nature for man is society. What are 
his natural affections towards children, relations, friends, 
and country but manifestations of that end? "The perfec­
tion of human nature is in that which fits and accomodates 
to society, for he who wants those natural affections 
which tend thither, is imperfect and monstrous." If, 
however, the end of man— society— be not also his good, 
then his private good is to go contrary to nature, so that 
his end in nature and his end in himself are entirely
contrary. In that case, it must be in his good to extin­
guish his natural affections, which would lead him to 
society. But if he extinguishes his natural affections, 
he will become "savage, unnatural, horrid and inhuman."
Thus,
if it be a detestable and miserable state to 
be wholly unnatural and void of humanity and 
humane affection, then is it the good of man 
to be socially inclined and affected; if so, 
it is his greater good still to act by a more
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clear and perfect affection of that kind; 
if so, then that affection which is wholly 
towards virtue is that in which he finds 
his greatest good ; if so, that it is his end, 
and not anything else is his end but to af­
fect as is natural to him and as becomes him; 
to will and incline as the nature of man re­
quires; in short, to follow nature, or the 
order and appointment of supreme reason in 
his particular constitution and make.
In other words, man's end, as seen so often before, is to 
live according to nature.
Shaftesbury has said that natural man must operate 
in society according to natural affections, that is the 
love of his relations, friends, country, and, more impor­
tantly, the deity who has ordered nature in such a wise 
and good manner. Man, then, is good and virtuous: at
least, rational man is, for he has considered his place 
in nature and has accepted it. One cannot speak of the 
"state of nature" when discussing Shaftesbury, for his 
natural or rational man lives in the here-and-now world; 
the whole thrust of Shaftesbury's philosophy is to enable 
man to understand and to cope with the immediate world. 
Hobbes, of course, argued that man in the state of nature 
was vile and miserable and that government brought order 
to his life and made it bearable. Shaftesbury opposes 
the whole concept of a "state of nature." Man, who is 
rational and whose end is society, can be vile and miser­
able only if he rejects what nature (the deity) has of­
fered him. He does not have to impose government on him-
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self: nature has already provided it. In short, the
status quo is the best. Cosmic toryism has been trans­
ferred from the macrocosm to the microcosm.
A glimpse of how Shaftesbury used cosmic toryism 
as a foundation for aesthetic theory is provided by the 
exercise "Good and 111." Here Shaftesbury opens with the 
question: whose judgment determines what is good? Indi­
vidual judgments vary widely: one man affects the hero
and says the battlefield is the only good, another values 
wealth, another aims at popularity, another cites poetry 
and fashionable literature. All go different ways. If 
it is asked whether riches are themselves good, disagree­
ment arises. So it must be concluded that they are of
themselves neither good nor can they be made good. The 
same conclusion is reached if fame and pleasure are asked 
about.
In the meantime I both see and know certainly, 
that the necessary effect or consequence of 
loving and esteeming these things highly, and
as essentially good, is to be envious, to repine
and long, to be often disappointed and grieved, 
to be bitter, anxious, malignant, suspicious, 
and jealous of men, and fearful of events (all 
which is misery); and that on the other side 
the effect of despising these is liberty, gener­
osity, magnanimity, self-approbation, conscious­
ness of worth. And are not these really good, 
but uncertainly so, as the other? A generous 
affection, an exercise of friendship uninter­
rupted, a constant kindness and benignity of 
disposition, a constant complacency, constant 
security, tranquility, equanimity: are not
these ever and at all times good?
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"Whatsoever is good must be alike good to all; whatsoever 
is ill alike ill to all." Are fame, honor, power, riches 
good? They are not necessary to all men's contentment, for 
I do not require them. Thus they cannot be good. Are 
pain, death, poverty, obscurity ill? These are not ills 
for everyone, for a sportsman enjoys those things that 
cannot be accomplished without difficulty and pain. A 
hermit lives in poverty and obscurity. Thus they are not 
ill.
The good of life must be found either in the sensa­
tions of the body, or in the affections of the soul, or in 
the action of the mind in thought and contemplation, or in a 
mixture of these things. If it be in sexuality alone, then 
the brutes have the most complete and perfect good. If it 
be in soul and mind subservient to the senses, the brutes 
again are supreme, for the soul and mind are slighted in 
favor of the senses. If it be in soul and mind with the 
senses and body subservient, how subservient must the body 
be? It must be completely so for the highest degree of 
good "is the enjoyment of a soul and mind freed from the 
incitements, commotions, and disorders of sense." Now 
if the highest good is that of the soul and mind, "what 
are the thoughts thy mind contemplates with delight? and 
what are the thoughts it loves to be entertained with?"
Find out in what subject resides "the chiefest excellence
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and beauty," for it is here that the mind's delights will 
be found. Look at the immediate world: is it of the
first degree of beauty, or is it of a lesser degree? Are 
the parts less perfect than the whole? Consider painting 
and architecture: is beauty in every single stroke or
stone? If so, is not the beauty of the whole lost because 
the eye is confined to the beauty of the parts? Hence,
"go to the first object. Go to the source, origin, and 
principle of excellence and beauty Æ h e  Whole?. See 
where the perfect beauty is, for where it is, there alone 
can be perfect enjoyment, there alone the highest good."
Thus in searching for the good, that which everyone 
can agree is good, Shaftesbury again turns to the Whole.
The Whole through its harmony, unity, and completeness is 
beautiful. Hence beauty is the highest good. This, of 
course, is Platonic and it foreshadows his later aesthetic 
work.
Finally, the exercise "Philosophy" needs be consid­
ered for Shaftesbury's definition of philosophy clarifies 
the tenor of his works and the rationale of his cosmic 
toryism. It is necessary that man should examine his ideas. 
Which ideas? The ideas of space, extension, solidity? But 
what is it to him, as an individual, whether there is a 
vacuum or a plenitude? Whether matter be divisible ad 
infinitum or not divisible? He may be the best versed
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man in the world in these ideas, but what does their ex­
amination do for him if he has not tranquillity? To solve 
the true phenomena is important— not the phenomena of the 
skies, not those of mathematics and mechanics, for their 
solution does not make one better, happier, wiser, or of 
a more open, free understanding.
"Either that which I call philosophy is so from the 
subtlety and niceness of the speculation (and then mathe­
matics, physics, and all of that kind is philosophy), or 
from its being superior and judge of all the others, as 
that which teaches happiness and gives the rule of life."
As has been seen already, happiness does not consist in 
outward things— wealth, preferment, and so on— but in the 
mind. The work of philosophy, then, is "to correct and 
amend those opinions which we commonly have of outward 
things;" it should fortify the mind against avarice, 
ambition, intemperance; it should show the mind how to 
cure disquiet, restlessness, anxiety and how to find that 
which will satisfy and content us. "Here therefore lies 
philosophy." It is to reason about what is good and what 
is ill; it is to reason concerning happiness.
Shaftesbury's definition of philosophy would be un­
likely to satisfy a Newton or a Descartes, but it is cer­
tainly one that provides a unifying thread for his writings. 
It is consistent with the philosophical schools that his
80
ideas draw together. It is consistent with his reputa­
tion as an ethical philosopher. And, finally, it is 
consistent with his task as a cosmic tory philosopher—  
to vindicate the perfection of the universe and the 
social order and to indicate how one should live in this 
world.
I have reviewed several of the exercises in Shaftes­
bury's longest and perhaps most significant notebook. I 
have not, by any means, covered all the exercises included 
in it; what I have tried to do is choose a representative 
selection from those dealing specifically with cosmic 
toryism. The majority of those omitted are concerned with 
more specifically ethical topics: most, however, are also
directly or indirectly predicated on cosmic toryism, but 
they do not contain such explicit statements of the prin­
ciples involved. Those chosen are also the most syste­
matic of the exercises, but even in some of them Shaftes­
bury failed to maintain the systematic approach. The ex­
ercise "Deity" is a good example; the last quarter of it 
trails off into a random and rhapsodic praise of deity; dis­
cussion of the principles of cosmic toryism is left behind. 
None of the other notebooks contain discussions such as 
these, although one^? contains extracts from the exercise 
"Deity." The major items of importance from the other
27pRO 27/12
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notebooks in the first group are the booklists and read­
ing notes. These will be used when I discuss the specific 
origins of Shaftesbury's thought.^8
The notebook "Exercises" has shown how Shaftesbury 
conceived cosmic toryism and how the concept pervades his 
thinking; it is clear that cosmic toryism is the founda­
tion on which Shaftesbury built his philosophical princi­
ples. The exercises in the notebooks explicitly state, 
or at least touch upon, all aspects of cosmic toryism.
But the exercises were private. If Shaftesbury's ideas 
were to have any influence, they had to be published.
Thus the Characteristics.
ii
Shaftesbury's reputation as a thinker and as a 
writer is based solely on the Characteristics of Men, Man­
ners, Opinions, Times. Through the Characteristics he 
established a new school of ethical theory, the moral 
sense school; he contributed to the establishment of the 
Enlightenment, principally through his cosmic toryism; 
and he was considered to be one of the most important 
prose stylists of the age— a judgment from which the twen­
tieth century would generally dissent. As noted in Chap-
28gee below. Chapter IV.
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ter I, the Characteristics is a collection of essays, 
most of which had been published previously. The essays, 
at first glance, seem to have little in common other than 
being popularized philosophy. Yet the notion which 
Shaftesbury called true enthusiasm runs through the whole 
of the Characteristics. Proper or true enthusiasm is the 
ardent admiration for and understanding of nature and its
OQ
"supreme governor." Shaftesbury’s aim is to show how 
true enthusiasm can be attained by reason— the only means 
of attaining it. In the Letter concerning Enthusiasm and 
its sequel. An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, 
Shaftesbury set out to expose false enthusiasm, that of 
religious fanatics, and to offer ridicule as an antidote 
to it. In the two more formally philosophical essays. An 
Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit and The Moralists, he 
set down the philosophical bases and consequences of true 
enthusiasm. These essays indicate clearly that true en­
thusiasm is founded on cosmic toryism. In the essay Advice 
to an Author and in the Miscellaneous Reflections Shaftes­
bury continues and supports his arguments for the supremacy 
of reason. Thus the Characteristics actually is of a piece,
^^Nowhere in the Characteristics does Shaftesbury 
give a concise definition of true enthusiasm. He himself 
cites An Inquiry, bk i, part iii, sec. 3 end; Moralists, 
part iii, sec. 2; and Miscellaneous Reflections, Misc. ii, 
ch. i as the principal discussions of the idea. Character­
istics , I, p. 54n.
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Of the treatises forming the Characteristics, The
Moralists is the most important for a study of cosmic
toryism. It contains as complete a statement of its
principles as can be found in Shaftesbury's works. Among
contemporary writers only Leibniz in his Theodicy states
similar ideas in a fuller and more systematic manner.
One reason for this is that the intended audience of
Shaftesbury differed from that of Leibniz. Shaftesbury
was writing for the educated upper classes, particularly
30the governing class: Leibniz was writing primarily
for an academic and philosophical audience. The very 
structure of The Moralists affirms Shaftesbury's intention- 
it is a dialogue. He felt that the ancient's use of dia­
logue in poetry and philosophy was the best means of con­
veying ideas, for the dialogue acted as a mirror allowing 
the reader not only to be informed of other's ideas, but
also to see his own in relation to the others— that is,
31a process of "Self-Inspection." Dialogue, however, was 
unfashionable. The age demanded quick and easy answers; 
the age was superficial and consequently "dogmatical in 
Philosophy."32 Nonetheless, Shaftesbury chose to emulate
30see above. Chapter I, pp. 35-39. Shaftesbury's 
covering letter to Lord Somers accompanying the first 
edition of The Moralists clearly delineates the intended 
audience.
31çhar., I, pp. 194-96.
3%Char. , I I ,  p. 190.
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the ancients since they combined philosophy and politics 
and thus provided the model for men of public affairs 
which he desired to illustrate to his age. The use of 
dialogue, then, is more than a stylistic device to at­
tract readers; it serves to resurrect the spirit and 
virtue of the ancients.
Philosophy has been reduced, bemoans Philocles— the 
sceptical interlocutor— to a study immured in colleges 
and cells. No longer is she active in the world; no 
longer does she produce statesmen or indeed even receive 
any recognition from them. Yet "if Morals be allow'd be­
longing to her. Politicks must undeniably be hers."33 
If the "Manners and Constitutions" of men in society are 
to be understood, then it is first necessary to study man 
"in particular" and to know him as he is. Man has been 
studied in his relation to society quite often previously, 
specifically how he comes to join this or that society 
(i.e., how a contract was formed among men). But consid­
eration of man as a "Citizen or Commoner of the World," 
to "view his End and Constitution in Nature itself" is 
considered "over-refin'd Speculation."34 if^ however, 
man in particular is to be understood, such a study of 
him must be made. This is the task of The Moralists.
33jbid., pp. 184-85, 
34lbid., p. 185.
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To anyone familiar with the manuscript notebook, 
"Exercises," one of the most striking things about The 
Moralists is its dependence on that notebook. The liter­
ary aspects of The Moralists are original, that is, they 
generally do not come from the "Exercises." But a sig­
nificant proportion of the philosophical content of The 
Moralists comes directly from the "Exercises." The only 
important difference between the two is that, whereas the 
"Exercises" is primarily Stoic in its orientation, The 
Moralists is openly and clearly Platonic.
Drawing heavily on the exercises "Deity," "Natural 
Affection," "Nature," "Good and 111," and "Philosophy" 
Shaftesbury set forth a cosmic tory system exactly as he 
did in the notebooks. Due to the stylistic device of the 
dialogue, however, he did not lay out the system in the 
progressive order that I followed in my discussion of the 
"Exercises." That is, he not only used a different starting 
point, but he also employed digressions to fill in several 
aspects of the system. Nonetheless, all the necessary 
ingredients are included, and the whole work stands as an 
impressive manifesto of cosmic toryism.
0 WRETCHED State of Mankind! Hapless Nature,
thus to have err’d in thy chief Workmanship!---
 Whence sprang this fatal Weakness? What
Chance or Destiny shall we accuse? Or shall we 
mind the Poets, when they sing thy Tragedy 
(PROMETHEUS!) who with thy stoln celestial Fire,
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mix’d with the vile Clay, didst mock Heaven’s 
Countenance, and in abusive Likeness of the 
Immortals mad’st the compound MAN; that wretched 
Mortal, ill to himself. Cause of 111 to all. 35
With this ’’Rant” Palemon— who has requested that the con­
versation be recounted so that he might correct his mis­
taken understanding of man's nature— raises the problem. 
Why is man ill and why should he communicate his ill to 
the rest of the world? Philocles quickly denies that 
man alone is ill; pleasure and pain, beauty and deform­
ity are everywhere interwoven. Thus they "fell naturally 
into cool Reasoning about the Nature and Cause of ILL in 
general: ’Thro’ what Contingency, what Chance ; by what
fatal Necessity, what Will, or what Permission it came 
upon the World; or being come once, shou'd still sub­
sist . "36
Palemon insists on using a Promethean figure to 
account for ill against all Philocles’s objections, but 
is finally persuaded that such a "hazardous Affair" as 
the creation could not have been undertaken by "those who 
had not perfect Foresight." Hence the creators^? were 
aware of what the consequences of their work would be.
36ibid., pp. 199-200.
3?At this point in the dialogue, Shaftesbury care­
fully refrains from referring to a single deity and speaks 
of multiple creators. Only when he gets down to serious 
discussion does he limit himself to a single creator or 
deity. This is in keeping with his reliance at this stage 
on Greek mythology for his material.
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Even so, they knew that they could not omit them if the
Whole was to be for the best.
’Twas better still that the Project shou'd 
be executed, whatever might become of Mankind, 
or how hard soever such a Creation was like to 
fall on the generality of this miserable Race.
For 'twas impossible, you ^alemo£7 thought, 
that Heaven shou'd have acted otherwise than 
for the best. So that even from this Misery 
and ILL of Man, there was undoubtedly some 
GOOD arising; something which overbalanc'd all, 
and made full a m e n d s . 38
This conclusion, which it might be noted is based on the 
Platonic argument for the goodness of the w o r l d , l e d  
Philocles to give a summary account of the cosmic tory 
system, and that in turn led him to recount in detail 
the conversation he had with Theocles— a true enthusiast- 
which convinced him of the veracity of the system.
The main conversation— that between Theocles and 
Philocles— revolves about the question, what is good?
It begins by noting that the common notion of good is 
pleasure; but the problem of "What sort" is quickly 
raised. Examples similar to, but not exactly the same 
as, those in "Good and 111" are cited to show that dif­
ferent people have different concepts of what is good. 
Finally it is agreed that only some pleasures are good,
38char., II, pp. 203-04.
39l will discuss the Platonic elements in detail 
later in this section.
88
and a type of pleasure usually ignored is put forward 
as a possible good— pleasures of the mind. But even these 
are seen to be not necessarily good. At this point 
Philocles interrupts to assert that one thing can be 
taken as definite— that pain is ill. But this too, as 
in "Good and 111," quickly becomes a questionable asser­
tion. Thus, if pleasure is not good and pain not ill, 
what is good?40
Theocles undertakes to describe to Philocles "the 
nature of this which I call GOOD;" but he will not do it 
directly, rather he will attempt to lead Philocles to it 
by showing him "something of it" in himself. "Tell me, 
my Friend! if ever you were weary of doing good to those 
you lov'd? Say when you ever found it unpleasing to serve 
a Friend? Or whether when you first prov'd this generous 
Pleasure, you did not feel it less than at this present; 
after so long E x p e r i e n c e ? " ^ !  Friendship is the basis of 
true good; but is it limited just to individual friend­
ship? "CAN any Friendship . . . be so heroick, as that 
towards Mankind?"— No. "Publick" friendship, then, is 
of a higher order than "private f r i e n d s h i p . ^2 Philocles
40çhar., II, pp. 226-37.
41lbid., p. 238.
42ibid., pp. 238-39. The terms "Private" and "Pub­
lick" are used in marginal headings added by Shaftesbury
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demurs from the notion that friendship, particularly to 
mankind, can be the basis of good. But just as Theocles 
begins to carry the idea further the conversation is in­
terrupted and he promises to continue the topic the next 
day.
Public and private friendship are clearly the same
as the natural affection discussed in the exercise of that 
43
name. Thus far, Shaftesbury has only broached the topic 
and thus the distinction between natural affection among 
species and that for the Deity cannot be made. Indeed it 
is necessary to introduce the notion of Deity first: this
is the purpose of the interruption, for a second lengthy 
conversation ensues which is used to establish the exist­
ence of a Deity,
The secondary c o n v e r s a t i o n ^ ^  begins with a defense 
of a treatise. An Inquiry concerning Virtue, which had
when he prepared the 1705 edition of The Moralists for the 
1709 edition, A printed copy of the 1705 edition with 
longhand corrections and additions, dated 22 July 1707, is 
item PRO 26/4 in the Shaftesbury Archive,
4^in The Moralists, Shaftesbury, for reasons I can 
only guess at, avoids the term "natural affection," The 
ideas that he presents are the same as those in the exer­
cise but different terminology is used. Perhaps, he felt 
that "friendship" would be an easier concept for his read­
ers to grasp than "natural affection," It must never be 
forgotten that he was writing for a mass audience and hence 
his philosophy is invariably presented with as little 
technical jargon as possible,
44çhar,, II, Part II, Sections II-V.
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given offense when published The defense serves to 
raise the question of how the existence of a Deity can 
be d e m o n s t r a t e d . 46 "A Providence must be prov'd from 
what we see of Order in things p r e s e n t . "47 Look at the 
structure of plant and animal bodies. Every part and 
organ has its "Uses, Ends, and Advantages." The order 
and exactness of these is evident. "STRANGE! That there 
shou'd be in Nature the Idea of an Order and Perfection, 
which NATURE her-self wants !" "Nothing surely is more 
strongly imprinted on our Minds, or more closely inter­
woven with our Souls, than the Idea or Sense of Order and 
Proportion." Thus, "whatever Things have Order, the same 
have Unity of Design, and concur in one, are Parts con­
stituent of one WHOLE, or are, in themselves, intire 
Systems."48 Now if the various systems of the universe 
are not united into one systèmes then there is no coher-
45This section, Part II, Section III, of The Moral­
ists is the strongest evidence that the fourth Earl's ac- 
count of the early publication of An Inquiry is mistaken. 
See Chapter I, pp. 10-11.
46Because Shaftesbury simply reiterates the funda­
mental arguments of An Inquiry, rather than presenting any 
significantly new material, it will not be necessary to 
discuss this defense. The basic arguments will be noted 
when I discuss An Inquiry itself.
47char., II, p. 277.
48ibid., pp. 284-85.
49At this point Shaftesbury cites Locke, Cicero,
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ence, order, or design in the Whole. But if there is
apparent unity, then there is actual unity.
Here then is our main Subject, insisted on:
That neither Man, nor any other Animal, tho 
ever so compleat a System of Parts, as to 
all within, can be allow'd in the same man­
ner compleat as to all without ; but must be 
consider'd as having a further relation a- 
broad to the System of his Kind. So even 
this System of his Kind to the Animal-System; 
this to the World (our Earth) ; and this a- 
gain to the bigger World, and to the U n i v e r s e .50
Thus, "All things in this World are united."
Theocles then delineates the interrelationship—
much as it was done in the exercise "Deity”— of the things
in the world. As the branch is united with the tree, so
the tree is with the earth, air, and water which feed it.
As much as the fertile Mould is fitted to 
the Tree, as much as the strong and upright 
Trunk of the Oak or Elm is fitted to the 
twining Branches of the Vine or Ivy ; so much 
are the very Leaves, the Seeds, and Fruits 
of these Trees fitted to the various Animals :
These again to one another, and to the Ele­
ments where they live, and to which they are, 
as Appendices, in a manner fitted and join’d; 
as either by Wings for the Air, Fins for the 
Water, Feet for the Earth, and by other cor­
respondent inward Parts of a more curious 
Frame and Texture. Thus in contemplating 
all on Earth, we must of necessity view All 
in One, as holding to one common Stock.51
Seneca, and Lucan for support of the notion of a unified 
system of the world. The citation is notable because it 
is the only direct citation of Locke in the Characteristics,
SOChar., II, p. 286.
5 1 l b i d . , p. 287.
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There is, then, not just a unity of the world, but also 
an interdependence of everything in the world on everything 
else. There is a chain of being. It connects the lowest 
beings with animals, men, and the system of the bigger 
world. Thus there is "Order, Union, and Coherence of 
the Whole !"
Still in this "mighty UNION" the relations of some 
parts to others are not easily discovered. The ends or 
uses of some things are not fully clear. "There is no 
wonder; since ’tis no more indeed than what must happen 
of necessity; Nor cou'd supreme Wisdom have otherwise 
order’d it." That is, the appearance of ill is necessary, 
for a mind, such as man’s, which cannot see infinitely, 
cannot comprehend everything. Thus, even though every 
particular has a relation to all in general, that rela­
tion cannot be perfectly and fully known by man.
"Now having recogniz’d this uniform consistent 
Fabrick, and own’d the Universal System, we must of con­
sequence acknowledge a Universal MIND."5% No rational 
man can reject it except through imagining disorder in 
the universe. Could anyone, in some remote desert, hear 
a perfect symphony or see a stunning piece of architec­
ture and believe that no design, no active mind created 
it? "Wou’d he, because he saw no Hand, deny the Handy-
5 2 l b i d . , p. 290.
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Work?" Would he believe it to have happened solely by 
accident? Thus if a universal system is accepted— and 
most men of the day would have done so— then a universal 
mind, a Deity, must also be accepted.
The conversation then moves on to the topic of man's 
place in the universal system; most of the material here 
comes directly from the exercise "Nature." Philocles 
asks, why has nature given creatures hardiness and vigor
which she has denied to man? Theocles replies, why not
ask why man does not have wings? And he describes the 
changes that would be necessary in the anatomy of man if 
he were to have w i n g s . ^3 Once again the answer is pre­
dicated on the conservatism and strictness of the order 
of nature, that is, on the chain of being concept.
Such then . . .  is the admirable Distribution 
of NATURE, her adapting and adjusting not only 
the Stuff or Matter to the Shape and Form, and 
even the Shape it-self and Form to the Circum­
stance , Place, Element or Region ; but also the
Affections, Appetites, Sensations, mutually to 
each other, as well as to the Matter, Form,
Action, and all besides: 'All manag'd for the
best, with perfect Frugality and just Reserve : 
profuse to none, but bountiful to all; never 
employing in one thing more than enough; but 
with exact OEconomy retrenching the superfluous, 
and adding Force to what is principal in every 
thing.'54
53see above, pp. 70-72.
54çhar., II, p. 306. The quotation within the quo­
tation is simply Philocles— who is recounting the conver­
sation— quoting Theocles.
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Philocles is willing to accept this answer, until the 
uniqueness of man’s thought and reason is asserted. He 
then objects that beasts have instincts which man lacks. 
But surely, Theocles replies, this is good, for it 
forces man to use his facilities and to enter into soci­
ety. Man is, by nature, a social a n i m a l . ^5 Thus man 
needs to "submit to the Elements of NATURE:" he needs 
to accept his role in the universal system.
After this lengthy interruption Shaftesbury returns 
once again to the main conversation— that of Theocles and 
Philocles on the question of good. Theocles is now pre­
sented as a thorough-going Platonist and thus most of his 
arguments are Platonic in origin. It is also now that 
the "Rhapsody" promised in the title appears: Theocles
voices ecstatic paeans to nature. Indeed, the opening 
lines of the renewed conversation combine both:
0 GLORIOUS Nature ! supremely Fair, and sov­
ereignly Good ! All-loving and All-lovely, 
All-divine! Whose Looks are so becoming, and 
of such infinite Grace; whose Study brings 
such Wisdom, and whose Contemplation such De­
light; whose every single Work affords an 
ampler Scene, and is a nobler Spectacle than
all which ever Art presented 0 mighty
Nature ! Wise Substitute of Providence ! im- 
power'd Creatress ! Or Thou impowering DEITY, 
supreme Creator! Thee I invoke, and Thee alone 
adore. To thee this Solitude, this Place, these 
Rural Meditations are sacred; whilst thus in­
spir'd with Harmony of Thought, tho unconfin'd
55see above, pp. 73 -75 .
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by Words, and in loose Numbers, I sing of Na­
ture's Order in created Beings, celebrate the 
Beautys which resolve in Thee, the Source and 
Principle of all Beauty and Perfection.
Nature is said to be the "Wise Substitute of Providence :" 
that is, Nature is the sensible image of the eternal 
"Maker" or D e m i u r g e . T h e  "DEITY"— Demiurge—  is the 
source of all order, beauty and perfection. Again, these 
characteristics of the original Form— Deity—  are trans­
mitted or transferred to Nature, the sensible image, in 
the process of creation. The remainder of the conversa­
tion is used to expound and detail these assertions.
Theocles continues by demonstrating that there is 
unity in the individual "Self." Indeed the "Self" or
56char., II, p. 345.
5?F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The "Timaeus"
of Plato translated with a running commentary (London:
1937), pp. 33-5. Cornford correctly points out that Plato's 
Demiurge cannot legitimately be equated with the Judeo- 
Christian concept of God, Shaftesbury, of course, has 
done just that. This, however, is not at all surprising 
for modern (i,e., post-Renaissance) Platonism has consis­
tently made this error. In the context of Shaftesbury's 
thought this is undoubtedly a minor point, but it does in­
dicate that his Platonism is not pure. To confirm his 
position Cornford cites a passage from Galen, which fur­
ther illustrates how a cosmic tory could use Plato, albeit 
corrupt Plato, to support his cosmology; "the doctrine of 
Moses differed from that of Plato and of all the Greeks 
who have correctly approached the study of Nature, For 
Moses, God has only to will to bring matter into order, 
and matter is ordered immediately. We do not think in 
that way; we say that certain things are impossible by 
nature and these God does not even attempt; he only 
chooses the best among the things that come about," (p,
36)
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"Personality" of an individual is what is constant and 
unites the components of the body. "Is there then such 
a uniting Principle in NATURE? If so, how are you then 
a Self, and Nature not so? How have you something to 
understand and act for you, and NATURE, who gave this 
Understanding, nothing at all to understand for her, ad­
vise her, or help her out (poor Being!) on any occasion, 
whatever Necessity she may be in?"^^ Is there nothing 
which administers all? A contemporary hypothesis, the 
mechanical philosophy of Descartes and his successors, 
says there is not. From eternity there has been only mat­
ter in motion, with thought scattered only here and there. 
No, said the ancient atomists, for only by chance has 
matter fallen out into its present state: no intelli­
gence guided it. "For my own share (thank Providence) I 
have a MIND in my possession, which serves, such as it is, 
to keep my Body and its Affections, my Passions, Appe­
tites, Imaginations, Fancys, and the rest, in tolerable 
Harmony and Order. But the Order of the UNIVERSE, I am 
persuaded still, is much the better of the two. Theo­
cles concludes that he is convinced of his own being.
That 'tis a real Self, drawn out, and copy'd
from another principal and original SELF (the
58Çhar., II, p. 357. 
59lbid., pp. 357-58.
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Great-one of the World). I endeavour to be 
really one with it, and conformable to it, as 
far as I am able. I consider, That as there 
is one general Mass, one Body of the Whole; 
so to this Body there is an Order, to this 
Order a MIND: That to this general MIND each
particular-one must have relation ; as being 
of like Substance, (as much as we can under­
stand of Substance) alike active upon Body, 
original to Motion and Order; alike simple, 
uncompounded, individual; of like Energy, Ef­
fect, and Operation; and more like still, if 
it co-operates with it to general Good, and 
strives to will according to the best of Wills.
So that it cannot surely but seem natural, that 
the particular MIND shou'd seek its Happiness 
in conformity with the general-one, and en­
deavour to resemble it in its highest Simpli­
city and Excellence.60
In arguing for a "Self" Theocles has established 
what would ordinarily be called a "soul." His argument 
is exactly that used by Plato in the Timaeus, except he 
has reversed it. Plato established the world-soul— the 
soul of Nature— first and had it transmitted to individ­
uals.®^ Theocles argued for the existence of the indi­
vidual soul and concluded from it that there must be a 
universal soul, and that the individual soul was "copy'd" 
from the world-soul. Again, Plato is called upon to 
demonstrate the unity of the world, this time through 
the likeness of the individual soul and the world-soul.
It is worth noting that the discussion of "Self" 
or soul was added by Shaftesbury when he revised the 1705
60 Ibid., pp. 358-59
G^Timaeus, 3GB.
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edition in July 1707. Indeed, many, but not all, of the 
Platonic arguments were added in the process of revision, 
indicating that Shaftesbury's full awareness of Plato 
came fairly late in his career, after his periods of pro­
longed study. This is fully confirmed by the date in­
cluded in his reading notes on Plato: "S^ G. 1706/7
Thus we are seeing a major new element in 
Shaftesbury's thought, which quickly discounts the notion 
that Shaftesbury obtained his Platonism from the Cam­
bridge Platonists.63
Theocles has now obtained a united and intelligent 
world. But still all is good and this is contrary to ap­
pearances. The argument, founded on the inertial analogy, 
that all particular natures constantly strive for their 
good and are deflected from it only by outside forces is 
repeated by T h e o c l e s . ^4 Philocles fails to accept this 
as an adequate proof that ill is only apparent and de­
mands a demonstration, which Theocles immediately pro­
vides .
TAKE Demonstration then, said he ^heocles7, 
if you /Philocles/ can endure I shou’d reason
62pRO 27/13.
G^E.g.; Aldridge, "Deist Manifesto," p. 322. I 
will discuss this point further in Chapter IV.
64çhar., II, pp. 359-60. Shaftesbury here repeats 
verbatim the argument given in "Deity." See above, pp. 
58-59.
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thus abstractedly and drily. The Appearances 
of ILL, you say, are not necessarily that ILL 
they represent to you.
I own i t .
THEREFORE, what they represent may possibly 
be GOOD.
It may.
AND therefore there may possibly be no real 
ILL in things : but all may be perfectly con­
current to one interest; the Interest of that 
Universal ONE.
It may be so.
WHY, then, if it may be so, (be not surprized)
’It follows that it must be so;' on the account 
of that great Unit, and simple Self-principle, 
which you have granted in the WHOLE. For what­
ever is possible in the Whole, the Nature or 
Mind of the Whole will put in execution for 
the Whole's Good: And if it be possible to
exclude ILL, it will exclude it. Therefore 
since notwithstanding the Appearances, 'tis 
possible that ILL may actually be excluded; 
count upon it, 'That actually it is excluded.
Theocles has used the Principle of Sufficient Reason to
demonstrate the proposition, that is, the principle that
nothing is without r e a s o n . 66 The reason, of course, is
65çhar., II, p. 364.
6®Lovejoy, p. 175. Lovejoy devotes a chapter of 
his book to the use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
by Leibniz and Spinoza (Chapter V).
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the will of the creator— the Deity. The Deity desires 
to exclude ill for the good of the Whole; hence all ill 
is excluded.G7
The Principle of Sufficient Reason was fairly 
widely used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
most notably by Leibniz and Spinoza. As Lovejoy makes 
clear, it is ultimately based on the Platonic conception 
of the creation of the world and was used by Leibniz and 
Spinoza to explain why everything that exists does exist.G& 
It was for both of them a supplement to the principle of 
plenitude— the notion of a full universe— which is neces­
sary for a chain of being. It is interesting to note, 
however, that while Shaftesbury accepted the concept of 
plenitude, as will be seen shortly, his use of the Prin­
ciple of Sufficient Reason here leads him to a conclusion 
markedly different from Leibniz’s optimism. Shaftesbury 
uses the Principle to deny the existence of any ill in 
the world. Leibniz, more in tune with Plato, argues 
only that this is the best of possible worlds; ill ex-
®^Shaftesbury's exclusion of ill here seems to me 
to contradict his earlier statements— above p. 86-7. There 
he said the creators could not avoid creating ill, which 
is wholly consistent with Plato. Here he says the Deity 
can, if he desires and he does, exclude ill. This latter 
conclusion is consistent with his belief that ill is only 
apparent in the world: he asserts this proposition re­
peatedly in the "Exercises" and in An Inquiry. Thus I take 
this second argument to be his personal choice.
68Lovejoy, pp. 144-182 passim.
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ists; indeed it cannot be avoided, but it is minimal.®®
Using the principle again, Theocles attacks, almost 
in the same breath, Bayle’s Manicheanism. Nothing merely 
passive can oppose the "universally active Principle" of 
the good. If an active principle opposes it, it is an­
other principle.
'Tis impossible. For were there in Nature 
Two or more Principles, either they must agree, 
or not. If they agree not, all must be Confu­
sion, till one be predominant. If they agree, 
there must be some natural Reason for their 
Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot be 
from Chance, but from some particular Design, 
Contrivance, or Thought : which brings us up
again to ONE Principle, and makes the other 
two to be subordinate.'®
With this Shaftesbury removes all doubt that his iner­
tial analogy can lead to a system of two principles— a 
doubt which arose in the exercise " D e i t y . T h e r e  is 
and can be only one governing principle in the world—  
the principle of the good. Or to put it another way, 
the world is united and is governed by a good Deity for 
the good of the Whole.
It is useless to hope to understand the Whole 
through the senses, for all that they suggest may be de-
®®In this regard it should be pointed out that 
Shaftesbury seldom speaks of "possible" worlds; indeed 
he does so only once— in An Inquiry— that I am aware of 
Generally he speaks of this "best of worlds."
70char., II, p. 365.
71see above, pp. 58 -59 .
102
ceitful.72 Reason alone enables us to be conscious of 
that "original and eternally existent THOUGHT, whence 
we derive our own. And thus the Assurance we have of the 
Existence of Beings above our Sense, and of THEE, (the 
great Exemplar of thy Works) comes from Thee, the ALL- 
TRUE, and Perfect, who hast thus communicated thy-self 
more immediately to us, so as in some manner to inhabit 
within our Souls; Thou who art Original SOUL, diffusive, 
vital in all, inspiriting the Whole. Again, Theocles 
repeats the Platonic conception of the creation as a 
prelude to a discursive exposition of the fullness of 
the universe. He begins by detailing the "System of the 
bigger World," moving on to the inhabitants of the earth, 
noting how various creatures and plants are suited es­
pecially to their environment, and the complexity and 
completeness of their being. He is describing the pleni­
tude of nature, and he appropriately ends by saying that 
we are incapable of declaring "the Use or Service" of 
all things in the universe. Yet we are "assur’d of the 
Perfection of all, and of the Justice of that OEconomy, 
to which all things are subservient, and in respect of
72This may be a statement of Shaftesbury's opposi­
tion to Locke’s epistemology, but it is too brief to be 
certain. Similar statements, however, are made in An 
Inquiry. Char., II, p. 369.
73çhar . ,  I I ,  pp. 369-70.
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which, Things seemingly deform'd are amiable; Disorder
becomes regular, Corruption Wholesom; and Poisons (such
as these we have seen) prove healing and beneficial.
We may not understand the Whole, but reason assures us
that it is good.
At this point, cosmological discussion ends and
the conversation turns to establishing beauty as the
true good. By this point Philocles has succumbed to the
beauties of nature, as seen in its plenitude. But why,
he asks, are not more people enamored of natural beauty?
Many appear to be, but they are normally called enthusiasts
and are denigrated. No wonder, replies Theocles, for it
is easy to pursue the shadow for the substance.
For if we may trust to what our Reasoning has 
taught us; whatever in Nature is beautiful or 
charming, is only the faint Shadow of that 
First Beauty. So that every real LOVE depend­
ing on the Mind, and being only the Contem­
plation of Beauty, either as it really is in 
itself, or as it appears imperfectly in the 
Objects which strike the Sense ; how can the 
rational Mind rest here, or be satisfy'd with 
the absurd Enjoyment which reaches the Sense
alone?75
We, then, who are rational must not seek enjoyment through 
the senses; we must seek enjoyment in those objects which 
are "truly Fair, Generous, or Good." "So that BEAUTY,
74ibid., pp. 388-89, 
75ibid., p. 395.
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said I, and GOOD, with you, THEOCLES, I perceive are
still one and the same."
'TIS SO, said he. And thus we are return'd 
again to the Subject of our Yesterday's Morn- 
ing-Conversation. Whether I have made good 
my Promise to you, in showing the true Good,
I know not. But so, doubtless, I shou'd have 
done with good success, had I been able in my 
poetick Extasys, or by any other Efforts, to 
have led you into some deep View of Nature, 
and the Sovereign GENIUS. We then had prov'd 
the Force of Divine BEAUTY; and form'd in our­
selves an Object capable and worthy of real 
Enjoyment.Vb
Philocles agrees that he has been convinced and now sees 
"that all sound Love and Admiration is E N T H U S I A S M . H e ,  
too, has now become an enthusiast. Thus we have true en­
thusiasm; the love and admiration of "Divine BEAUTY."
The two interlocutors, to strengthen Philocles's 
conversion, proceed to discuss beauty, the "Chief Science." 
They search for the subject in which "BEAUTY reigns: 
where 'tis intire, perfect, absolute." Is it to be found 
in the metal or stone of the sculpture? No. Is it, 
then, in the art? Certainly. "The Art then is the Beauty. 
Right. And the Art is that which beautifies. The Same.
So that the Beautifying, not the Beautify'd, is the
76lbid., p. 399-400; see above, p. 89 where the 
original conversation broke off.
77 Ib id .  , p. 400.
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really Beautiful. It seems so. For that which is beau­
tify 'd, is beautiful only by the accession of something 
beautifying: and by the recess or withdrawing of the
same, it ceases to be b e a u t i f u l ? " ? ^  Thus, "the Beautiful, 
the Fair, the Comely, were never in the Matter, but in the 
Art and Design ; never in Body it-self, but in the Form or 
forming Power. B e a u t y ,  then, is a form— a Platonic 
Form, What is ultimately sought is the "first Order of 
Beauty"— that which is the source of all beauty. It is 
that which has the power to fashion even minds themselves ; 
in other words, the first order of beauty is "Divine 
BEAUTY." It is wholly equivalent to the Good and thus to 
the Deity. Once again, we find beauty leading us to the 
unity and goodness of the world. Indeed, they are one and 
the same.
But why discuss beauty at such length? Because 
beauty— the first order of beauty— is something that the 
mind and reason of man can enjoy. "Here lies his Dignity 
and highest Interest: Here his Capacity toward Good and
Happiness. His Ability or Incompetency, his Power of En­
joyment, or his Impotence, is founded in this alone. As 
this is sound, fair, noble, worthy ; so are its Subjects, 
Acts and Employments."80 The enjoyment of beauty is man's
78lbid., p p .  4 0 3 - 4 .
79lbid., p. 4 0 5 .  80ibid., p. 4 2 5 .
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happiness. And the search for happiness is the defini­
tion of philosophy.81
In The Moralists Shaftesbury undertook to study the
relation of man to "his End and Constitution in Nature."
He did this to establish a foundation for a moral or vir­
tuous society, for if man properly understands and accepts 
his place in nature, he will "know himself" and act proper­
ly in this world. Acting properly in this world entails 
affection for mankind; that is, he will love mankind and
all his action will be directed to obtaining or enhancing
what is best for mankind and, thus, his own private hap­
piness .
A more detailed study of man's social responsibil­
ities occurs in An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit, 
which was written a few years before The M o r a l i s t s .82 
The Moralists, however, is the logical predecessor of
BlSee above, pp. 78-80. The final pages of The 
Moralists are devoted to repeating this definition of 
philosophy. Char., II, pp. 438-42.
82precisely when it was written is not known, but it 
was sometime before 1699, when Toland published it. It 
did not appear in print again until 1711 when it was in­
cluded in the Characteristics. I am using the final ver­
sion— that in the Characteristics— exclusively, since the 
differences between the two versions are mainly stylistic. 
Aldridge, however, does point out that a short addition to 
the 1711 version indicates Shaftesbury had become aware of 
philosophic idealism in the intervening years: he attri­
butes this to Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge 
(1710), but ignores or is ignorant of the evidence of 
Shaftesbury’s knowledge of Plato. I suspect— since Al-
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An Inquiry, for the latter treatise adopts the cosmic 
tory system as a postulate and proceeds to work out the 
details of a moral or virtuous society. It was Shaftes­
bury's only effort at purely formal, systematic philoso­
phy and is a closely-woven essay proceeding with strictly 
logical order, allowing no diversions or extraneous ma­
terial. It is necessary for the present exposition of 
Shaftesbury’s cosmic toryism to see how he used cosmic 
toryism in An Inquiry as the basis of virtue, but it will 
not be necessary to discuss the details of the ethical 
system thus derived.
An Inquiry begins by stating its purpose; to in­
quire into what virtue is, in what manner it is influenced 
by religion, and whether it is possible for an atheist to 
be virtuous.83 To answer these questions the ’’Original" 
of all possible opinions concerning Deity or religion 
must be sought; it is here that Shaftesbury postulates 
the basic premises of a cosmic tory system.
In the Whole of Things (or in the Universe) 
either all is according to a good Order, and
dridge never indicates that he studied the Shaftesbury 
papers— that it is a case of ignorance of the evidence. 
Philosophic idealism, however, does not play any con- 
spicious role in An Inquiry. See Aldridge, "Two Ver­
sions . . . , ’’ p. 2l2.
83çhar., II, p. 7. I will deal in part with all 
three questions. The third one is the one that created 
controversy and is the one Shaftesbury defended in The 
Moralists.
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the most agreeable to a general Interest: or 
there is that which is otherwise, and might 
possibly have been better constituted, more 
wisely contriv'd, and with more advantage to 
the general Interest of Beings, or of the 
Whole.
If every thing which exists be according to 
a good Order, and for the best; then of ne­
cessity there is no such thing as real ILL 
in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to 
the Whole.84
The universe is either constituted according to a good 
order, or there might be a better possible world. If 
there is a good order, then there is no real ill, for 
ill implies a better possible order. Thus if there is 
no better possible order, then all is perfectly good. 
"WHATSOEVER is really ILL" must be caused either by de­
sign or chance. If it is caused by design, then there is 
no one good designing principle (Deity). The designing 
principle is either corrupt or there are at least two 
such principles. If ill is caused by chance, then there 
is no universal designing principle at all.®^ All pos­
sible opinions concerning Deity— and there are four— are 
derived from one or more of these positions. "To believe 
. . . that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated 
for the best, by a designing Principle, or Mind, neces-
84çhar., II, p. 9. 
85%bid., pp. 9-10.
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sarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect T H E I 8 T . " 8 6
To believe that there is no designing principle, that
there is only chance, is to be a perfect Atheist. To
believe in no single designing principle but in two or
more is to be a Polytheist. And to believe that the
governing mind or minds are not absolutely and necessarily
good, but capable of acting according to mere fancy or
87will is to be a Daemonist. Thus a believer in what 
Shaftesbury will argue is the true position of religion, 
that is to be a theist, necessitates acceptance of the 
cosmic tory scheme of things as the defining character­
istics of the Deity.
With the preliminary definitions established, Shaftes­
bury turns to the problem of determining exactly what vir­
tue is: after that he will analyze virtue in terms of
each of the possible religious opinions. As will quickly 
become evident, virtue is founded on the notion of natural 
affection— the idea that we have already seen him use in 
both the "Exercises" and The Moralists to indicate the 
individual's role in the system of the Whole.
While it is impossible to understand the reason and 




many of the reasons or ends of many things.&& "We know 
that every Creature has a private Good and Interest of 
his own; which Nature has compel'd him to seek, by all 
the Advantages afforded him, within the compass of his 
Make. . . . There being therefore in every Creature a 
certain Interest or Good; there must be also a certain 
END, to which every thing in his Constitution must na­
turally refer."89 If the creature’s appetites or passions 
lead him in a direction contrary to his end, then it is 
ill to him and it will also be ill to others of his kind. 
Thus what is good and useful to himself is the same to 
others. "And thus Virtue and Interest may be found . . . 
to agree."90
That there is a system of all animals, an order or 
economy, in which all animal affairs are regulated, can 
be readily seen by considering the interrelationships of 
the various species. If that system is extended to include 
the vegetable world, and then again to include all other 
things in this "inferior World," it can be concluded that 
there is one system of the earth. If the system of the
®®Note that this is exactly the same conclusion as 
was drawn in The Moralists after the plenitude of nature 
was established. See above, pp. 101-103.
BGchar., II, p. 15.
9 0 i b i d . ,  p. 16.
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earth in turn is related to extra-terrestrial objects, 
then there must be a greater system, a system of the 
universe from which all things can be deduced. If there 
be such a universal system, "there can be no particular 
Being or System which is not either good or ill in that 
general one of the Universe." "THEREFORE if any Being 
be wholly and really ILL, it must be ill with respect to 
the Universal System; and then the System of the Universe 
is ill, or imperfect." But if the ill of one particular 
system be the good of the others, then that ill is no 
real ill in itself. "So that we cannot say of any Being, 
that it is wholly and absolutely ill, unless we can posi­
tively shew and ascertain, that what we call ILL is no 
where GOOD besides, in any other System, or with respect 
to any other Order or OEconomy whatsoever."®^
Thus if there be any entire species destructive to 
all others, it may correctly be called an ill species; 
if in any species one individual is pernicious to the 
rest, he is justly called ill. However, if a man has 
plague-spots or is subject to convulsive fits, he is not 
justly called an ill man, for he is not wholly ill to the 
system of the Whole. Thus in sensible creatures "that 
which is not done thro' any Affection at all, makes 
neither Good nor 111 in the nature of that Creature."
9 1 lb id . , pp. 19-20,
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Accidental distempers are not due to affections, which 
operate only in relation to a system. Again, the man 
with plague-spots does not affect them, and hence is not 
ill with regard to the system of the Whole. Thus, the
creature is "suppos'd Good, when the Good or 111 of the
System to which he has relation, is the immediate Object 
of some Passion or Affection moving in him. In other 
words, a creature is good if he affects the good of the 
system, and ill if he affects the ill of the system.
Hence we must examine "which are the good and natural,
and which the ill and unnnatural Affections" to discover
virtue.
Affections are of two kinds, those toward private
good or self-interest and those towards public interest
or good. If an affection toward private good contributes
in any measure to public good, it is a good affection.
If, however, an affection towards private good harms the
public interest, it is an ill or unnatural affection.
WHEN in general, all the Affections or Pas­
sions are suited to the publick Good, or 
good of the Species, as above-mentioned; then 
is the natural Temper intirely good. If, on 
the contrary, any requisite Passion be wanting; 
or if there be any one supernumerary, or weak, 
or any-wise disserviceable, or contrary to 
that main End; then is the natural Temper, and 
consequently the Creature himself, in some mea­
sure corrupt and ill.93
92 Ibid., p. 21.
G ^ Ib id ., pp. 2 6 -7 .
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Goodness is attainable by all sensible creatures; 
"VIRTUE or MERIT" "is allow’d to Man only." A rational 
creature capable of forming general notions of things, 
affects not only the objects of the senses, but also 
emotions such as pity, kindness, and gratitude which are 
objects of the mind through reflection. "So that, by 
means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind 
of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, 
which have already been felt, and are now become the 
Subject of a new Liking or D i s l i k e . M a n  has affec­
tions of a higher order than those of the sensible crea­
tures .
THUS the several Motions, Inclinations,
Passions, Dispositions, and consequent Car­
riage and Behaviour of Creatures in the var­
ious Parts of Life, being in several Views 
or Perspectives represented to the Mind, 
which readily discerns the Good and 111 to­
wards the Species or Publick; there arises 
a new Trial or Exercise of the Heart; which 
must either rightly and soundly affect what 
is just and right, and disaffect what is con­
trary; or, corruptly affect what is ill, and 
disaffect what is worthy and good.
AND in this Case alone it is we call any 
Creature worthy or virtuous, when it can 
have the Notion of a publick Interest, and 
can attain the Speculation or Science of 
what is morally good or ill, admirable or 
blameable, right or wrong.95
94ibid., p. 28. 
95jbid., pp. 30-1.
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Thus virtue depends on a knowledge of right and wrong and 
on the use of reason. Reason must be used to ensure that 
the affections are properly or correctly applied. Virtue 
is the rational use of the affections for the good of the 
public interest. This, as has been seen before, is the 
natural affection of mankind.
The question, can this principle of virtue be elim­
inated or made ineffectual, is raised; the answer turns on 
the various opinions of Deity. The definition of virtue 
is again repeated: "THE Nature of VIRTUE consists (as has
been explain’d) in a certain just Disposition, or propor­
tionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the 
moral Objects of Right and W r o n g ."96 First, then, can 
this principle of virtue be eliminated?— only if the na­
tural sense of right and wrong is taken away.
IT will not surely be understood, that by 
this is meant the taking away the Notion of 
what is good o£ ill in the Species, or So­
ciety . For of the Reality of such a Good 
and 111, no rational Creature can possibly 
be insensible. Every one discerns and owns 
a publick Interest, and is conscious of what 
affects his Fellowship or Community.9?
That is, natural affection, which is innate, provides a
rational creature, man, with his notion of right and
wrong. Thus the "SENSE of Right and Wrong therefore
96lb id . , p. 40 .
9 ? Ib id . ,  p. 41.
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being as natural to us as natural Affection itself, and 
being a first Principle in our Constitution and Make; 
there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion, or Belief, 
which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or
Q Q
destroy it,' Not even atheism, which does not acknow­
ledge a designing principle, can destroy this innate 
"moral Sense"^^— the natural sense of right and wrong.
Can the moral sense be made ineffectual? It can, 
if the belief or conception of a Deity is of a certain 
kind. Men may yield obedience to a Deity in two ways: 
"It must be either in the way of his POWER, as presup­
posing some Disadvantage or Benefit to accrue from him: 
or in the way of his EXCELLENCY and WORTH, as thinking 
it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and resemble 
him."100 If the first case holds and a creature does 
good or is restrained from doing ill only through fear 
of punishment or hope of reward, then there is no virtue 
or goodness whatever, because no affection is allowed to 
operate. The moral sense is overridden: reason is not
O^Ibid., p. 44.
O^shaftesbury did not actually use the term "moral 
sense" in the text until two pages later (p. 46), but he 
used it in the marginal headings (pp. 40 and 42) to refer 
to the natural sense of right and wrong. It is clear that 
he intended the first part of the quotation to be a defin­
ition of the term— indeed it is the only definition of it 
that he gives in An Inquiry.
lO O c h ar., I I ,  p. 54.
116
given a chance to operate.101 But if the second case 
holds and the Deity is admired and revered for his worth 
and goodness, is understood to have the highest excel­
lence of nature, making him amiable to all, then he serves 
as an example "to raise and increase the Affection towards 
Virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other Affections
to that alone."102
NOR is this Good effected by Example merely.
For where the Theistical Belief is intire and 
perfect, there must be a steddy Opinion of the 
Superintendency of a Supreme Being, a Witness 
and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of 
whatsoever is felt or acted in the Universe;
So that in the perfectest Recess, or deepest 
Solitude, there must be One still presum'd 
remaining with us; whose Presence singly must 
be of more moment than that of the most august 
Assembly on Earth. In such a Presence, 'tis 
evident, that as the Shame of guilty Actions 
must be the greatest of any; so must the Hon­
our be, or well-doing, even under the unjust 
Censure of a World. And in this Case, 'tis 
very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism 
must be to Virtue, and how great Defficiency 
there is in Atheism.103
Perfect theism aids the moral sense, for the Deity encour­
ages by example and by its own affection for the world, 
natural affection in man.
lOljbid., pp. 55-6. 
102ibid., p. 56.
103 Ibid., II, p. 57. I might add at this point that 
the other opinions of Deity, Polytheism and Daemonism, are 
never used by Shaftesbury in the discussion even though he 
promised to do so. They merely served to make his defini­
tions logically complete.
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One more example of the advantages of perfect Theism
to virtue may be cited: all men are subject to misfortune
and calamities. Atheists, of course, argue that it all
happens by chance and hence nothing can be done. But a
perfect theist understands "That whatever the Order of
the World produces, is in the main both just and good."
Therefore in the Course of Things in this 
World, whatever Hardship of Events may seem 
to force from any rational Creature a hard 
Censure of his private Condition or Lot ; he 
may by Reflection nevertheless come to have 
Patience, and to acquiesce in it. Nor is 
this all. He may go further still in this 
Reconciliation; and from the same Principle 
may make the Lot itself an Object of his 
good Affection; whilst he strives to maintain 
this general Fealty, and stands so well-dis- 
pos’d towards the Laws and Government of his
highest C o u n t r y . 104
Virtue increases when man understands and accepts his role 
in Nature, for he has natural affection not just for man­
kind but also and more importantly for Nature itself and 
the governor of Nature, Deity. Virtue, then, is at its 
highest when man accepts the cosmic tory system.
In his rather discursive manner Shaftesbury, in 
The Moralists and An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit,105
104ibid., p. 74.
lOSj^one of the other treatises in the Characteristics 
add any new material to the picture of cosmic toryism drawn 
in these treatises, and thus I will not discuss them here. 
They do, however, show that they, too, are based on the same 
principles, thus further substantiating the ubiquity of 
Shaftesbury’s cosmic toryism.
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set forth a thorough statement and vindication of cosmic 
toryism. He also indicated its use to men of the world; 
it is the foundation of virtue and, as such, can and should 
be practiced by the governing classes.
The universe is a unitary system; the multitude of 
secondary systems that we can analyze leads us inevitably 
to the unity of the Whole. The unity and order of the 
Whole in turn indicate an intelligent governor and design­
er, Deity. The Deity’s goodness is evident from the order 
and harmony of his creation. Hence the Whole is good.
All ill is merely apparent, for our finite minds cannot 
comprehend the purpose of everything within the Whole.
That is, the ends or purposes of all things are for the 
good of the Whole, but we are incapable of seeing this 
and hence some things appear ill to us. All creatures 
have natural affection for their species. Man alone has 
a natural affection greater than that for mankind, na­
tural affection for the Deity. This affection for Deity 
enables man to submit to the Whole and to accept his 
place in the Whole. Thus man, who understands the unity 
and order of the Whole, the goodness of the Deity, accepts 
the status quo, including whatever ill comes his way.
Man’s natural affection for mankind makes him a so­
cial animal. It also leads him to practice virtue, that 
is, a rational adherence to the public good. A virtuous
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man will attempt at all times to make his actions conform 
to the good of the Whole, for in it lies his happiness. 
Politicians, too, should be virtuous. They should study 
philosophy so that they can understand man's role in na­
ture and by working for the good of the Whole, can con­
tribute to the general happiness of society.
It is this extension of cosmic toryism, with its 
inherent acceptance of the existing social order, to the 
political realm that distinguishes Shaftesbury's beliefs 
from similar contemporary systems. Therefore I want to 
turn now to a more detailed discussion of Shaftesbury's 
political beliefs and their relation to cosmic toryism.
CHAPTER III 
COSMIC TORYISM AND POLITICS
Although his active political career was extremely 
short, Shaftesbury’s political stance is often character­
ized by such phrases as Rubini’s ’’extreme whig" or "the 
rabid whig."^ It is undeniable that he was a Whig: his
reverence for his grandfather assured that.^ Yet that 
very reverence makes Rubini’s simplistic characteriza­
tion doubtful, for the vagaries of the Whigs from the 
Revolution to the rise of Walpole indicate that Whiggery 
was not clear-cut. Shaftesbury adhered to the basic 
principles utilized by his grandfather, but these were 
generally outside the drift of post-Revolution Whiggism. 
Indeed they bear a marked likeness to the developing 
Toryism of Bolingbroke and his circle. In this chapter 
I wish to analyze Shaftesbury’s political views in an 
effort to show that they follow from his cosmic toryism
^Dennis Rubini, Court and Country, 1688-1702 (Lon­
don: 1967), pp. 237 and 2'05 res pec t i v'ely.
^E.g., Letter to Peter King, January 1704/5, PRO 
22/4 and Rand, pp. 325-6.
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and that they, thus, do not conform to any facile con­
cept of Whiggism.3
Considerable controversy surrounds the discussion 
of political parties in this period. Robert Walcott 
argues that the period is one of confused politics be­
cause the two-party system was absent.^ Both J. H.
Plumb^ and Geoffrey Holmes® argue for the existence of 
a two-party system, although they acknowledge many di­
visions within each of the parties. All agree, however, 
that there was a court-country division and that this 
split, whether within or without parties, was a major 
factor in the politics of the day. The country element 
was largely one of opposition: it opposed the consolida­
tion of central government with its consequent patronage.
The suggestion that there might be a relation be­
tween Shaftesbury's cosmic toryism and his politics was 
made to me in conversation by John Dunn of King's College, 
Cambridge. I found the suggestion most intriguing and 
began to look for evidence of it in my reading, I quickly 
decided that it was indeed there and that by seeing the 
Characteristics as a political work, it makes much greater 
sense and is a much more unified work than any other way 
of reading it would indicate.
^Robert Walcott, English Politics in the Early 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 1956), p. 160.
®J. H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in 
England, 1675-1725 (London; 1967), pp"I 134-35.
®Geoffrey Holmes, British Politics in the Age of 
Anne (London: 1967), p." 6'.
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inefficiency, and corruption— real or imagined.? Its 
members were mainly back-bench gentry, who for the most 
part played little role in the actual government of the 
kingdom. The court element, on the other hand, readily 
accepted office and generally worked to strengthen the 
monarchy and its authority. Members of both factions 
have been classified with party labels: thus one can
speak of court Whigs, country Whigs, court Tories, and 
country Tories. Our principal concern will be with the 
country Whigs and Tories.
Among the more important members of the country 
Whig group were the "commonwealthraen. A circle formed 
around Robert Molesworth including John Toland, Walter 
Moyle, William Molyneux, John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, 
and Matthew Tindal. These men, with the exception of
?Rubini, pp. 23-25; J. G. A. Pocock, "Machiavelli, 
Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eigh­
teenth Century," The William and Mary Quarterly, Third 
Series, XXII (1965), 5Ô5.
^Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Common- 
wealthman (Cambridge, Mass.: 195Ô). Commonwealthmen ac-
cepted various philosophical positions growing out of the 
Cromwellian Commonwealth. More often than not their ideas 
were based on Harrington's Oceana (see Pocock's article). 
Miss Robbins' thesis is that these men kept radical and 
republican notions alive throughout the eighteenth century 
and that they were ultimately transmitted to the American 
colonies where they found their fruition in the new Consti­
tution. In our period their primary effort was directed 
towards the maintenance of the Revolution Settlement and 
Protestant succession.
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Molesworth and Trenchard, both intermittent officeholders, 
were political theorists and writers, who were primarily 
responsible for publicizing the country beliefs. Moles­
worth 's circle also included several governmental fig­
ures: Lord John Somers, Sidney Godolphin, Robert Harley,
Charles Montagu (later Earl of Halifax), and General 
James Stanhope.® None of them could be classified com­
monwealthmen, but all adhered more or less to the country 
party position. Significantly Godolphin and Harley had 
both Whig and Tory allegiances, for by the turn of the 
century the bulk of the country opposition had largely 
merged with the Tory party under the leadership of Har- 
leyl® and his rising lieutenant, Henry St. John, later 
Viscount Bolingbroke, whose writings are usually consid­
ered to be the embodiment of country i d e a l s . S h a f t e s ­
bury had connections with all these men. He was a "self-
1 2declared disciple" of Molesworth, a patron to Toland, 
and corresponded with most of the others. Indeed even 
his publisher, John Darby, was the primary publisher of
^Robbins, pp. 91-98.
lOpiumb, pp. 139ff.
^^Plumb, p. 133; and Isaac Kranmick, Bolingbroke 
and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of
Walpole (Cambridge, Mass.: 1968), which is the best analy­
sis of Bolingbroke's political thought available. Kranmick 
details his country connections.
l^Robbins, p. 6 .
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commonwealth and country t r a c t s . T h u s  his ties with 
the group were strong; when his political thought is 
analyzed it will become clear that both are from the 
same mold.
Unfortunately, but for reasons I hope to make 
clear, Shaftesbury did not write a treatise of political 
philosophy. His views must be gathered from brief state­
ments in the Characteristics, the Second Characters, and 
his correspondence. Nonetheless a coherent political 
philosophy can be ascertained, one in which his country 
party position and its cosmic tory foundations are clear. 
The fact that one has to look to the Characteristics for 
it indicates an aspect of that work which has generally 
been overlooked by commentators on Shaftesbury. In Chap­
ter I, it was pointed out that he considered the Char­
acteristics to be a political work.^^ An analysis of 
his political thought will show why. He designed his 
treatises to be guides for practicing politicians; they 
would teach them to understand the nature of the Whole 
and would show them how to govern in accordance with the 
principles of Nature. His explicit political comments 
serve as examples of how to put his principles into action, 
He was concerned to raise the level of political activity;
13 Ibid., p. 48.
l^see above. Chapter I, pp. 37-38.
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adherence to his ideals would do that.
The end of man in nature is society: that is, man 
is a social animal. We have already seen how Shaftesbury 
arrived at this conclusion from his concept of natural 
a f f e c t i o n , 15 perhaps i t  would be well to see how he
develops the argument in other contexts for it lies at 
the heart of his political philosophy. It may be taken 
as an axiom, "That if any thing be natural, in any Crea­
ture, or any Kind; 'tis that which is preservative of 
the Kind it-self, and conducing to its Welfare and Sup­
port." "If Eating and Drinking be natural. Herding is 
so too. If any Appetite or Sense be natural, the Sense 
of Fellowship is the same." If affection between the 
sexes is natural, then certainly love of offspring and 
mutual affection between the offspring is also. In this 
way a "Clan or Tribe is gradually form'd." Pleasure is 
found in "social Entertainment, Language, and Discourse," 
hence strengthening the social ties. Indeed, to find no 
pleasure in these, to have no love of country or community 
is "to be insensible even of the plainest Means of Self- 
Preservation , and most necessary Condition of Self-Enjoy­
ment."^®
ISChapter II, pp. 64-68, 93-95, 118-19.
l®Char., I, pp. 110-11. (Essay on the Freedom of Wit 
and Humour)
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HOW the Wit of Man shou'd so puzzle this 
Cause, as to make Civil Government and 
Society appear a kind of Invention, and 
Creature of Art, I know not. For my own 
part, methinks, this Herding Principle, 
and associating Inclination, is seen so 
natural and strong in most Men, that one 
might readily affirm, ’twas even from the 
violence of this Passion that so much Dis­
order arose in the general Society of 
Mankind.17
Civil society, then, is a natural development from the 
instincts of self-preservation and herding. It does not 
require a contract or any other form of mutual agreement 
between the members. It is as old as man himself, since 
it is natural to him.
In the Miscellaneous Reflections Shaftesbury set 
forth another variation of the argument. "OF all human 
Affections, the noblest and most becoming human Nature, 
is that of LOVE to one's Country." Efforts by men to re­
solve this "generous Passion into a Relation to /o£7 mere 
Clay and Dust, exclusively of any thing sensible, intel­
ligent , or moral" shows the most squalid aspect of man­
kind, for it is a denial of the highest degree of affec­
tion. To be sure, there are relations of a lower order. 
Each of us has a relation to the mere earth itself along 
with the other animals. It, however, is not all there 
is. If one happens to have been born at sea, is he still 
not properly called British? Is not the same true for
l ? I b i d . , p. 111.
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those born in the colonies? Are they not fellow-citizens, 
and may they not love our country as heartily as island 
inhabitants? Even if the details of one's birth or par­
entage are unknown, would he not "joyfully embrace" some 
country and "by force of Nature" join the "general So­
ciety of Mankind?" "It may therefore be esteem'd no bet­
ter than a mean Subterfuge of narrow Minds, to assign 
this natural Passion for Society and a Country, to such a 
Relation as that of a mere Fungus or common Excrescence, to 
its Parent-Mould, or nursing Dung-hill."18
THE RELATION of Country-man, if it be al­
low'd any thing at all, must imply something 
moral and social. The Notion it-self pre­
supposes a naturally civil and political State 
of Mankind, and has reference to that parti­
cular part of Society, to which we owe our 
chief Advantages as Men, and rational Creatures, 
such as are naturally and necessarily united 
for each other's Happiness and Support, and 
for the highest of all Happinesses and Enjoy­
ments; 'The Intercourse of Minds, the free 
Use of our Reason, and the Exercise of mutual 
Love and Friendship.'
If any doubt remains that society and man's natural role 
in it are derived from cosmic tory principles, a state­
ment summarizing An Inquiry concerning Virtue will remove 
it :
THIS is the main Problem which our Author in 
more philosophical Terms demonstrates, in this 
Treatise /An Inquiry/, 'That for a Creature
18char., Ill, pp. 143-46
I S l b i d . , p. 146.
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whose natural End is Society, to operate 
as is by Nature appointed him towards the 
Good of such his SOCIETY, or Wh OLI^ is in 
reality to pursue his own natural and pro- 
per GOODT^ And 'That to operate contrary- 
wise , or by such Affections as sever from 
that common Good, or publick Interest, is, 
in reality, to work towards his own natural 
and proper ILL.' Now if Man, as has been 
prov'd, be justly rank'd in the number of 
those Creatures whose OEconomy is according 
to a joint-stock and publick-Weal; if it be 
understood, withal, that the only State of 
his Affections which answers rightly to this 
publick-Weal, is the regular, orderly, or 
virtuous State: it necessarily follows,
'That VIRTUE is his natural Good, and VICE 
his Misery and 111.'2U
Thus all discussion of man in society, that is, all dis­
cussion of political philosophy, is based on the philo­
sophical principles of cosmic toryism. Man's social 
nature and his activities in society all derive from 
and conform to the interests of the Whole, which is 
Good. Man lives in the best of worlds: the problem for
the political philosopher is to indicate the proper 
activities for man to enable him to practice virtue and 
hence be happy.
Before a positive political schema could be set 
forth, however, it was necessary to refute the prevailing 
notions of political and social organization, notably the
20lbid., p. 223. In the Miscellaneous Reflections 
Shaftesbury writes as a third person commenting on the 
earlier treatises. Hence the phrase "our Author" is a 
reference to himself.
X129
idea of a state of nature. In a lengthy and closely- 
woven passage which was added to the 1709 edition of 
The Moralists, Shaftesbury gave a convincing confutation 
of the Hobbesean and Lockean h y p o t h e s i s I t  follows 
immediately after the demonstration of man's social na­
turels in response to a mentioning of the dictum that the 
state of nature was a state of war. If it be allowed 
that the state of nature and that of society are per­
fectly distinct, then such a principle follows, for if 
man could endure to live without society, and if he 
actually did for a period, then he cannot be said to be 
sociable by nature. Thus having no natural affection or 
"friendly Inclination" he was forced into a social state. 
But why? If he lived without society, his existence 
must have been tolerable. Thus it probably occurred 
"from such Inconveniences as arose chiefly from himself, 
and his own malignant Temper and Principles." Certainly 
it is not surprising that such unsociable creatures would 
be troublesome, that they would fight for their own in-
21lt may seem somewhat unfair to link Locke with-r- 
Hobbes in this discussion since Locke felt himself in dis­
agreement with Hobbes. Nonetheless Shaftesbury believed 
that Locke's thought was derivative from Hobbes's and 
hence he lumped his criticisms of the two together. In a 
group of "Moral and Theological Citations and Maxims" in­
cluded in the Second Characters, Shaftesbury explicitly 
pairs the two men: "Hence Hobbes, Locke, etc. still the 
same man, same genus at the bottom." (p. 178).
^^See above, Chapter I I ,  pp. 9 3 -9 5 .
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terests. Hence such a state of nature "in all likeli­
hood" was a state of war. However, there cannot be 
"naturally any Human State which is not social," which 
means that the premise of the argument is false.23 
Shaftesbury then goes on to demonstrate the validity of 
this last proposition.
It would not be proper to speak of an infant in 
the moment of birth as a state, for a state must be of 
some duration. Likewise it is improper to speak of a 
state of man "ere yet he enter'd into Society, and became 
in truth a Human Creature." Until then all that existed 
was "the Essay or first Effort of Nature, a Species in 
the Birth, a Kind as yet unform'd," but not man. When 
man is finally formed one cannot without absurdity say 
that it is his natural state to live separately. "For 
sooner may you divest the Creature of any other Feeling 
or Affection, than that towards Society and his Likeness.' 
But if it be allowed that he can be so divested, could 
you strip him of his members and parts and still call him 
a man? "Yet better might you do this indeed, than you 
could strip him of his natural Affections, separate him 
from all his Kind, and inclosing him like some solitary 
Insect in a Shell, declare him still a MAN. . . . For tho
23çhar., I I ,  pp. 31 0 -1 2 .
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his outward Shape were human, his Passions, Appetites, 
and Organs must be wholly different. His whole inward 
Make must be revers'd, to fit him for such a recluse 
OEconomy, and separate S u b s i s t e n c e . "%4
What then is the foundation of "this pretended 
State of Nature?" Either man must have been from eternity 
or not. If from eternity, there could be no primitive or 
original state different from what we see at present. If 
not from eternity, then he arose either all at once, in 
which case he has never been different than he is now, or 
by degrees and through several stages until he became 
settled in the condition as he is now. If by degrees, 
what superfluities did Nature first give him? "They 
dropt off, it seems, in time; and happily have left things 
at last, in a good posture, and (to a wonder!) just as 
they should be." Surely this is the "lowest view" of 
the beginning of mankind, but it is a view that a certain 
sort of philosophers take. For them Nature had no inten­
tion, no meaning or design at all. "So how any thing can 
be call'd natural in the Case; how any State can be call'd 
a State of Nature, or according to Nature, one more than 
another, I know not." But for the sake of argument, let 
us agree that there can be and consider "Which State we
2 4 ib id . , pp. 313 -14 .
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may best call Nature's own."
'She has by Accident, thro’ many Changes and 
Chances, rais'd a Creature, which springing 
at first from rude Seeds of Matter, proceeded 
till it became what now it is; and arriv'd 
where for many Generations it has been at a 
stay.' In this long Procession (for I allow 
it any length whatever) I ask, 'Where was it 
that this State of Nature cou'd begin?' The 
Creature must have endur'd many Changes : and
each Change, whilst he was thus growing up, 
was as natural, one as another. So that either 
there must be reckon'd a hundred different 
States of Nature; or if one, it can be only 
that in which Nature was perfect, and her 
Growth compleat. Here where She rested, and 
attain'd her End, here must be her State, or
no-where.25
Surely Nature would not stop in that "desolate State" be­
fore society. How would it be possible to maintain and 
propagate the species without "Fellowship or Community?" 
Will the society required to preserve the species be
denied to man, when it is known to be proper to all other
creatures?
And can we allow this social Part to Man, 
and go no further? Is it possible he shou'd 
pair, and live in Love and Fellowship with 
his Partner and Offspring, and remain still 
wholly wild, and speechless, and without those 
Arts of Storing, Building, and other OEconomy, 
as natural to him surely as to the Beaver, or 
to the Ant, or Bee? Where, therefore, shou'd 
He break off from this Society, if once begun?
For that it began thus, as early as Genera­
tion, and grew into a Household and OEconomy,
is plain. Must not this have grown soon into
a Tribe? and this Tribe into a Nation? Or 
tho it remain'd a Tribe only; was hot this 
still a Society for mutual Defense and common
25ibid., p. 316.
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Interest? In short, if Generation be na­
tural , if natural Affection and the Care 
and Nurture of the Offspring be natural,
Things standing as they do with Man, and the 
Creature, being of that Form and Constitu­
tion he now is; it follows, 'That Society 
must be also natural to him;' And ^That out 
of Society and Community he never did, nor 
ever can s u b s i s t . ’26
Thus there is no natural human state that is not social, 
and hence there can never have been a state of nature 
distinct from society.
Talk of the state of nature, though, can be useful, 
particularly if it is of a vile and ill state. Since it 
is unsocial, let it be as uncomfortable and as frightful 
as possible. Let it be considered much worse than the 
worst government in being. "The greater Dread we have of 
Anarchy, the better Country-men^? we shall prove, and 
value more the Laws and Constitution under which we live, 
and by which we are protected from the outrageous Vio­
lences of such an unnatural State. In this I agree 
heartily with those Transformers of Human Nature, who 
considering it abstractedly and apart from Government
26 Ibid., pp. 318-19.
2?This term, I think, is intended to have a double 
meaning: the obvious one in the context of a person who 
loves his country and the meaning of "country party" be­
cause of its use in conjunction with maintenance of the 
constitution and implied rejection of corruption.
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or Society, represent it under monstrous Visages of 
Dragons, Leviathans, and I know not what devouring Crea­
tures. "28 Thus Hobbes's work has at least a negative 
value: while his state of nature cannot be accepted as
a reality, discussion of it is useful for the creation 
and maintenance of good government.
A less formal, but equally effective, argument 
against the state of nature was used in the Essay on the 
Freedom of Wit and Humour. Because it is less abstract, 
it is more immediately clear that Hobbes and Locke are 
the targets. "'Tis ridiculous to say, there is any 
Obligation on Man to act sociably, or honestly, in a 
form'd Government; and not in that which is commonly 
call'd the State of Nature." For, using the fashionable 
language of contemporary philosophers, society is founded 
on a compact, whereby every man's private rights are sur­
rendered into the hands of the majority or their repre­
sentatives. The surrender occurs by free choice and by 
promise. Now the promise was made in the state of nature 
and "that which cou'd make a Promise obligatory in the 
State of Nature, must make all other Acts of Humanity as 
much our real Duty, and natural Part. Thus Faith, Jus­
tice, Honesty, and Virtue, must have been as early as
28çhar., I I ,  p. 319.
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the State of Nature, or they cou'd never have been at 
all." Civil union or government could never make right 
or wrong if they did not exist before. Thus he who was 
free to be a villain before his contract, ought to be 
as free under his contract when he thinks fit. "The 
Natural Knave has the same reason to be a Civil one; 
and may dispense with his politick Capacity as oft as he
sees occasion: 'Tis only his Word stands in his way.----
A man is oblig'd to keep his Word. Why? Because he has 
given his Word to keep it. Is not this a notable Ac­
count of the Original of moral Justice, and the Rise of 
Civil Government and Allegiance!"^®
In rejecting the notion of a state of nature Shaftes­
bury also rejected the contract theory of government, as 
the last argument made clear. What he substituted for 
that theory to explain the origins of society and govern­
ment appeared in his arguments for man's social nature. 
Society arises out of familial relationships: that is,
as the family grows it develops into a clan or tribe 
uniting for "mutual Defense and common Interest." Since 
"social Entertainment, Language, and Discourse" are the 
benefits of this tribal society, the social ties within 
it are strengthened and it continues to grow. Ultimately
2®Char., I ,  pp. 109-110 .
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it becomes a nation, based still on the mutual benefits 
that the society provides for all its members. Thus 
society and government are founded on the common good of 
all its members.30
Hobbes had argued that society and government were 
formed out of self-interest— an argument that Bolingbroke 
would later use in part. Shaftesbury took some pains to 
counter this notion which so manifestly violated his own 
principles. It is a common saying that interest governs 
the world. Those who hold this notion, however, overlook 
such things as passion, humor, zeal, and faction which 
are all contrary to self-interest. The machine of so­
ciety and government is too complex to be explained by 
one simple view, especially since it leaves out the better 
affections of generosity, kindness, friendship. "MODERN 
projectors" want to be rid of these "natural Materials" 
in order to build more uniformly. "They wou’d new-frame 
the human Heart; and have a mighty fancy to reduce all its 
Motions, Balances and W e i g h t s ,31 to that one Principle 
and Foundation of a cool and deliberate Selfishness."
The revivers of the materialist philosophy want to equate 
all social passion and natural affection with self-interest
3 0 lbid., I, pp. 110-11; II, pp. 318-19.
31shaftesbury has been using the analogy of a clock 
mechanism to describe society and is continuing it here.
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To do so they change the meanings of words: civility
and hospitality become deliberate selfishness; and an 
honest heart becomes a cunning one; love of kindred, 
children, and posterity become purely love of self and 
of one's own immediate blood; and love of country and 
mankind also become self-love. "Now if these Gentlemen, 
who delight so much in the Play of Words, but are cautious 
how they grapple closely with Definitions, wou'd tell us 
only what Self-Interest was, and determine Happiness and 
Good, there wou'd be an end of this enigmatical Wit."
We all agree that happiness is what is being pursued: 
the question is, would it be sought by following Nature 
and common affection or by supressing it and turning every­
thing to narrow self-ends?^^
"'Tis the height of Wisdom, no doubt, to be rightly 
selfish." For to be "rightly.selfish" is to act accord­
ing to natural affections which are "intrinsically valu­
able and worthy."33 it is at bottom, then, a matter of 
public versus private good. There are, it will be re­
called, two sorts of natural affection, that towards the 
common nature or system of the species and that towards 
the private nature or self-system. Oftentimes following 
the public affections causes a person to go against his
32Çhar., I, pp. 115-122. 
33ibid., p. 121.
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private affections. "It may therefore be imagin'd, per­
haps, that there is a plain and absolute Opposition be­
tween these two Habits or Affections," and therefore 
"that which is of a social kind in us, shou’d of right 
be abolished." But, acting in accordance with public 
affection is to be virtuous and virtue is a person’s 
"natural good." Thus one who pursues the good of society 
is in reality pursuing "his own natural and proper good." 
Again, "to be well affected towards the Publick Interest 
and one’s own, is not only consistent, but inseparable: 
and that moral Rectitude, or Virtue, must accordingly be 
the Advantage, and Vice the Injury and Disadvantage of 
every C r e a t u r e . H o b b e s ,  by advocating self-interest, 
ignored virtue and the public interest. Thus his society 
cannot acheive happiness, which, while Shaftesbury did 
not explicitly say so, raises the point that there is no 
reason then for forming the contract and leaving the 
state of nature at all, since society will be as anti­
social as the state of nature.
Civil society and government, then, develop out of 
the natural operations of the affections. Public and pri­
vate affections work conjointly to ensure private happi­
ness, for the public interest is synonymous with virtue
34 C har. , I I ,  pp. 79 -81; I I I ,  p. 223.
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and virtue is synonymous with private good or happiness. 
Thus the purpose of government must be to provide for 
the public good or interest, which will in turn promote 
the good of the individual members of the society. "A 
PUBLICK Spirit can come only from a social Feeling or 
Sense of Partnership with human Kind." There can be 
none who are partners in this sense, who do not consider 
themselves subject to the law of fellowship and community. 
Thus morality and good government go together. "There 
is no real Love of Virtue, without the knowledge of Pub­
lick G o o d ."35 Or to put it more succinctly: "Reason
and Virtue alone can bestow LIBERTY."36 Hence good gov­
ernment is that which promotes reason and provides li­
berty; such a government will be virtuous.
No people in a civil state can possibly be free 
unless they are governed by such laws as they have them­
selves drawn up and approved. If they are governed by 
mere fancy, where the rules of government vary each day 
and are "without respect to any antient Constitution or 
Establishments," their life will be "as certain Slavery, 
as it is Violence, Distraction, and M i s e r y . "37 That is.
35çhar., I, pp. 106-7. 
SGchar., III, p. 313. 
3?Ibid., p. 312.
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if self-interest rules or if the nature of the public 
good is not understood, freedom cannot exist. Thus the 
governors must comprehend the nature of the Whole, so 
that their leadership will conform to the public good. 
This can happen only if the people also are educated 
and are rational, for "he alone is free who has within 
himself no Hindrance, or Controul, in acting what he him­
self, by his best Judgment, and most deliberate Choice, 
approves."38 In such a free society the arts of "PER­
SUASION," "Poetry, Rhetorick, Musick," will flourish, for 
the governors will use these arts to reason with the 
people and thus guide society. These arts also ensure 
that the country will be "led by Men of Science and 
Erudition,"39 who understand the workings of the system 
of the Whole.
In this regard, the state of affairs in Britain is 
a happy one for the "just Princes of our Island" are 
"surrounded with the best of Counsellors, the LAWS" and 
they "annually receive Advice and Aid, in the most ef­
fectual manner, from their good P e o p l e . " 4 0
AS for us BRITONS, thank Heaven, we have a 
better Sense of Government deliver'd to us
38 Ibid
39çhar., I, pp. 237-39. 
40lbid., p. 2 1 2 .
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from our Ancestors. We have the notion of 
A PUBLICK, and A CONSTITUTION; how a Légi­
slatif, and how an Executive is model'd.
We understand Weight and Measure in this 
kind, and can reason justly on the Balance 
of Power and Property. The Maxims we draw 
from hence, are as evident as those in 
Mathematicks. Our increasing Knowledg shews 
us every day, more and more, what COMMON 
SENSE is in Politics: And this must of ne­
cessity lead us to understand a like Sense 
in Morals; which is the Foundation.41
The British constitution is an example of wise and vir­
tuous government: it stands as a model of liberty. But
this has not always been the case. "I must take the 
liberty to say, I think OLD ENGLAND to have been in 
every respect a very indifferent Country: and that Late
ENGLAND, of an Age or two old, even since QUEEN BESS'S 
days, is indeed very much mended for the better." In 
her grandfather's era England was ruled by a sort of 
"Polish Nobility" in which self-interest reigned supreme, 
liberty hardly existed, and "we were highly fam'd" as 
"the best Tributarys and Servants to the Holy See abroad." 
Time and monarchs changed things for the better and the 
Revolution made the country "better still."42 All, 
though, is not secure. '"TIS scarce a quarter of an Age 
since such a happy Balance of Power was settled between 
our Prince and People, as has firmly secur'd our hitherto
41lbid., p. 108.
42char., I I I ,  pp. 150-51.
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precarious Libertys." And yet Britain must, at present, 
fight to preserve its free government against "the Ter­
ror of that Power, which . . . has again threaten'd the 
World with a Universal Monarchy, and a new Abyss of 
Ignorance and S u p e r s t i t i o n . "43
The external threat posed by the Sun King, however, 
was not the only one: corruption and the consolidation
of power in the hands of the court also menaced English 
liberties. All too often countrymen of worthy character 
entered into public and court life and became venal. 
"Equipages, Titles, Precedencys, Staffs , Ribbons, and 
other such glittering Ware, are taken in exchange for 
inward MERIT, HONOUR, and a CHARACTER,"44 because it is 
the nature of a court to corrupt taste.45 Such people 
may have descended from glorious ancestors who suffered 
for the nation’s liberty and welfare, but they have sacri­
ficed their friends and honest measures to private inter­
est. Such corruption, because it favored self-interest, 
can only work against the good of the state. Indeed, it 
undermines the laws and hence puts the people at the mercy 
of the court's whims, thus increasing the powers of the 
court. If this process were to continue for any period,
43çhar., I, pp. 216-17. 
44char., III, p. 169. 
45second Characters, p. 23
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that is, if the representatives of the people can not 
overcome the corruption and consolidation of power, it 
will lead to "the Establishment of an irretrievable 
State of Tyranny, and absolute D o m i n i o n ."46 Thus these 
" p l a c e m e n " ^ ?  must be removed or the liberties of the Eng­
lish, so recently confirmed by the Revolution, will be 
destroyed.
Shaftesbury cited two contemporary examples of the
change from honesty to venality. Since he wrote about
them in the Miscellaneous Reflections of 1711 their
identity is obvious even though he mentioned no names.
The two were Harley and Bolingbroke, both of whom had
been identified with the country party, but had, to gain
power in 1710, become High Church Tories. Shaftesbury
considered them apostates. His characterization of the
two men so clearly identifies the menace of corruption
and consolidation of power felt by the country party
that I feel the passage merits quotation in its entirety,
especially since, as we shall see, Shaftesbury earlier
felt Harley to be an ally.
'TIS not in one Party alone /Whigs7 that 
these Purchases and Sales of HONÔÏÏR are 
carry'd on. I can represent to my-self a 
noted PATRIOT, and reputed Pillar of the
46Char., III, p. 312,
47shaftesbury does not use this term in any of his 
published works, but it was the standard term for anyone 
who held office and usually connoted corruption.
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religious Part of our Constitution ^arle^7, 
who having by many and long Services, and a 
steddy Conduct, gain'd the Reputation of 
thorow Zeal with his own Party, and of Sin­
cerity and Honour with his very Enemys, on a 
sudden (the time being come that the Fulness 
of his Reward was set before him) submits com­
placently to the propos'd Bargain, and sells 
himself for what he is worth, in a vile de­
testable Old-Age, to which he has reserv'd the 
Infamy of betraying both his Friends and 
Country the country party as well as
the nationT.
I CAN imagine, on the other side, one of a 
contrary Party; a noted Friend to LIBERTY in 
Church and State _^olingbroke7; an Abhorrer 
of the Slavish Dependency on Courts, and of 
the narrow Principles of Bigots : Such a one,
after many publick Services of note, I can see 
wrought upon, by degrees, to seek Court-Pre- 
ferment; and this too under a Patriot-Character. 
But having perhaps try'd this way with less 
success, he is oblig'd to change his Character, 
and become a royal Flatterer, a Courtier against 
his Nature; submitting himself, and suing, in 
so much the meaner degree, as his inherent Prin­
ciples are well known at Court, and to his new- 
adopted Party, to whom he feigns himself £ 
Proselyte.
THE greater the Genius or Character is of such 
a Person ^ e  is still referring to Bolingbroke7, 
the greater is his Slavery, and heavier his Load. 
Better had it been that he had never discover'd 
such a Zeal for publick Good, or signaliz'd him­
self in that Party ^ountry party7; which can 
with least grace make Sacrifices of national In­
terests to a Crown, or to the private Will, Ap­
petite, or Pleasure of a Prince. For supposing 
such a Genius as this had been to act his Part 
of Courtship in some foreign and absolute Court; 
how much less infamous wou'd his Part have prov'd? 
How much less slavish, amidst a People who were 
All Slaves? Had he peradventure been one of that 
forlorn begging Troop of Gentry extant in DENMARK, 
or SWEDEN, since the time that those Nations lost 
their Libertys; had he liv'd out of a free Nation, 
and happily-balanc'd Constitution; had he been 
either conscious of no Talent in the Affairs of
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Government, or of no Opportunity to exert 
any such, to the advantage of Mankind: Where 
had been the mighty shame, if perhaps he had 
employ'd some of his Abilitys in flattering 
like others, and paying the necessary Homage 
requir'd for Safety's sake, and Self-preser­
vation, in absolute and despotick Governments?
The TASTE, perhaps, in strictness, might still 
be wrong, even in this hard Circumstance: But
how inexcusable in a quite contrary one! For 
let us suppose our Courtier not only an English­
man, but of the Rank and Stem of those old 
English Patriots, who were wont to curb the 
Licentiousness of our Court, arraign its Flat­
terers, and purge away those Poisons from the 
Ear of Princes ; let us suppose him of a com­
petent Fortune and moderate Appetites, without 
any apparent Luxury or Lavishment in his Man­
ners: What shall we, after this, bring in
Excuse, or as an Apology, for such a Choice as 
his? How shall we explain this preposterous 
Relish, this odd Preference of Subtlety and 
Indirectness to true Wisdom, open Honesty, 
and Uprightness?48
One of the most striking aspects of Shaftesbury's charac­
terization of Bolingbroke is how it anticipated his later 
career. He believed that Bolingbroke's activities might 
have been appropriate in France, and at least one year 
of the Tory's exile in France was spent in such activity. 
His genius could have been more effectively used in ef­
forts to maintain freedom and Bolingbroke's period of 
opposition from 1725 to 1735 was directed toward that 
end. It makes one wonder how Shaftesbury would have 
received The Craftsman.
I have tried to outline what I believe a Treatise
48char., I l l ,  pp. 170-72 .
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on Government by Shaftesbury would have said if it had 
been written. It is clear that enough material 
exists in the Characteristics to formulate a coherent 
political philosophy. Why then did Shaftesbury not 
write a Treatise on Government? The answer I feel lies 
in the title I have used. Any such treatise would have 
to be directed against John Locke. Shaftesbury disagreed 
fundamentally with Locke's philosophical principles, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, but, and this is the 
important point, he never disagreed publically. All his 
objections to the state of nature, to government by self- 
interest, and so on, are seemingly against Hobbes— whom 
he privately described as "a genius, and even an original 
among these latter leaders in philosophy."49 A casual 
reader might suspect some anti-Locke bias, but without 
the aid of his private notes and correspondence, it would 
have to remain a suspicion. The reader would never find 
anything in the published writings to confirm it.
Why was Shaftesbury so careful to avoid saying any­
thing against Locke in public? In my opinion, it was 
simply because of his personal relationship with the man: 
Shaftesbury revered him as a father. His own father was 
a very weak character, so much so that his grandfather
40Letter to Stanhope, 7 November 1709, PRO 22/7.
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adopted him and immediately put him into Locke's care. 
After the first Earl's death, Shaftesbury's relations 
with his parents were never more than correct. His real 
affection was reserved for Locke— an affection that can 
be seen in a series of letters to him dating primarily 
from the 1690's. If it would not suggest an,impropriety 
that did not exist, they could best be described as love 
letters. Shaftesbury continuously bemoaned the fact 
that he could not be with Locke and acknowledged repeat­
edly that he was "more obleidg'd and more yett to be 
obleidg'd to You than anybody."50 Or again, "I needed 
nothing to convince mee, yt what Good I was able to doe in 
y© world, was better and more worthly bestow'd in serving 
a Person . . .  in a corner of Essex."51 it was this 
affection, I believe, which prevented him, no matter how 
much he might disagree with Locke— and at least two of 
the letters indicate this disagreement— from opposing 
him in public. Hence he not only could not write a 
Treatise on Government, but he also could not overtly 
oppose him in the Characteristics.52
50Bodleian Library, MSS Locke, c. 7, f. 89, 15 
November 1689.
SlBodleian Library, MSS Locke, c. 7, f. 114, 27 
November 1694. Locke was living in Essex at the home of 
Sir Francis Masham.
52it is for this reason that epistemology is largely 
omitted from the Characteristics.
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Let us now turn to practical politics and briefly 
look at Shaftesbury's country party beliefs in the light 
of some of the events of the day. The country party po­
sition is usually understood to include demands for fre­
quent parliaments, preferably annual, the exclusion of 
placemen to eliminate corruption, and the limitation of
C O
parliamentary membership to men of s u b s t a n c e . A  con­
temporary pamphlet by Charles D'Avenant, The True Picture 
of a Modern Whig (1701), more picturesquely describes the 
country Whig’s stance:
What have we in us /i’s Modern Whigs7 that 
resembles the Old WEigs ^ountry WTTigs7?
They hated arbitrary government, we have 
been all along for a standing army: they
desired triennial parliaments, and that 
trials for treason might be better regu­
lated; and it is notorious that we opposed 
both those bills. They were for calling 
corrupt ministers to an account; we have 
ever countenanced and protected corruption 
to the utmost of our power. They were 
frugal for the nation, and careful how they 
loaded the people with taxes ; we have 
squandered away their money as if there 
could be no end of England's treasure. The 
Old Whigs would have prevented the immoder­
ate growth of the French empire, we Modern 
Whigs have made a partition-treaty, which 
unless Providence save us, may end in mak­
ing the King of France universal monarch.
53piumb, pp. 143-44.
S^charles D'Avenant. The Political and Commercial 
Works, ed., by Sir Charles Whitworth (London: 1771), IV, 
p. 162. D'Avenant's pamphlet is a sledge hammer attack 
on the corruption of the Modern Whigs.
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By these definitions Shaftesbury’s political philosophy 
is obviously consistent with the country party; he spoke 
in favor of annual p a rl ia me nt sp a rl i a m en t s  were to be 
made up of good men and the government was to be entrusted 
to "Men of Science and Erudition;"56 corruption was to be 
opposed;57 a balanced constitution was to be preserved 
and the government should function in the public's inter­
est.58 And it is worth recalling that Shaftesbury's 
maiden speech in the Commons was in support of the Treason 
Act.59
If his political philosophy does not provide enough 
evidence of Shaftesbury's country party position, a retro­
spective letter to Robert Molesworth states it explicitly:
You may think me melancholy, if you will.
I own there was a time in publick affairs 
when I really was; for, saving your self, 
and perhaps one or two more (I speak the 
most) I had none that acted with me, against 
the injustice and corruption of both parties; 
each of them enflam'd against me, particu­
larly one ^ h e  Tories?, because of my birth 
and principles ; the other ^ h e  Whigs?, be­
cause of my pretended Apostacy, which was 
only adhering to those principles on which
55See above, pp. 140-41.
S^See above, p. 140.
57see above, pp. 142-43.
5®See above, pp. 139-40.
59see above. Chapter I, p. 8 .
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their party was founded.®®
Shaftesbury was not an apostate from the Whig party: he
remained faithful to the principles of the party of his 
grandfather. This, of course, meant that he was largely 
out of step with the party of the turn of the century.
At the time he had great hopes of bringing the "Mod­
ern Whigs" back to their rightful position. In November 
1700, shortly before he began to take active part in the 
work of the Lords, he commented on the situation and the 
hopefulness of it. There were fears of a dissolution, 
which ultimately took place, but at this time Shaftesbury 
wanted the parliament to continue for its work was not 
complete. The bill excluding excise-office placemen had 
been passed, but more was yet to come which would amount 
"to the thorough purgation of the Parliament, and re­
ducing it solely and wholly to the country bottom." Fur­
thermore, the Whigs who had been "shamefull in their over 
great condescensions to the Court" had been scared by the 
rise of the Tories. A new parliament would probably be
6O4 November 1708, PRO 25/22 and Letters . . . 
Shaftesbury . . . Molesworth, p. 13.
Gljohn Toland's introduction to his edition of the 
Letters . . . Shaftesbury . . . Molesworth provides an 
account of Shaftesbury's political activities and princi­
ples. He clearly indicates his acceptance of the "Old 
Whig" ideals and specifically mentions his support of the 
country party legislation. It is a fascinating account: 
unfortunately space does not permit use of it.
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Tory, and hence, he believed that a continuation of the 
present one would give the Whigs an opportunity to mend 
their ways, "so that they may approve themselves to their 
countrye, and wash off the court stain."62
Shaftesbury took his seat in the House of Lords at 
the beginning of William's penultimate parliament. It 
was to be a most significant and contradictory session 
for the country party, for it included both the impeach­
ment of Somers and the passage of the Act of Settlement.
As would be expected Shaftesbury was vitally interested 
in both cases. His Whig heritage, as well as his friend­
ship, shone through in the Somers case, where he reso­
lutely supported Somers against what he considered a 
Tory or Church Party "extremity,"^3 even though the case 
might have been considered a country party one. He worked 
diligently for the passage of the Act of Settlement and 
provided Furly with a running account of its progress.
"The settlement of the Succession will go on well, and 
care will be taken to confirm and enlarge our Bill of 
Rights, in the same Act of Settlement."®'^ "Besides this,
G^Letter to Furly, 15 November 1700, PRO 20/57 and 
Forster, pp. 107-12.
GSLetter to Furly, 27 February 1702, PRO 20/57 and 
Forster, pp. 171-75. Also see above. Chapter I, p. 12.
G^Letter to Furly, 4 March 1701, PRO 20/19 and 
Forster, p. 123.
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they have pushed on the Bill of Succession, and carried 
it through the committee, so that we shall now soon see 
it pass’d. . , , "The Succession Bill is (I thank 
God) pass’d both Houses and ready for the royal assent."®® 
He summed up his participation during his subsequent re­
tirement in Rotterdam:
I kept in them /public affairs/ as long as I 
was able; but by a constitution unfitted for 
the fatigue of business, I had long since been 
forced to quit, but that I chose to suffer any­
thing rather than not come in heartily and with 
all my strength at that last hour when I appre­
hended not my country only, but mankind, was 
sinking, had not the Prince, then alive, been 
supported, a war entered into, and an English 
Protestant Succession established.
I have lived to see the chiefest of those ends 
compassed, and those good laws passed for the 
establishment of our constitution, which I 
wished for at the Revolution. . . .67
In his only political tract. Paradoxes of State
(1702), Shaftesbury called for nonpartisan support of the
war against France. The excuses for political division
had been eliminated during William's reign: the country
party had achieved its major desires:
All the natural Disunion since King WILLIAM’S 
reign, so dextrously improv’d by designing Men, 
has proceded from the ill Balance still left in
®5Letter to Furly, 6 May 1701, PRO 20/23 and Forster, 
p. 135.
®®Letter to Furly, 23 May 1701, PRO 20/25 and Forster, 
p . 142.
®?Letter to Sir Rowland Gwinn, 23 January 1704, PRO 
22/4 and Rand, pp. 318-19.
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the State by the Insufficiency of our hasty 
Bill of Rights. But this is now for the most 
Part (if not altogether) remedy'd by passing 
of the Treason Bill, the Triennial Bill, and 
those other parliamentary Regulations which 
are not less valuable, tho Hast will not give 
me leave to mention 'em. We have in Reversion 
a Security for the Judge's Bill, the Self- 
denying Bill (which is already got in part) 
and the transacting of State Matters in the 
privy Council. There is also a Provision 
made against imploying of Foreners, pleading 
of Pardons against Impeachments, our Princes 
leaving the Realm without Consent of Parla- 
ment, or being of the Popish Communion, or 
any other than that of the Church establisht 
by Law. Finally, by a Clause in the late Act 
of Succession, and by som procedings of the 
last Parlament (approv'd and comply'd with by 
the King) the power of Peace and War is so far 
lodg'd in our Senat, that the best Patriots 
wou'd hardly wish it m o r e . 68
A more concise statement of the country party's platform 
and achievements could hardly be imagined. Clearly Shaftes­
bury favored them in their entirety.
It remains to comment on Shaftesbury's relations with 
Harley, a man whom he found very frustrating, and Boling­
broke, which will indicate why Shaftesbury could never 
support the Tories, even though their beliefs were so 
alike. Robert Harley began his political career as a 
Whig69 and adhered throughout most of it to ideals and 
principles which were generally the same as those of the
GSpRO 20/68, pp. 1-2 .
G^Angus Mclnnes, "The Political Ideas of Robert Har­
ley," History, N. S. L (1965), 311.
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country p a r t y . yet he oscillated in his party allegi­
ances, finally ending up in the camp of the High Church 
Tories. We have already seen Shaftesbury's opinion of 
him at that time— a most unfavorable o n e . 71 He regarded 
him as a man who would sell himself to anyone for the 
sake of office, thus betraying all principles as well as 
the country. This was Shaftesbury at his most disillu­
sioned. Previously he had always been willing to give 
Harley the benefit of the doubt, considering him an hon­
est and able man who would benefit the country cause. He 
had been an early supporter of Harley believing that his 
abilities were "of greater moment to the publick, than my 
own, or family's could ever b e . "72 Repeatedly during the 
period 1700-02, he expressed his optimism that Harley 
would ultimately remain true to the Whigs, even though 
he seemed to be on the Tory side. "This behaviour of Mr. 
Harley extremely troubles me, for he looses all reputa­
tion and trust among us. . . "Your judgment about
70McInnes, pp. 315ff. and R. B. Ballinger, The Early 
Political Life and Connexions of Robert Harley, unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1954.
7lsee above, pp. 143-45.
72Letter to Harley (Oxford), 29 March 1711, PRO 25/ 
22. It is a letter of congratulations upon Harley's ele­
vation to the Earldom of Oxford.
73letter to Furly, 27 February 1702, PRO 20/57 and 
Forster, p. 174.
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R. Harley is perfectly right. He is ours at the bottom. .
. . This gentleman and others will then soon come over.
God grant that M , I mean, may be so wise. . . ,"74 
recognized that Harley was the only reason that the 
Tories were having any success; ". . . it is by him 
alone that that party has rais'd itself to such a great­
ness as allmost to destroy u s . "75 "’Tis he and he alone 
that wounds us; for all the strength of the Tories or 
Church party is nothing, but by that force which he brings 
over to them from our side. . . ."76 Shaftesbury could 
never trust the Tories, even though they, under Harley's 
leadership espoused many of the aims he himself was work­
ing for. He always feared— and here he remained true to 
his grandfather— that if the Tories had a clear shot at 
office they would revert "to what they naturally belong 
to, a high and absolute court and church interest.
It would lead to absolute government and the loss of
74Letter to Furly, 30 January 1702 or 1703, PRO 20/
55 and Forster, pp. 192-93. The copy of the letter in the 
PRO is dated 1701/2 and is so cataloged. Forster, who had 
the original letters for his edition, gives the date as 
1702/3. Since both (this and PRO 20/57) are from "Chelsea," 
and Shaftesbury was in Chelsea in 1701/2, I suspect Forster's 




77Letter to Furly, 15 November 1700, PRO 20/15 and 
Forster, p. 110.
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freedom. This, of course, accounted for the outspoken 
attack on Harley and Bolingbroke in the Miscellaneous 
Reflections, for he believed them not only to be violat­
ing his own political principles, but theirs as well.
His distrust of the Tories remained unmitigated to his 
death. Had he witnessed Bolingbroke's activities in 
1714-15 he surely would have seen them as confirmation 
of his attitudes. Yet their philosophies were remarkably 
similar.
There is no evidence that Shaftesbury ever met or 
corresponded with Bolingbroke; nonetheless he certainly 
knew of him and followed the development of his career, 
as the attack in the Miscellaneous Reflections attests. 
Some controversy exists about the question of Shaftes­
bury’s influence on B o l i n g b r o k e . I  think, however, 
that there can be no question but that Bolingbroke read 
Shaftesbury and that in some of his writings he adopted 
positions analogous to those of the senior philosopher,
78Alfred Owen Aldridge in ’’Shaftesbury and Boling­
broke,” Philological Quarterly, XXXI (1952), 5, says that 
their philosophical opinions are ’’not at all sympathetic.” 
Kranmick, on the other hand, devotes considerable atten­
tion to the similarity of their views. I tend to find 
Kranmick’s arguments more convincing, but without a more 
thorough study of Bolingbroke than I have been able to 
make, I would not want to make a definite judgment.
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most notably in political p h i l o s o p h y . A  brief summary 
of Bolingbroke's thought will indicate this and will 
demonstrate the impossibility of easy party classifica­
tion in the period, at least among those who adopted 
country positions.
Bolingbroke wrote to refute Locke and Plato and to 
uphold the Stoic tradition.®® He began by vindicating 
natural law, which must have had prior existence if civil 
society is to exist. Hobbes had argued that moral obli­
gations derive from the Leviathan, but Bolingbroke count­
ered that they come only from an anterior law of nature, 
for society, because of human fallibility, cannot estab­
lish right and wrong. The laws of nature are the product 
of Divine will and are the origin of all positive law.
Thus natural law is God's basic law and it determines the 
morality of men's actions. But it is not simply God's 
law: it is also reason's law and is therefore available
to all rational creatures. This is because God is a 
"gracious and beneficent lord and master . . . who commands
79Aldridge cites examples of Bolingbroke's use of 
Shaftesbury which clearly indicate his knowledge of the 
Characteristics. Without mentioning Shaftesbury, D. G. 
James, The Life of Reason: Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke
(London! 194Ô), quotes passages from Bolingbroke that 
could come directly from Shaftesbury.
®®I am following Kranmick's account throughout (pp. 
84-105). The quotations are from Bolingbroke and unless 
otherwise cited are used by Kranmick.
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us nothing which it is not our interest to perform," 
Rational creatures eventually realize that certain ac­
tions contribute to the happiness of individuals and 
society and hence label these actions virtuous. In this 
way man arrives at the principles of morality, which are 
the laws of nature. It is, then, an a posteriori pro­
cedure. Among the obligations imposed by natural law is 
universal benevolence, for "God has made benevolence to 
all rational beings the fundamental law of our nature."
That civil laws and society do not always live up 
to the standards set by the natural law is evident. This 
is because civil laws are not always made with a suffi­
cient regard for reason and natural law. Man has passions 
and appetites which often prevail over his rational na­
ture. This is to say that God determined that the state 
of mankind would be less than perfect. Man must accept 
this; he must submit to God's incomprehensible order.
Not to do so would be to overlook man's assigned place 
in the chain of being. For "if our reasoning faculties 
were more perfect than they are, the order of intellectual 
beings would be broken unnecessarily, and man would be 
raised above his proper form. . . . The reason he has is 
sufficient for him in the state allotted to him."
Man is by nature a social animal. "We are designed 
to be social, not solitary creatures. Mutual wants unite
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us; and natural benevolence and political order, on which 
our happiness depends, are founded in them. This is the 
law of our nature. . . ."81 Thus political society finds 
its origins in natural law. Here Bolingbroke is at one 
with Shaftesbury, but he did not accept the notion of 
Shaftesbury's that men are sociable because of natural 
affection. Rather sociability comes from "self love" 
which leads man to seek his pleasure and utility in so­
ciety. God, however, wanted men to be social also and 
hence endowed them with instincts, notably sexual in­
stincts. These led to offspring and the development of 
family life, which gradually widened to yield communities 
and countries. As these larger societies were formed 
instinct gave way to reason and man sought long-term 
happiness in society. Hence the virtues of benevolence, 
justice, and concern for the public good evolved as man 
came to see that private good depended upon the happiness 
of society. "These virtues, therefore, are the foundations 
of society; and thus men are led, by a chain of necessary 
consequences, from the instinctive to the rational law 
of nature, if I may speak so. Self love operates in all 
these stages. We love ourselves, we love our families.
B^The Philosophical Works of the late Right Honor- 
able Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke (London: 
TTMr, IV ,  p. 388'.------------------------------------------------------
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we love the particular societies to which we belong, and 
our benevolence extends at last to the whole race of 
mankind. Like so many different vortices, the center of 
them all is self love. . . . Shaftesbury, of course, 
vehemently denied that self love could lead to happiness.83 
Otherwise he and Bolingbroke agreed on the formation of 
society and, perhaps, more significantly, on the end of 
society— happiness. Bolingbroke is as forthright in 
declaring that public and private good are synonymous as 
Shaftesbury: ". . . since the author of our nature has
determined us irresistably to desire our own happiness, 
and since he has constituted us so, that private good 
depends on the public, and the happiness of every indi­
vidual on the happiness of society, the practice of all 
the social virtues is the law of our nature, and made 
such by the will of God, who, having determined the end 
and proportioned the means, has willed that we should 
pursue one by the other.”84
There was no state of nature, no contract to form 
government. Some form of government has existed ever since 
men and women first lived together in pursuit of instinc-
®^Bolingbroke, Works, IV, p. 11. 
83gee above, pp. 136-38. 
®^Bolingbroke, Works, IV, p. 11.
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tuai pleasure. Political society originated with fami­
lies and paternal authority. On these grounds Boling­
broke attacked Locke's doctrines, particularly his indi­
vidualism, which led to notions of equality. Such no­
tions subvert the established order. The principle of 
a hierarchical ordering of society was threatened by 
natural equality. Locke's notion of the perfect freedom 
of individuals made him, as Shaftesbury suggested, at one 
with Hobbes, for it would result in chaos and anarchy. 
" . . .  the state of mankind under the law of nature, ac­
cording to Locke, would have been very little, if at all, 
better than the state of nature before there was any such 
thing as law, according to Hobbes." Hierarchy is neces­
sary for social well-being and any efforts to remove it 
are contrary to nature. "Our real nature demands that 
there always be authority; if it were ever lacking men 
would live in the nightmare world of the Hobbesian state 
of war."
Thus Bolingbroke's political philosophy is aristo­
cratic and paternal. His "political thought is the ideol­
ogy of a family-centered aristocracy and gentry. Fathers, 
paternal authority, subordination, rank, cooperation, and 
public service are the dimensions of this ideology's 
superstructure."85 Clearly it is almost identical to
S^Kranmick, p. 98.
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Shaftesbury’s. Both men adopted cosmic tory p h i l o s o p h i e s ^ ô  
and derived their political ideas from them.
Bolingbroke is often, if not always,87 considered 
one of the founders of "modern" Toryism. His political 
thought provided a foundation for it. He certainly con­
sidered himself a member of the Tory party most of his 
life. Shaftesbury considered himself a Whig. Yet their 
doctrines do not oppose one another. Why? It is largely 
because both espoused country party principles and "with 
each passing year country and Tory became increasingly 
closely identified."®8 While Shaftesbury could never 
trust the Tories and always feared that they would re­
vert to their old ways, by 1712 he recognized the change 
that was taking place; " . . .  for my own part I am so 
contented with the present balance of power in our nation, 
and with the authority and prerogative of the Crown, such 
as the Tories have reduced it, that I can say from the 
bottom of my heart, I am as an Englishman the most truly
86i have not attempted to illustrate Bolingbroke's 
optimistic philosophy. I think that all students of Boling­
broke agree that he was an optimist and since he, as Shaftes­
bury, carried it into the political realm, he can be called 
a cosmic tory. That cosmic toryism lies behind his social 
thought should be clear from the references to acceptance 
of God's will and the chain of being.




monarchical in my principle."89 Thus the distinction be­
tween Whig and Tory, which Plumb and Holmes properly argue 
is there, is not an easy one to make. It is there simply 
because contemporaries saw it and could make it. But we, 
with the advantage of hindsight, can see its vagueness.
®^Letter to John Molesworth, 29 March 1712, PRO 23/9 
and Rand, p. 481. Geoffrey Holmes cites this remark and 
comments "The contrast with 1679 or with 1689 is forcibly 
brought home to us when we find an Ashley-Cooper, no less" 
making it. (p. 96)
CHAPTER IV 
ORIGINALITY OF SHAFTESBURY'S THOUGHT
Cosmic toryism, as has been shown, was something 
more than just a philosophical outlook. Its authors were 
attempting to incorporate a set of philosophical princi­
ples into ordinary life. As such they sought to provide 
a viable alternative to the fashionable English philoso­
phies based on the works of Newton and Locke. In formu­
lating his cosmic toryism Shaftesbury relied heavily on 
earlier writers. Ancients such as Socrates, Plato, 
Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius figured most prominently 
in his writings. Though he was clearly versed in con­
temporary thought as well, he generally preferred to dis­
regard it unless he was specifically criticizing some 
aspect of it. Thus one finds few references to seven­
teenth-century authors in Shaftesbury. All this raises 
questions about the originality of his thought, and about 
his relationship to his age. Did he borrow his ideas 
wholesale from the ancients, specifically the Stoics? Or 
did he add his own contributions to their systems? What 
were his relations with such contemporary thinkers as 
Locke, Spinoza, Bayle, and the Cambridge Platonists? In
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this chapter, I hope to answer these questions in an ef­
fort to determine his place in the history of ideas.
Among ancient works Shaftesbury cited the Medita­
tions of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius more often than any 
other work. By doing so he indicated his enormous debt 
to the Stoics; a debt which can most readily be seen 
through a brief account of Stoic ideas. Stoicism orig­
inated in the late fourth century B. C. and continued to 
be an influential philosophy until the firm establishment 
of Christianity in the Roman Empire. Throughout its 
history its proponents adhered remarkably closely to the 
ideas of its founder, Zeno. Thus the works of the two 
most influential late Stoics, Epictetus and Marcus 
Aurelius, may be taken as representative of the whole 
movement. The Emperor was primarily concerned to set 
forth the Stoic cosmological system and man’s relation 
to it, whereas Epictetus concerned himself with elaborat­
ing the ethical consequences of the system.
The Stoics found it impossible to accept the Epi­
curean notion that the world was a result of a fortuitous 
combination of matter and atoms. Rather they looked to 
the scientific work of Plato and Aristotle and saw the 
world as ordered, obeying the laws of nature. That is, 
it has a rational order due to the fact that God produced 
it. The universe, then, is a Whole and is good, because
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God is benevolent.
The substance of the universe is obedient 
and compliant ; and the reason which governs 
it has in itself no cause for doing evil, 
for it has no malice, nor does it do evil 
to anything, nor is anything harmed by it.
But all things are made and perfected ac­
cording to this reason.1
For there is one universe made up of all 
things, and one god who pervades all things, 
and one substance, and one law, /one7 com­
mon reason in all intelligent animals, and 
one truth.2
It is not just an ordered macrocosm, for man is a part of 
the order and of the Whole. "I am a part of the whole 
which is governed by nature . . . I am in a manner inti­
mately related to the parts which are of the same kind 
with myself."3 But if all things are so wisely ordered, 
why is the world so full of what we call evil? It is an 
illusion, since nothing can happen in the Whole which 
would be harmful to the Whole. Hence individuals must 
be content with everything that is assigned to them out 
of the Whole. "For the whole contains nothing which is
^Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VI, 1. For a de­
scription of his system see George Long, "The Philosophy 
of Antonius," Postscript to his translation of the Medi­
tation^ in Plato, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, The Harvard 
Classics (New York; 1937), pp. &20-45. For an excellent 
account of Stoicism in general see Ludwig Edelstein, The 
Meaning of Stoicism (Cambridge, Mass.; 1966).
^Meditations, VII, 9.
3lbid., X, 6 .
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not for its advantage; and all natures indeed have this
common principle, but the nature of the universe has this
principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by
any external cause to generate anything harmful to i t s e l f . "4
"Nothing is evil that is according to nature."5
The end of man is to live according to Nature, both
his own nature and that of the universe or the Whole. "To
the rational animal the same act is according to nature
and according to reason."® Reason causes man to be social ,
thus he must tailor his life and actions to the good of
the social community. "To act against one another then is
contrary to nature. . . . Man’s well-being comes not
through selfish practices, but by living according to the
universal nature, that is, by always working for the good
of the Whole. The Emperor sums up the Stoic vision of
man succinctly in a passage stating his own relationship
to the world:
If the gods have determined about me and about 
the things which must happen to me, they have 
determined well, for it is not easy even to 
imagine a deity without forethought; and as to 
doing me harm, why should they have any desire
4lbid.
Sibid., II, p, 17 
®Ibid., VII, 11. 
7lbid., II, 1.
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towards that? For what advantage would re­
sult to them from this or to the whole, which 
is the special object of their providence?
But if they have not determined about me in­
dividually, they have certainly determined 
about the whole at least ; and the things which 
happen by way of sequence in this general ar­
rangement I ought to accept with pleasure and 
to be content with them. But if they deter­
mine about nothing— which it is wicked to be­
lieve, or if we do believe it, let us neither 
sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do 
anything else which we do as if the gods were 
present and lived with us— but if however the 
gods determine about none of the things which 
concern us, I am able to determine about my­
self, and I can inquire about that which is 
useful; and that is useful to every man which 
is conformable to his own constitution and na­
ture. But my nature is rational and social; 
and my city and country, so far as I am An­
tonius, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it 
is the world. The things then which are useful 
to these cities are alone useful to me.8
The direct object of life for the Stoics, then, is not 
happiness; rather it is simply to live in conformity with 
nature. That this will lead ultimately to happiness is 
not denied, but even if it did not, man’s task would still 
be to conform to the dictates of the Whole.
The social nature of mankind led the Stoics to an 
enunciation of a rudimentary political philosophy. Such 
a philosophy is necessary since man can perfect himself 
only within the community of men. The initial social unit 
is the family— a unit which is natural, because it pre­
serves the species.9 Even within the family, which in-
S lbid., VI, 44.
am following Edelstein's discussion. Chapter IV, 
"The Stoic Way of Life," pp. 71-98.
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eludes slaves as members, Stoic respect for individuals 
is found. All human beings are equal and have inalien­
able rights. Thus no member of the family can subjugate 
the other members: all can and do bestow benefits upon
the whole family.
Beyond those to his family, man has duties to the 
state. First he must obey the laws of the state. Yet 
some of those laws may conflict with morality, for posi­
tive law is morally right only if it agrees with the law 
of nature, that is, if it is rational. For example, by 
nature all men are equal. There are no slaves, no castes, 
no nobilities by nature. Thus rational law must confirm 
individual rights to be morally correct. In such a case 
individual rights or freedoms are superior to the laws 
of the state and man must uphold these natural rights, 
even to the point of following the example of Socrates. 
Normally, however, he will not go so far, but will at­
tempt to bring reason to bear upon the laws, so that 
they will conform with the higher law, for "Law is not 
what any fool can do."^0 Thus man's highest duty is to 
resist wrong.
The form of government was not a major concern of 
the Stoics. Any type— kingship, oligarchy, or democracy—  
which worked for the good of the society was acceptable.
lOEpictetus, Discourses, IV, 7, 33.
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A king, for example, who understands that his duty is 
service will be a good king. He will know what is good 
and evil, he will exercise self-control and cultivate 
reason so that he can choose properly among the advice 
given him. He will not only educate himself, but he will 
surround himself with educated, and thus good, advisors.
He will appeal to his subjects for cooperation and he will 
refrain from violence. In short, he will be the fountain- 
head of law, because of his obedience to divine law or 
reason. Reason and virtue, then, form the basis of the 
state and bring it into agreement with the Whole.
Clearly the foundations and much of the superstruc­
ture of cosmic toryism are Stoic. Yet it must be noted 
that Shaftesbury diverged from the Stoics on at least two 
major points. First, he insisted that happiness was the 
primary end of life. Private happiness, according to him, 
was attainable only through virtue, which was the rational 
adherence to the public good or the Whole. Thus virtue 
is the primary aim of man's life, for it alone yields 
happiness. The Stoics found individual happiness only 
incidental: to them, the purpose of life was to conform
to the dictates of the Whole. This may appear to be a 
subtle distinction but it is nonetheless real, and it in­
dicates that Shaftesbury was more concerned with life in 
the immediate world than were the Stoics. This is not at
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all surprising when one remembers both that the purpose 
of his works was to provide guidance for the men of af­
fairs of the day and that his was not a transcendental 
age.
Second, while Shaftesbury never explicitly denied 
the equality of men, the whole thrust of his political 
philosophy negated the principle. For him society was 
based on familial relationships which were carried for­
ward into the larger state. That is, a paterfamilias 
relationship obtained. If there were not authority, if 
there were complete individualism, society would be an­
archical and most certainly would not conform to the laws 
and order of the Whole. Hence, men could not be equal.
Other parts of his cosmic toryism confirm this. 
Nature operates on hierarchical principles as seen in the 
chain of being. All parts of nature were graded and 
ordered from the lowest to the highest. If man were not 
also hierarchical in his social order, then the chain of 
being would be broken and the order of nature destroyed. 
Thus again, men cannot be equal. Finally, one of the 
purposes of cosmic toryism would be violated if equality 
or individualism existed. Shaftesbury set out to defend 
the status quo, which was an aristocratic society. He 
certainly could not then conclude that all men are equal.
Thus Shaftesbury adopted much from the Stoics, but
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he tailored Stoicism to meet his own needs. This can 
perhaps best be seen by remembering how he used Platonic 
arguments in The Moralists. There he utilized the myths 
of the Timaeus to account for the order and goodness of 
the universe.11 The Platonic explanation provided fur­
ther evidence of the goodness of the Deity and its cre­
ation, as well as providing a firmer foundation for the 
chain of being principle. Thus Plato enabled Shaftesbury 
to fill out the materials he adopted from the Stoic 
authors.
But his use of Plato raises another question: 
where did his knowledge of Plato come from? Did it come 
through his knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists or did 
Shaftesbury know Plato’s works firsthand? It has already 
been pointed out that a set of reading notes on Plato 
dated 1707 exists and that the most significant Platonic 
parts of The Moralists were added after that date.12 The 
notes themselves are extremely concise and are largely 
concerned with ethics. They indicate an immediate and 
fairly broad knowledge of the dialogues. These are the 
only direct references to Plato in Shaftesbury's notes, 
but the evidence contained in them is corroborated by his
llsee above, Chapter II, pp. 94-97
l^Se 
PRO 27/13.
^ e above. Chapter I I ,  pp. 9 7 -8 . The notes are in
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library catalogs^^ and an inventory of books purchased 
in H o l l a n d . Both list several copies of Plato's works 
in Greek, Latin, and contemporary translations, and com­
mentaries on Plato, including ones by Proclus, Ficino 
and Causabon.
An interesting anomaly occurs, however, when one 
searches for comments about the Timaeus. It is not men­
tioned in the reading notes and it is not included in 
any of the lists of contents of the collected editions.
This is surprising since the passages in The Moralists 
bear enough resemblance to that dialogue to indicate direct 
knowledge. The Earl did purchase both Proclus's commentary 
on the Timaeus and Chalcidius's early, but incomplete,
Latin translation of the work in Holland. So he certainly 
knew it, but whether he actually owned a complete copy 
is open to question.
In a letter to Michael Ainsworth he urged him to 
learn the Greek language, for it opened the "source and 
fountain" of all learning. But even if he did not yet 
know the language, he should read "the divine PLATO."15
l^The library catalogs are items PRO 23/10, 23/11, 
23/12 and are dated 1708-9.
14pRo 27/14 includes a list of books purchased dur­
ing his 1698 and 1703-4 visits to Holland.
1528 January 1709, PRO 2 5 /2 2 .
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Thus Shaftesbury's admiration for Plato is clear and 
there can be no doubt that his knowledge of the Greek 
philosopher was firsthand.
All this does not say, however, that his knowledge 
of the Cambridge Platonists did not lead him to the study 
of Plato. It remains a possibility, but as will be seen 
later, no definite evidence either way can be given.
That Shaftesbury had a thorough knowledge of and respect 
for the Cambridge Platonists cannot be doubted. Indeed, 
it will be recalled that his first publication was the 
preface to an edition of Benjamin Whichcote's Sermons in 
1698. To demarcate the influence of the Cambridge men 
on Shaftesbury, particularly on his cosmic toryism, is 
much more difficult. Students of "the Platonic Renais­
sance in England" almost unanimously assert that "Shaftes­
bury was fundamentally a Cambridge Platonist: most 
students of the Earl's writings agree that "it was from 
this tradition that Shaftesbury sprang."1?
Certainly Henry More and Ralph Cudworth receive
16J . A . Passmore, Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation
(Cambridge; 1951), p. 96; Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic 
Renaissance in England, trans. by James P. Pettegrove 
(Edinburgh: 1953), p. 159.
l^Brett, p. 13; also C. A. Moore, "Shaftesbury and 
the Ethical Poets in England," PMLA, 31 (1916), 266; R. S. 
Crane, "Suggestions toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of 
Feeling,"' ELH: A Journal of English Literary History, I
(1934), passim; and William E. Alderman, "The Significance 
of Shaftesbury in English Speculation," PMLA, 38 (1923), 
176.
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favorable recognition from him, even though he did not
ordinarily acknowledge contemporary sources. In The
Moralists he coupled Cudworth's The True Intellectual
System of the Universe with his own An Inquiry concerning
Virtue, noting that both works were considered offensive
because they seemed to support atheism.
You know the common Fate of those who dare 
to appear fair Authors. What was that pious 
and learned Man's Case, who wrote the Intel­
lectual System of the Universe? I confess it 
was pleasant enough to consider, that tho the 
whole World were no less satisfy'd with his 
Capacity and Learning, than with his Sincerity 
in the Cause of Deity ; yet was he acus'd of 
giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for 
having only stated their Reasons, and those 
of their Adversarys, fairly together. And 
among other Writings of this kind, you may 
remember how a certain Fair INQUIRY (as you 
/Theocles7 call'd it) was receiv'd, and what 
offence was taken at it.18
More recieved a somewhat critical notice in a letter to
Ainsworth:
Dr. MORE'S Enchiridion Ethicum, is a right 
good piece of sound morals; tho’ the doctor 
himself, in other english pieces, could not 
abide by it; but made different excursions 
into other regions, and was perhaps as great 
an enthusiast, as any of those, whom he wrote 
against. However, he was a learned and a 
good man.19
The fact that he singled More out and recommended him to 
Ainsworth to read mitigates the criticism, however. Also
l^Char., II, pp. 262-63.
1930 December 1709, PRO 25/22.
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his own use of More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus in his 
Letter concerning Enthusiasm indicates his agreement with 
the Platonist's views on the subject of enthusiasm.20 
Still none of this would confirm or deny Shaftesbury's 
debt to the Cambridge Platonists.
It is not possible to set forth a system as was done 
for the Stoics to juxtapose to cosmic toryism. The most 
that can be done is to point to a few similarities and 
differences of views. Shaftesbury’s thinking is wholly 
in agreement with that of the Cambridge men with respect 
to the importance of reason. It is the supreme power of 
man in nature and is the foundation of his existence. 
Virtue, based on reason, is the means to happiness or the 
good life. It is distinct from religion and thus forms 
the basis of "natural” morality, what Shaftesbury called 
the "moral sense." The Cambridge philosophers did not 
agree as to whether happiness is the end of man’s life or 
not: Whichcote argued that it was, whereas his pupil,
Cudworth, said it was merely a product of a virtuous life. 
There was also disagreement between the earlier thinkers 
and Shaftesbury about the role of evil in the world. The 
Cambridge group generally agreed that God bore no re-
2ûMany of the themes and examples, including that of 
ridicule, used by Shaftesbury came directly from More's 
earlier work. Indeed in his Miscellaneous Reflections he 
acknowledged his borrowings from More. Char., ÏÏ1, pp. 63- 
68.
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sponsibility for evil in the world but nevertheless ac­
cepted the doctrine of rewards and punishments to explain 
its purpose, Shaftesbury, of course, rejected the notion 
of rewards and punishments and adopted a Stoic attitude 
towards evil. Further analysis and comparison would in­
dicate that much of Shaftesbury’s ethical theory agrees 
with the doctrines of the earlier thinkers, but the prob­
lem of the relation of his cosmic toryism to their ideas 
remains enigmatic. Thus from the point of view of cosmic 
toryism, it is not possible to agree that Shaftesbury 
was "fundamentally a Cambridge Platonist." And since 
cosmic toryism serves as the foundation for his ethical 
system, it must be concluded that it, too, was derived 
from other sources, such as the Stoics and Plato. This, 
however, is not to say that the Cambridge Platonists did 
not influence Shaftesbury; rather it is to say that the 
influence is not readily definable.
Further problems arise in considering Shaftesbury’s 
relations with his contemporaries. Only with Leibniz is 
it possible to make a definite statement: the two men
worked wholly independently although their sources and 
conclusions were similar. Leibniz himself verified this 
when he commented that "If I had seen this book /The 
Moralists/ before the publishing of my Theodicee, I 
should have made that use of it I ought to have done,
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and borrowed from thence very considerable passages. ,
21. ." Leibniz's purpose was different from that of
Shaftesbury. He wished to create a metaphysical system
that would provide a foundation for the new thought of
29the seventeenth c e n t u r y . H i s  system, commonly known 
as monodology, required a pre-established harmony and 
divine ordering of the universe.23 Thus the Theodicy 
describes how and why God created this, the best of all 
possible worlds. It is a world in which evil exists, 
but good predominates. Since evil could not be entirely 
eliminated if man were to have free will, God, being 
good, chose to create that world in which it was minimal. 
When the consequences of these premises are spun out, the 
fabric of the world is seen to be quite analogous to 
Shaftesbury's. It is in purpose that the two men dif­
fered, for the Earl wished to defend a set of ideas con­
trary to those developed earlier in the century. He 
could not accept, as will become more evident shortly, 
the implications of empirical rationalism, and since he 
could not accept scholasticism— "the gibberish of the
2^See above. Chapter I, p. 30; PRO 26/9.
22g . W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness
of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, ed. 
with intro, by Austin Farre'r (London : 1952) , p. 12.
Z^Leibniz, p. 27.
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s c h o o l s " 2 4 — either, he turned to the idealism of Plato 
and the Stoics. Thus although the conclusions and methods 
of Leibniz are similar, their aims were divergent.
A word about Shaftesbury's philosophical abilities 
might be in order at this point, for when he is com­
pared with Leibniz the reasons for his secondary position 
in the history of ideas and his popularity in the eigh­
teenth century became clearer. Their differing objec­
tives go most of the way to explain the status of the 
two men. Leibniz, as already noted, was writing for a 
philosophical audience and hence took great care to en­
sure that his arguments were sound without worrying 
greatly about their popularity, although his record of 
controversies could be said to contradict this. Shaftes­
bury, on the other hand, was writing for men of affairs 
who were unlikely to be versed in the intricacies of 
formal philosophy. His arguments are usually quite 
sound, although they are often truncated, assertive, and 
frequently do not answer all possible questions. His 
basic argument for the existence of the Deity, the argu­
ment from design, is perhaps the soundest of all those 
a v a i l a b l e , 25 and is indicative of his approach. Thus his
24pR0 25/22.
25Bertrand Russell comments to this effect in his 
History of Western Philosophy (London: 1946), p. 612.
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works are cogent philosophically, although they were 
designed for popular consumption and occasionally remind 
one of the "philosophy for the ladies" genera, which was 
so popular in the early eighteenth century. It is pre­
cisely this simplicity which downgraded Shaftesbury's 
place in the history of ideas and which made him popular 
in the eighteenth century, a period given to dilettantism. 
Thus the differing objectives and styles of the two men 
have largely determined their status, for their systems 
have both subsequently been judged to be generally in­
correct .
A slightly less definite statement can be made about 
the connection between Locke and his pupil. The affec­
tion Shaftesbury felt for his master has already been 
observed. Their philosophical differences have been 
noted but not explored. When that is done it will be­
come clear that their ideas were fundamentally opposed: 
unfortunately the reasons for Shaftesbury's rejection of 
Locke’s principles can only be surmised.
The objections began early. When only eighteen, 
shortly after both had returned to England and before the 
Essay concerning Human Understanding appeared in the book­
s h o p s , 26 Shaftesbury wrote Locke to continue an earlier
26xhe first edition of the Essay went on sale in 
December 1689. Cranston, p. 327.
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conversation about the Essay. The letter raised many 
technical questions concerning the status of ideas and 
their relation to material objects. He clearly could 
not accept the implicit nominalism of the Essay, for he 
repeatedly asked how ideas could exist without matter 
(material objects) unless they had some independent ex­
istence of their own, that is, unless a form of idealism 
pertained.27 Already he was convinced that there were 
innate ideas and that any epistemology omitting them was 
suspect.
It is not possible to say what reading Shaftesbury 
had done by 1689 to convince him of the validity of innate 
ideas. There can be no question about his ability in the 
classics: Mrs. Birch taught him Greek and Latin, even
though Locke did not recommend Greek for a gentleman's 
education. Locke's tuition also ensured that he was 
well-grounded.in contemporary authors, but the Earl tend­
ed to dismiss contemporary learning, particularly empiri­
cism, with such statements as "It is not with me as with 
an empiric. . . ."28 His learning of Greek seems to
27Bodleian Library, MSS Locke, c. 7, f. 85, August 
1689. Also Lord ^ e t e r 7  King, The Life and Letters of John 
Locke, with Extracts from His Journals and Common-Place 
Books (London: 1858), pp. 182-85. King comments, referring 
to this letter, that "the reader will probably be of opinion 
/sic/that the friends of the author of the Essay gave him as 
much trouble as his public adversaries." (p. 182).
28Bodleian Library, MSS Locke, c. 7, f. 112, 29 Sep­
tember 1694, and King, pp. 186-88.
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have been the crucial deviation from the Lockean princi­
ples of education, rather than his antipathy towards con­
temporary knowledge, for he censured his tutor for not 
having an adequate understanding of Greek philosophy, which 
he believed would have saved him from error. "But if . . . 
he had known but ever so little of Antiquity, or been 
tolerably Learn'd in the state of Philosophy with the
Antients, he had not heap’d such Loads of Words upon Us. .
"29
One has to assume that the study of the Greek Langu­
age led Shaftesbury to his love of that ancient civiliza­
tion. It is possible that his study of the Cambridge 
Platonists or of the Stoics might have done it, but no 
direct evidence can be produced to confirm the possibility, 
other than the fact that Locke had certain connections 
with the Cambridge g r o u p . I t  makes little difference, 
however, because his knowledge of the Greeks was direct; 
his library contained many volumes in Greek, including all 
the major authors, and his notebooks are full of Greek 
passages. Indeed, Shaftesbury seems to me to fall directly
29Letter to General Stanhope, 7 November 1709, PRO
22/7.
S^Lady Masham, in whose house Locke spent his last 
years, was the daughter of Ralph Cudworth. Locke knew, but 
generally rejected, the ideas of the Platonists. (Cassirer, 
p. 159).
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into the tradition of Renaissance P l a t o n i s m . H i s  
breadth of knowledge, his love of classical antiquity, 
and his interest in ethics and aesthetics^^ are much more 
characteristic of the Florentine humanist than of the 
seventeenth-century empiricist or even of the Augustan 
poet. It is ironic, however, for most intellectual his­
torians agree that Renaissance Platonism led, in part, to 
that empiricism which Shaftesbury deprecated.
Another letter to Locke, dated 1694 towards the end 
of his period of intense study, shows that the philosoph­
ical principles which he held for the remainder of his life 
were formulated by this time. In the letter^^ he raised 
no questions about Locke's ideas; rather he simply stated 
his own view of philosophy and let it stand in opposition 
to his master's. Philosophy should teach one "how to be
SlCassirer's thesis is that there was a direct line 
between the Florentine Academy and Shaftesbury via the Cam­
bridge Platonists. As I stated above, I question the con­
clusion that Shaftesbury was a Cambridge Platonist, but I 
do not feel that these qualms necessarily prevent my class­
ifying him in the tradition of Renaissance Platonism.
32The role of aesthetics in cosmic toryism was pointed 
out in Chapter II. Shaftesbury, as Plato, equated the good 
with the beautiful (see pp. 76-9 and 103-6 above). Also, 
it will be remembered that the last years of his life were 
devoted to working out his aesthetic theories, a project he 
considered the culmination of all his work. See Rand,
Second Characters.
33Bodleian Library, MSS Locke, c. 7 f. 112, 29 Septem­
ber, 1694, and King, pp. 185-89.
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more sociable, and more a friend. . . . "  "For my part,
I am so far from thinking that mankind need any new 
discoveries, or that they lie in the dark, and are un­
happy for want of them, that I know not what we could 
ask of God to know more than we do, or easily may do.
The thing that I would ask of God should be to make men 
live up to what they know. . . . ” and that is that "all 
things in the universe are done for the best, and ever will 
go on so. . . ."
What is philosophy, then, if nothing of this 
is in the case? What signifies it to know 
(if we could know) what elements the earth was 
made from, or how many atoms went to make up 
the round ball we live upon, though we know it 
to an atom? What signifies it to know whether 
the chaos was cast in Dr. Burnet's34 mould, or 
if God did it a quite different way? What if 
we knew the exact system of that of our frames; 
should we learn any more than this, that God 
did all things wisely and for the best?
Contemporary natural philosophy was wrongheaded: it added
nothing to true knowledge.
What I count true learning, and all that we 
can profit by, is, to know ourselves; what it 
is that makes us low and base, stubborn against 
reason, to be corrupted and drawn away from 
virtue, of different tempers, inconstant, and 
inconsistent with ourselves; to know how to be 
always friends with Providence, though death 
and many such dreadful businesses come in the 
way; and to be sociable and good towards all
34Thomas Burnet, The Sacred Theory of the Earth 
(London: 1681). Burnet's theory was a controversial, but 
significant, milestone in the history of geological theory 
See C. C. Gillispie, Genesis and Geology (New York: 1959,
first published 1951).
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men, though they turn miscreants, or are 
injurious to us.
What Locke's reply to this tirade was will never be known, 
for Shaftesbury preserved no letters from the elder man.35 
Nonetheless it clearly indicates how divergent their phi­
losophical paths had become.
The year 1709, during which The Moralists was pub­
lished, saw Shaftesbury break his public silence about his 
opposition to Locke. In two letters he "ventur'd" to dis­
close "the greatest Confidence in the World, which is that 
of my Philosophy, even against my old Tutor and Governour, 
whose Name is so established in the World: but with whom
I ever conceal'd my Differences as much as p o s s i b l e . " 3 6
35it is a noteworthy hiatus in the Shaftesbury papers. 
Generally Shaftesbury preserved most of his correspondence, 
incoming and outgoing, but there are no letters from Locke 
or copies of letters to Locke in his papers. The same is 
true for Pierre Bayle. Professor Voitle feels that it is 
because Shaftesbury’s domestic life was not very systematic 
much before 1700 (personal letter, 29 April 1972). While 
this may explain the absence of correspondence with Locke, 
it will not suffice for the Bayle letters— most of which 
would have been written after 1700. Since the remainder of 
Shaftesbury's papers contain very few (no more than a dozen) 
letters on philosophical subjects— and those preserved were 
clearly considered important for there is more than one copy 
of most— I suspect that Shaftesbury may have destroyed all 
others. Why, I do not know. The only explanation seems to 
lie in their paucity. It is only reasonable to assume that 
a philosopher of some reputation would have corresponded 
with other thinkers. That Shaftesbury did is indicated by 
the few surviving letters; that some have been destroyed or 
lost is clear from other minor gaps in the papers.
^®Letter to General Stanhope, 7 November 1709, PRO 
22/7 and PRO 27/23.
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The first letter, to Michael Ainsworth, is more direct 
and outspoken in defense of innate ideas, which were so 
important to his own system. He began by asserting that 
Locke's work was a continuation of "those principles, 
which Mr. HOBBES set a foot in this last age. Mr. LOCKE, 
as much as I honour him on account of other writings (viz. 
on government, policy, trade, coin, education, toleration, 
&c.) . . . did however go in the self same track."3? In­
deed his former tutor was even more insidious than Hobbes:
'Twas Mr. LOCKE, that struck the home blow: 
for Mr. HOBBES'S character and base slavish 
principles in government took off the poyson 
of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. LOCKE that struck 
at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue 
out of the world, and made the very ideas of 
these (which are the same as those of GOD) un­
natural , and without foundation in our minds.
By rejecting innate ideas the author of the Essay destroyed 
the foundation of cosmic toryism. There could be no na­
tural understanding of the order and administration of the 
universe, no natural affection, no moral sense: in a
word, all would be anarchy.
THUS virtue, according to Mr. LOCKE, has no 
other measure, law, or rule, than fashion 
and custom: morality, justice, equity, de­
pend only on law and will : and GOD indeed
is a perfect free agent in his sense; that 
is, free to any thing, that is however ill;
^^3 June 1709, PRO 25/22. The eighteenth century knew 
this letter since the series of letters from Shaftesbury to 
Ainsworth was published in 1716 under the title Several Let­
ters , written by a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the Uni­
versity .
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for if he wills it, it will be made good; 
virtue may be vice, and vice virtue in its 
turn, if he pleases. And thus neither 
right nor wrong, virtue nor vice are any 
thing in themselves; nor is there any trace 
or idea of them naturally imprinted on human 
minds. Experience and,our catechism teach 
us all!
If there were no innate ideas or instincts how would the
species propagate itself?
Your THEOCLES, whom you commend so much . . . 
as modestly as he can, asks a Lockist, whether 
the idea of a woman (and what is sought after 
in woman) be not taught also by some catechism, 
and dictated to the man. Perhaps if we had no 
schools of Venus, nor such horid lewd books, 
or lewd companions; we might have no understand­
ing of this, till we were taught by our parents: 
and if the tradition should happen to be lost; 
the race of mankind might perish in a sober 
nation. This is very poor philosophy.
But surely Locke was intelligent enough to see such conse­
quences: why, then, did he ignore them? Because he was
"credulous." He was willing to believe stories of bar­
barian nations. He had "more faith, and was more learn'd 
in modern wonder-writers, than in antient philosophy. . . .'
The other letter was to General Stanhope.^® It makes 
the same basic points and arrives at the same conclusion.
As for Innate Principles, which You mention,
'tis in my Opinion one of the Childeshest dis­
putes that ever was. Well it is for our friend 
M r . Lock and other modern Philosophers of his 
size, that they have so poor a Specter as the 
Ghost of Aristotle to fight with. A ghost.
387 November 1709, PRO 2 2 /7  and 2 7 /2 3 .
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indeed! Since 'tis not in reality the 
Stagirite himself nor the original Peri- 
patetick Hypothesis, but the poor Secon­
dary tralatitiouse System of modern and 
barbarouse Schoolmen which is the Subject 
of their continual Triumph. Tom Hobbs 
whom I must confess a Genius, and even an 
Original among these Latter Leaders in 
Philosophy, had allready gather'd Lawrells 
enow and at an easy rate, from this field.
Shaftesbury went on to defend the innateness of natural
affections and their role in society, again making the
points that society would be anarchical without an innate
sense of right and wrong and that without instincts the
species would not survive. But before administering the
final coup de grace, he perversely found a use for Locke's
Essay : "For as ill a Builder as he is, and as Little
able to treat the home-points of Philosophy; he is of
admirable Use against the Rubbish of the Schools; in
which most of Us have been bred up. But if instead of
the Phantom he oppos'd, and had allways before his Eyes,
he had known but ever so little of Antiquity, or been
tolerably Learn'd in the state of Philosophy with the
Antients, he had not heap'd such Loads of Words upon Us. .
. ." Neither of these condemnations were published in
Shaftesbury's lifetime and thus he never put his objections
into print. Once again, I would assert it was because of
his personal affection for Locke.
At first it seems extraordinary that such a brilliant
pupil could develop a system so contrary to that of his
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master, but it had happened before. Once need only cite 
the case of Plato and Aristotle for confirmation. As with 
the more famous master and pupil, Locke and Shaftesbury 
had antithetical minds. To use the epithets of a contem­
porary controversy, Locke was a modern, Shaftesbury an 
ancient.
Whether or not two other late seventeenth-century 
figures influenced Shaftesbury is open to question. The 
evidence concerning his use of Bayle and Spinoza is nebu­
lous. The eulogies which the Earl wrote after Bayle's 
death have already been q u o t e d . T h e y  indicate an inti­
mate relationship and frequent conversation. They also 
show that Shaftesbury often tested his ideas in those con­
versations. To say more than this, however, is difficult. 
In the sketch of his father's life, the fourth Earl says 
that the two men "never ceased" to correspond "till Mr. 
Bayle's death" in 1706.^0 yet there are no traces of the 
correspondence in the Shaftesbury papers; as with Locke, 
the Earl neither kept incoming letters nor made copies of 
outgoing ones.41 Hence that potential source of informa­
tion is closed off and the published works of the two 
philosophers must be examined for traces of influence.
39see above. Chapter I, pp. 15-17 
40%and, p. xxiii.
41gee note 35 above.
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Parallel passages can be cited, but they are not 
conclusive. Bayle's Miscellaneous Thoughts on the Comet 
of 1680, a copy of which was in Shaftesbury’s l i b r a r y , 42 
argues that morality is independent of religion and that 
an atheist can be a moral person, A similar argument 
forms a major portion of An Inquiry concerning Virtue, 
but, it will be recalled, Shaftesbury cited Ralph Cud­
worth 's The True Intellectual System of the Universe as 
a work with much the same aim as his Inquiry when he de­
fended it in The M o r a l i s t s .43 Thus, even though Bayle 
argues that friendship is the true principle of men's 
actions, it cannot be said that the Miscellaneous Thoughts 
provided Shaftesbury with these notions, although Bayle's 
use of them might well have reinforced them in his own 
mind.
There can be little doubt that the passages in The 
Moralists refuting Manicheanism were intended as answers 
to the theses promoted in the Historical and Critical 
Dictionary. Shaftesbury's "optimistic" solution of the 
problem of evil could in no way be reconciled with any 
Manichean system of two principles, although, as was point-
42”Catalogus Librorum Anglicorum, Gallicorum, Itali- 
corum &c. utriusque Bibliothecae vizi AEgidianae & Chel- 
seyanae Comitis de Shaftesbury AEgidiis Anno AErae Chris­
tianas 1709," PRO 23/12.
43gee above, p. 175.
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ed out in Chapter 11,44 he seemed to toy briefly with the 
possibility. Still this use of Bayle is not indicative 
of major influence, for the concept of two principles 
merely provided Shaftesbury with a straw-man argument to 
strengthen his own. And it was one which he would logic­
ally have to answer even if he did not know the Dictionary.
Even less can be said about Spinoza. It seems un­
likely that Shaftesbury did not know the works of the 
great Jewish philosopher, for if he did not read them 
independently, he would have found lengthy passages con­
cerning them in Bayle's Dictionary, which he did read.45 
The Earl apparently did not own copies of any of his works, 
for none are listed in the library catalogs. Cryptic 
comments in both the notebooks and the Characteristics 
referring to a philosopher who believed in multiple in­
telligences governing nature would seem to refer to Spinoza, 
but he is never actually named. J. M. Robertson in his 
edition of the Characteristics (1900) indicated what he 
considered to be Spinozean passages in his footnotes.
They do indicate a similarity of ideas, but they provide 
no real evidence of immediate knowledge on Shaftesbury’s 
part. Given the third Earl’s attitude toward contemporary
44see above. Chapter II, pp. 57-58 and 101.
45various letters to Le Clerc, Des Maizeaux and other 
mutual acquaintances indicate that Shaftesbury read each 
volume of the Dictionary as Bayle sent it to him.
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works, it is probably safe to conclude that he was not 
significantly, if at all, indebted to Spinoza.
Thus Shaftesbury does not seem to have been notably 
influenced by any seventeenth-century authors. He was 
familiar with most of their works, but he generally re­
jected them in favor of his beloved ancients. He was 
greatly inspired by the latters’ works and borrowed 
heavily from them, particularly Plato, the Stoics, and 
the neo-Platonists. But he did not simply parrot their 
ideas. Rather he modified and adapted them to his age—  
such as the Renaissance Platonists had done two centuries 
earlier. That he was wholly conscious of what he was 
doing is confirmed by his letter to Lord Somers accompany­
ing the first edition of The Moralists.^ 6 Here he argued 
that statesmen should be philosophers as they were in 
antiquity. His purpose in writing was to provide a guide 
to philosophy: he could do it because he had the leisure,
not being able to participate in the affairs of state.
Thus the ancients provided the ideal: it was the job of
the moderns to achieve it. The Characteristics provided 
a means of doing so.
The preponderant influence of the ancients is fur­
ther illustrated by Shaftesbury's reading, although his
4620 October 1705, PRO 22/4. See above. Chapter I, 
pp. 35-37.
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thorough knowledge of contemporary works is also made 
clear. What he read may, in part, be determined by an 
analysis of his library catalogs and lists of books 
purchased. The Shaftesbury Archive in the Public Record 
Office contains three library catalogs, one dated 1708 
and two 1709.4? The latter two contain all the items 
listed in the first one and thus only they need be con­
sidered. The 1709 catalogs are divided according to 
languages involved: one contains only Greek and Latin
items; the other only English, French and Italian works. 
Both are approximately 100 pages long, with a varying num­
ber of items— an average of five— on each page. Since 
the Greek and Latin catalog lists, almost exclusively, 
works of the ancients and the modern language catalog 
contains mostly contemporary works, it is clear that 
Shaftesbury's library was fairly evenly divided between 
the two groups. The ancients, however, do predominate 
since many of the contemporary works are translations and 
editions of classical authors. All the major writers of 
philosophy and literature, Greek and Latin, are included. 
It is a thoroughly balanced list in which no single group 
of authors stands out. The ancients' catalog can be sup­
plemented by a lengthy list of some 160 volumes, all in
47pRO 23/10, 23/11, and 23/12 respectively. I have 
been unable to determine if any of the library remains at 
Wimborne St. Giles.
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Greek and Latin, which were purchased during the Earl's 
two periods of residence in H o l l a n d . 4 8  jf  these are the 
only books he purchased while there, and the lists con­
tain no hint that they might be incomplete, his passion 
for ancient literature is fully confirmed.
The modern language catalog is equally significant 
for it shows that he was aware of almost all of the most 
important seventeenth-century authors. He knew, for 
example, the continental political theorists, Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Guy de Balzac, and Machiavelli, as well as 
the major English theorists, Hooker, Harrington, Hobbes, 
Filmer, Molesworth, Temple, Locke, and Tyrrell. He knew 
the major Latitudinarian writers, Burnet, Stillingfleet, 
and Tillotson, as well as the Cambridge Platonists. And 
the library included the works of Bacon, Descartes, Boyle, 
Grew, and Sprat, which indicates that his anti-empiricism 
was not the result of ignorance of the new science. There 
are, however, notable omissions: none of the works of
Isaac Newton is included, even though there is evidence 
that Shaftesbury knew him personally ; 49 Spinoza, as has 
already been pointed out, is missing; and so is John Dryden,
48pR0 27/14. The list is found in the back of a note­
book containing his "Design of a Socratick History" and 
commonplace notes.
49At least two letters from Naples refer to Newton 
in a manner which indicates that they were acquainted. PRO 
23/8 and 23/9.
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even though most other contemporary poets are included.
The last omission is perhaps explained by family pique, 
for "Absalom and Achitophel" must surely have offended 
the Shaftesburys greatly. The least that can be said 
about the third Earl is that he was well-read. He was 
a philosopher in the original sense of the term.
Where, then, does the third Earl of Shaftesbury 
stand in the history of ideas? Cosmic toryism is, to a 
significant degree, derivative. Yet it is remarkably 
fresh and original in its effort to bring about a ren­
aissance of ancient ideas. Several writers, particularly 
the Cambridge Platonists, had already expressed many of 
the sentiments found in the Characteristics, most notably, 
the emphasis on reason and virtue as the means of attain­
ing the good life. Their sources were often the same as 
Shaftesbury’s. Yet none formulated a system as complete, 
as unitary, and as compelling as cosmic toryism. It was 
a viable system simply because it met many of the needs 
of the age. It offered an alternative to the extremes of 
empiricism. It defended the hierarchical social and cos­
mological systems. And, most importantly, it resisted 
pessimistic views of mankind by accepting the natural 
goodness of man and exploiting it for the benefit of 
society. In this manner, the Characteristics opened the 
way for the eighteenth century’s quest for happiness. It
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offered a formula to mitigate the extremes of the seven­
teenth century and to promote the sense of balance and 
proportion which dominated the eighteenth. Thus Shaftes­
bury stood on the bridge between the two centuries.50
50üavid Ogg (pp. 542-43) uses the bridge analogy to 
describe Shaftesbury. I have purposely borrowed it since 
it seems to me to be the most apt description of Shaftes­
bury's place in the history of ideas.
CHAPTER V
EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VIEWS OF COSMIC TORYISM
The generous Ashley, thine, the friend of man;
Who scanned his nature with a brother’s eye.
His weakness prompt to shade, to raise his aim.
To touch the finer movements of the mind.
And with the moral beauty charm the heart.
James Thomson, "Summer”
Among the works that any educated man of the eigh­
teenth century could be expected to know was the Char­
acteristics .^  Its popularity has been well documented. 
Eleven English editions of the work were published be­
tween 1711 and 1790, and it was translated into French 
and German. Aldridge has compiled an "incomplete" bib­
liography containing over 200 English and French items
which referred to Shaftesbury in the course of the cen­
tury. ^  The list indicates that the Characteristics was 
controversial, for most of the notices are of polemical 
works either defending or opposing Shaftesbury. It also 
shows that the Scottish moralists, notably Hutcheson, Hume 
and Smith, found inspiration for their treatises in the
lErnest Tuveson, "The Importance of Shaftesbury,"
ELH: A Journal of English Literary History, 20 (1953), 267n,
%Aldridge, "Deist Manifesto" pp. 371-382.
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Earl's theories. The catalog does not, however, adequately 
illustrate the assimilation of cosmic toryism into eigh­
teenth-century thought.
Within twenty years after the first edition of the 
Characteristics, the scope of Shaftesbury's influence had 
clearly emerged. Not only did he inspire a school of 
academic philosophy, but cosmic toryism also provided a 
basis for the self-confident attitudes of the age of Wal­
pole. It buttressed the position of the aristocracy and 
reinforced the inertia of the social system.^ As is often 
the case, the literature of the day most clearly reflected 
the promise and frustrations of the system. The zenith 
of cosmic toryism was reached in Pope's An Essay on Man.
In his imposing work Pope reiterated the universality, as 
well as the anti-empirical nature, of the concept. Other 
writers with a more limited perspective, such as Addison 
and Fiddes, accepted the system but emphasized only the 
role of virtue in the quest for happiness. Mandeville, 
on the otherhand, demonstrated the impracticality of it. 
All, however, reflected the significance of cosmic toryian 
in the Augustan Age.
Mr. Spectator, whose essays were the rage of London 
and the country in 1711 and 1712, promoted many of the 
doctrines of the Characteristics. But neither Shaftesbury
3Plumb, p. 187.
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nor the Characteristics were ever mentioned in The Spec­
tator . It seems unlikely that Addison did not know the 
Earl’s work, especially since both authors dedicated 
their works to Lord Somers and were both active in the 
Whig party. Still one recalls Shaftesbury's plaintive 
remarks on the quiet reception of his works in 1712.4 
Perhaps among other things he was bemoaning the fact that 
Mr. Spectator had not acknowledged them. Be that as it 
may, many of the ideas found in The Moralists and An 
Inquiry are also found in Addison's contributions to 
The Spectator and here they reached a far larger audience. 
Indeed, Addison's biographer says that The Spectator was 
second only to the Bible in influencing English morals
5
and manners in the eighteenth century.
Addison's version of cosmic toryism was nowhere as 
systematic or complete as Shaftesbury's. It was presented 
in snippets at odd intervals, rather than as a sustained 
argument. Still it is possible to see that the essayist's 
aims and beliefs were substantially the same as the phi­
losopher's. The dedication to Lord Somers said that the 
purpose of the paper was "to Cultivate and Polish Human
4see above. Chapter I, pp. 32-34.
Speter Smithers, The Life of Joseph Addison, Second 
Edition (Oxford: 1968), p. 254 and The Spectator, ed. by
G. Gregory Smith, intro, by Peter Smithers, 4 vols. (Lon­
don: 1906-7, reprinted 1957), I, p. viii.
200
Life, by promoting Virtue and Knowledge, and by recom­
mending whatsoever may be . . . Useful . . .  to Society."® 
In issue ten Mr. Spectator said he was "ambitious to 
have it said of me, that I have brought Philosophy out 
of Closets and Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell .
. . at Tea-Tables and in Coffee-Houses."? Philosophy, 
and it soon became clear that the term meant the promotion 
of virtue, was to be made available to the public, so that 
society as a whole could be improved.
There can be no doubt that the world is an ordered 
one, that God created a unified and rational universe. 
Indeed, "The Supream Being has made the best Argument for 
his own Existence, in the Formation of the Heavens and 
the Earth, and these are Arguments which a Man of Sense 
cannot forbear attending to. . . . Nothing is more 
pleasant for man than to contemplate the order and pro­
portions of the universe, to compare "the Body of Man to 
the Bulk of the whole Earth, the Earth to the Circle it 
describes round the Sun, that Circle to the Sphere of the 
fixt Stars, the Sphere of the fixt Stars to the Circuit 
of the whole Creation, the whole Creation it self to the 
Infinite Space that is every where diffused about it. . .
^Spectator, I. p. 1. 
^Spectator, no. 10.
-9
8 l b i d . , no. 465. ^ I b i d . , no. 420.
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Such activities not only exercise the "Understanding," 
but they also confirm the order and hierarchical nature 
of the world. Consideration of the "Creation is a per­
petual Feast to the Mind of a good Man, every thing he 
sees chears and delights him," for it indicates the bene­
ficence of the creator.10
Yet, "Man is subject to innumerable Pains and Sor­
rows by the very Condition of Humanity," that is, evil 
or ill exists in the world. Man compounds his misery by 
his own malice, treachery, and injustice. But if he were 
benevolent and compassionate in his relations with his 
fellow man, "half the Misery of Human Life might be ex­
tinguished."H Addison called this disposition "Good­
nature" and his exposition of it parallels that of Shaftes­
bury on natural affection. "Good-nature is generally 
born with us. . . ." It is "an Overflowing of Humanity, 
such as an exuberant Love of Mankind. . . ."12 Good­
nature is a "Moral Virtue" if it is rational, that is, if 
it operates as something more than an instinct. To de­
termine this, it must be measured against three rules;
First, Whether it acts with Steadiness and 
Uniformity in Sickness and in Health, in 
Prosperity and in Adversity. . . ; The next
lOjbid., no. 393. 
lllbid., no. 169. 
12jbid.
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way of a Man’s bringing his Good-nature to 
the Test is, to consider whether it oper­
ates according to the Rules of Reason and 
Duty, . . ; The third Tryal of Good-nature 
will be the examining our selves, whether 
or no we are able to exert it to our own 
Disadvantage, and employ it on proper Ob­
jects, notwithstanding any little Pain,
Want or Inconvenience which may arise to 
our selves from it; In a word, whether we 
are willing to risque any part of our For­
tune, our Reputation, our Health or Ease, 
for the Benefit of Mankind.13
Since man is a ’’Sociable A n i m a l " 1 4  and Good-nature is the
natural love of mankind, a man who has accepted his place
in nature will be conscious of it and will use moral vir­
tue for the public good. In a passage that could have 
been written by Shaftesbury, Addison summarized all this:
A Person, therefore, who is possessed with 
such an habitual good Intention as that which 
I have been here speaking of, enters upon no 
single Circumstance of Life without consider­
ing it as well-pleasing to the great Author 
of his Being, conformable to the Dictates of
Reason, suitable to human Nature in general,
or to that particular Station in which Pro­
vidence has placed him. He lives in a per­
petual Sense of the Divine Presence, regards 
himself as acting, in the whole Course of 
his Existence, under the Observation and In­
spection of that Being. . . .15
In perhaps the most famous of the Spectator papers 
Addison discussed ’’Chearfulness. ”16 Chearfulness is an-
13lbid., no. 177. 
14ibid., no. 9. 
ISibid., no. 213. 
IGibid., no. 381.
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alogous to Good-nature and virtue and is the foundation 
of happiness. A man who possesses cheerfulness is "not 
only easy in his Thoughts, but a perfect Master of all 
the Powers and Faculties of his Soul. . . .  He comes with 
a Relish to all those Goods which Nature has provided for 
him, tastes all the Pleasures of the Creation which are 
poured about him, and does not feel the full Weight of 
those accidental Evils which may befall him." His rela­
tions with his fellow-men will produce "Love and Good­
will." He is grateful to the "Author of Nature," for 
cheerfulness "is a kind of Acquiesence in the State 
wherein we are placed, and a secret Approbation of the 
Divine Will in his Conduct towards Man. . . . "  A man 
who endeavors to live according to the principles of 
virtue and reason has "two perpetual Sources of Chearful­
ness." The first is his own existence, for his very 
being "spreads a perpetual Diffusion of Joy through the 
Soul of a virtuous Man." The second is the contemplation 
of the perfection and amiability of "that Being on whom 
we have our Dependence." Man finds himself "every where 
upheld by his Goodness, and surrounded with an Immensity 
of Love and Mercy."
Such Considerations, which every one should 
perpetually cherish in his Thougts, will ban­
ish from us all that secret Heaviness of 
Heart which unthinking Men are subject to 
when they lie under no real Affliction, all 
that Anguish which we may feel from any Evil
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that actually oppresses us, to which I 
may likewise add those little Cracklings 
of Mirth and Folly that are apter to be­
tray Virtue than support it; and estab­
lish in us such an even and chearful Tem­
per, as makes us pleasing to our selves, 
to those with whom we converse, and to
him whom we were made to please.
Even if the first edition of the Characteristics 
met with a slow response, the notions of Good-nature and 
Chearfulness popularized the basic ideas of cosmic tory­
ism. Both Shaftesbury and Addison sought to sustain the 
social order by promoting virtue and happiness within it. 
Both saw the Revolution Settlement as a vindication of 
that order.17 It had its flaws, but the banishment of 
"Vice and Ignorance,"!® which Mr. Spectator set out to 
do, would rectify them and ensure its continuation. On 
a less exalted plane, then, Addison, too, promoted a 
cosmic tory system.
There is nothing to suggest that Addison derived
his ideas from Shaftesbury. Indeed the fact that both
published almost simultaneously weighs against such a 
possibility. What is indicated, however, is that cosmic 
toryism was "in the air." Shaftesbury’s role was that of 
systematizer; Addison's was that of popularizer.
l^Spectator, no. 287, and T. B. Macaulay, "The Life 
and Writings of Addison," Critical and Historical Essays 
contributed to 'The Edinburgh Review’ (London": 1663), pp,
738-39.
1®Specta tor , no. 58.
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Without doubt the finest poetic expression of cosmic 
toryism was Alexander Pope's An Essay on Man (1733). From 
the beginning controversy has swirled about the origins 
of the work. Voltaire, among others, asked "pourquoi M. 
Pope en fait uniquement honneur à M. de Bolingbroke, sans 
dire un mot du célébré Shaftesbury, elève de Locke.
Pope freely admitted his debt to Bolingbroke but never 
acknowledged the Characteristics. The problems posed by 
this have been discussed by several scholars with varying 
results. R. L. Brett concluded that Pope was in the tra­
dition of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke, but that the ideas 
originated in the rational theory of the Cambridge Platon­
i s t s . ^0 Because of my qualms about their role in Shaftes­
bury's thought, I find C. A. Moore's earlier analysis more 
convincing.21 He argued that Pope was indebted to the 
Earl in three ways: first, many of the ideas attributed
to Bolingbroke originated in the Characteristics ; second, 
that some of Pope's phrasing indicates direct borrowing 
from The Moralists; and third, that the poet's acceptance 
of instinctive social affection is at variance with Bol-
l^Lettres sur les Anglais, no. 22, quoted in Brett, 
p. 190; also Fowler, pT 1Ô2.
B^Brett, p. 195.
BlMoore, pp. 300-8; Fowler also remarks that "several 
lines, especially of the First Epistle, are simply state­
ments from the Moralists done into verse." (p. 151).
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ingbroke’s theories and is wholly in accord with Shaftes­
bury's. Thus, according to Moore, "Pope's Essay on Man 
. . . becomes a conspicuous proof of the literary ascen­
dency attained by the Characteristics."22 The affinity 
of the two works will be clearly illustrated by an exam­
ination of the Essay.
Pope embarked on the task of studying the "Nature 
and State of MAN, with Respect to the UNIVERSAL SYSTEM" 
to find his "proper end and purpose of . . . being" so 
that he could enunciate a system of e t h i c s . ^3 The First 
Epistle establishes that this is the best of worlds to 
"vindicate the ways of God to M a n . "24
Of Systems possible, if 'tis confest
That Wisdom infinite must form the b e s t . 25
The universe is immense and nicely ordered. It is f u l l , 26 
as it must be for coherence. Its order is expressed in a 
"vast chain of being" which reaches from God to nothing
22Moore, p. 307.
23The Poems of Alexander Pope: A one-volume edition
of the Twickenham Text with selected Annotations, ed. John 
Butt (London; 1963), Essay on Man, "To the Reader" and
"The Design," pp. 501-21
24Essay, I , 16.
2 5 i b i d . , 43-44.
26xhe principle of plenitude. Lovejoy gives a lengthy 
analysis of the Essay as the strongest statement of the 
chain of being principle in the eighteenth century, pp. 
189-207.
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and encompasses the full c r e a t i o n . 27 Man is but one
creature on the scale; yet he believes that he occupies
a special place, that the earth is for him. "In Pride,
in reas’ning Pride, our error lies."^®
But if the end of man is happiness, right reasoning
will teach him to forego pride and to submit. "The bliss
of Man (could Pride that blessing find)/ Is not to act or
think beyond m a n k i n d . " 2 9  Man must consider his true place
in nature and see it in relation to the Whole.
Then say not Man's imperfect, Heav'n in fault;
Say rather, Man's as perfect as he ought;
His knowledge measur'd to his state and place.39
Having done this, man will understand that he cannot compre­
hend the entirety of things; that those things that appear
wrong to him are not so, but are part of God's design.
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
All Discord, Harmony, not understood;
All partial Evil, universal Good:
And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
OneTruth is clear, 'Whatever IS, is RIGHT.'31
Thus the First Epistle established two of the basic princi­
ples of cosmic toryism, that there is unity of the Whole






and that all ill is merely apparent.
As Shaftesbury, Pope then turned to man's relation­
ship with himself and other men, that is, to formulating 
his system of ethics.
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of Mankind is Man.
Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side.
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride.
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest,
In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;
In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer.
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such.
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd;
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd;
Created half to rise, and half to fall;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl'd;
The glory, jest, and riddle of the w o r l d ’. 3 2
How like Shaftesbury's rant deploring the state of mankind:
0 WRETCHED State of Mankind!— Hapless Nature, 
thus to have err'd in thy chief Workmanship!
 Whence sprang this fatal Weakness? What
Chance or Destiny shall we accuse? . . . that 
wretched Mortal, ill to himself, and Cause of 
111 to a l l . 33
Man on his own is miserable. He cannot help but err for 
he is helpless. Only by knowing himself, and thus his 
position in nature, can he overcome his innate handicaps. 
Both Pope and Shaftesbury devote their works to elaborat­
ing a means whereby man can do just that.
32Essay, I I ,  1 -1 8 .
33char . ,  I I ,  pp. 192-93.
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Pope found two principles in human nature, self-
love and r e a s o n . 34 Alone, neither is capable of properly
guiding man, but together they can lead man to his end—
h a p p i n e s s . 35 At this early stage. Pope's self-love is
not yet Shaftesbury's natural affection: it is more akin
to Hobbes's self-interest, but as the Essay unfolds the
identity of the two notions becomes apparent.
Ev'n mean Self-love becomes, by force divine.
The scale to measure others wants by thine.3o
Selfish man often thinks that God works solely for his
good, but reason teaches the contrary, that all is not
made for one, but "one for all." Comprehending this, we
see that "God, in the nature of each being, founds/ Its
proper bliss, and sets its proper b o u n d s . " 3 7  A n d  thus,
instinct, common to all beings, binds them together for
mutual sustenance:
Not Man alone, but all that roam the wood.
Or wing the sky, or roll along the flood,
Each loves itself, but not itself alone.
Each sex desires alike, 'till two are one.
Nor ends the pleasure with the fierce embrace;
They love themselves, a third time, in their r a c e . 38
34Essay, II, 53-54. 
35ibid., 87-88. 
36ibid., 291-92. 
37Essay, III, 109-10. 
38ibid., 119-24.
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Self-love thus is the same as the Earl's natural affection. 
It is more pronounced in man because of his natural weak­
ness and his reason.
A longer care Man’s helpless kind demands;
That longer care contracts more lasting bands: 
Reflection, Reason, still the ties improve.39
Man's self-love leads directly to the establishment
of society, just as natural affection did in The Moralists:
here too no state of nature existed prior to it.
Nor think, in NATURE'S STATE they blindly trod;
The state of Nature was the reign of God:
Self-love and Social at her birth began.
Union the bond of all things, and of M a n . 40
Nature instructed man to learn how to govern this society 
from the creatures. Thus he created a patriarchal state 
where the common interest "plac'd the sway in one" and 
"A Prince the Father of a People m a d e . "41 Within the 
state self-love had two faces. It could drive man's ambi­
tion and lust, in which case tyranny would prevail, or 
it could direct him to the public good, in which case 
virtue would prevail.
Self-love forsook the path it first pursu'd.
And found the private in the public good.42
39ibid., 131-33. 
40lbid., 146-50. 
4 1 l b i d ., 209-14. 
42ibid., 281-82.
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Thus God and Nature link'd the gen'ral frame.
And bade Self-love and Social be the s a m e . 43
As Shaftesbury's natural affection is at its best when it
adheres to the public good, so self-love is greatest when
it embraces social good.
Happiness, "our being's end and a i m ! " 4 4  is the goal
of society. It can be found by taking nature’s path and
remembering that
. . . 'the Universal Cause
Acts not by partial, but by general laws;'
And makes what Happiness we justly call 
Subsist not in the good of one, but a l l . 45
Riches, honors, nobility, fame are all sought by many as 
tangible evidence of happiness. But these things cannot 
yield real happiness, for what satisfies one does not sa­
tisfy all. Nor can they overcome accidents and ills.
Only he
Who sees and follows that great scheme the best.
Best knows the blessing, and will most be b l e s t . 46
He who understands the great scheme knows that "Virtue alone
is Happiness b e l o w . "47 The virtuous man
Joins heav'n and earth, and mortal and divine;
Sees, that no being any bliss can know,
43ibid., 317-18. 





But touches some above, and some below;
Learns, from this union of the rising Whole,
The first, last purpose of the human soul;
And knows where Faith, Law, Morals, all began.
All end in LOVE of GOD, and LOVE of M A N . 48
Thus virtue enables man not only to understand, but also
to fulfill, his place in the world. It links him to all
other beings and guides him to the common good.
Self-love thus push’d to social, to divine.
Gives thee to make thy neighbour's blessing 
thine.
Grasp the whole worlds of Reason, Life, and Sense, 
In one close system of Benevolence:
God loves from Whole to Parts : but human soul
Must rise from Individual to the Whole.
Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake.
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;
The centre mov’d, a circle strait succeeds.
Another still, and still another spreads.
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace.
His country next, and next all human race.
Wide and more wide, th’ o ’erflowings of the mind
Take e v ’ry creature in, of e v ’ry kind;
Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest.
And Heav’n beholds its image in his b r e a s t . 49
Self-love, as natural affection, in its widest manifesta­
tion gives man the means to live in this best of worlds by
teaching him to know himself.
Whether Pope actually knew the Characteristics or 




ilarity to the earlier work, he set forth a cosmic tory 
system almost as complete as Shaftesbury's. The actual 
origins of the Essay make little difference. What is im­
portant is that the system was presented once again as an 
alternative to empiricism. At least part of the eighteenth 
century was not yet ready to yield to the new philosophy.
Cosmic toryism was not without its critics, however. 
The critics generally objected to parts of Shaftesbury's 
system rather than to it as a whole. Its ethical impli­
cations were most often rejected— notably by Mandeville. 
Such criticism, while apparently limited, actually struck 
at the whole since the concept of virtue enunciated by the 
Earl is entirely derivative from the principles of cosmic 
toryism. It was not possible to destroy one section of 
the structure without destroying the whole structure.
Bernard Mandeville was by far the best known of 
Shaftesbury's critics in the eighteenth century. His 
Fable of the Bees was often considered to be solely di­
rected against the Characteristics. But his modern edi­
tor, F. B. Kaye, contravenes this by pointing out that the 
first explicit mention of Shaftesbury came only in the 
1723, or third, edition of the Fable. In 1723 Mande-
SOgernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: or. Pri­
vate Vices, Publick Benefits" ed. with commentary by F. fe. 
Kaye, 2 vols. (Oxford: 1924), I, p. Ixxii. Mandeville pub­
lished the poem "The Grumbling Hive" in 1705. In 1714 he 
added prose commentary to it and entitled the expanded work 
The Fable of the Bees.
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ville added an essay, "A Search into the Nature of Society,” 
specifically intended to refute Shaftesbury's moral theor­
ies. Mandeville's understanding of man's nature was wholly 
in opposition to the Earl's: indeed he himself admitted
"that two Systems cannot be more opposite than his Lord­
ship's and m i n e . ”51 The poet saw man as naturally self­
ish and wholly egoistic. He was concerned with man in the 
everyday world, not as a part of some greater whole. Thus 
he saw vice as the benefactor of society, arguing that a 
virtuous people would be unable to achieve the material 
benefits that make for a contented and progressive society. 
Clearly Mandeville was not interested in the larger philo­
sophical questions which exercised the author of the 
Characteristics and other cosmic tories. He focused his 
attention upon society as it really is, that is, he took 
an utilitarian or "empirical" approach to the questions 
of morality.
"A Search into the Nature of Society" proposed to 
show that the "good and amiable” qualities of man were 
not due to his being a social animal, and, moreover, that 
'it would be utterly impossible, either to raise any Multi­
tudes into a Populous, Rich and Flourishing Nation, or 
when so rais'd, to keep and maintain them in that Condi­
tion, without the assistance of what we call Evil both
S lM ande v i l le ,  I ,  p. 324,
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Natural and M o r a l .  "52 Immediately v/e see that evil not 
only exists, but that it has an important role to play in 
the creation of man's well-being.
Shaftesbury had argued that there were immutable 
standards of virtue, that all men, due to their social 
nature, had a natural affection for society, and thus a 
man of reason would readily govern himself to lead a vir­
tuous life. Hence Mandeville began with a demonstration 
of the relativity of taste and equated this with moral 
standards. Judgments about works of art differ according 
to time and place; fashions are known to run in cycles; 
religious architecture depends on the doctrines of the 
religion. "In Morals there is no greater Certainty."
For example, polygamy is anathema to Christians, but is 
accepted and practiced by Mahometans. Thus hunting for 
immutable standards "is not much better than a Wild- 
Goose-Chace."53
But what is even worse is that the notion that vir­
tue may come without self-denial leads to hypocrisy.
For "we must not only deceive others, but likewise become 
altogether unknown to our selves, and in an Instance I am 
going to give, it will appear, how for want of duly examin­
ing himself this might happen to a Person of Quality, of
52l b i d . , p. 325.
5 3 l b i d . , pp. 330-31 .
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Parts and Erudition, one every way resembling the Author 
of the Characteristicks himself." With that, Mandeville
launched into an attack on Shaftesbury, saying his aris­
tocratic upbringing enabled him to curb his passions and 
to shun everything that was troublesome. Thus he wrote 
of virtue from his closet rather than from experience of
the world. He then asked whether it was right for a man
of parts to remain closeted when his country needed his 
talents.
It is probable he would answer that he
lov'd Retirement, had no other Ambition
than to be a Good Man, and never aspired to
have any share in the Government, or that
he hated all Flattery and slavish Attendance,
the Insincerity of Courts and Bustle of the 
World. I am willing to believe him: but
may not a Man of an Indolent Temper and Un­
active Spirit say, and be sincere in all 
this, and at the same time indulge his Ap­
petites without being able to subdue them, 
tho' his Duty summons him to it. Virtue 
consists in Action, and whoever is possest of 
this Social Love and kind Affection to his 
Species, and by his Birth or Quality can 
claim any Post in the Publick Management, 
ought not to sit still when he can be Ser­
viceable, but exert himself to the utmost 
for the good of his Fellow Subjects.54
In this Mandeville was unfair to the Earl, but it is more
than probable that he did not know of the Earl's efforts
to take part in public affairs and the reasons why he did
not. How would the poet have had access to the letters
which indicated Shaftesbury's profound interest in poli-
5 4 j b i d . , pp. 332-33.
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tics and the belief that the Characteristics should serve 
as a guide to men of affairs? This is fully borne out 
when Mandeville cited Cicero as the epitome of a philoso- 
pher-politician, not realizing that Cicero was Shaftes­
bury's model also.
The remainder of "A Search into the Nature of So­
ciety" was devoted to demonstrating that men are not 
sociable by nature, but on the contrary prefer solitude 
and that they join society only because of their "Bad and 
Hateful Qualities," most notably, self-love.
How necessary our Appetites and Passions are 
for the welfare of a >.l Trades and Handicrafts 
has been sufficiently prov'd throughout the 
Book, and that they are our bad Qualities, or 
at least produce them, no Body denies. It 
remains then that I should set forth the 
variety of Obstacles that hinder and perplex 
Man in the Labour he is constantly employ'd 
in, the procuring of what he wants; and which 
in other Words is call'd the Business of Self- 
Preservation; While at the same time I demon­
strate that the Sociableness of Man arises 
only from these Two things, viz. The multi­
plicity of his Desires, and the continual Op­
position he meets with in his Endeavours to 
gratify them.55
He admits that the fewer desires a man has, the more ac­
tive he is in supplying his own wants, the better relations 
he has with his family and neighbors, all lead to real 
virtue and make him more "acceptable to God and Man." "But 
let us be Just, what Benefit can these things be of, or
5 5 i b i d . , p. 344.
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what earthly Good can they do, to promote the Wealth, the 
Glory and worldly Greatness of Nations?"^® The concern 
of man in society is only to add to its material prosper­
ity and hence to increase his own. For this end skillful 
politicians manage private vices to turn them to public 
benefits.57
Some of Mandeville*s ideas appear to be similar to 
those of cosmic toryism, such as the desire for public 
benefits, but in reality he rejected the premises used by 
cosmic tories. He was not concerned with the Whole in 
any way, either its origins or its composition. He be­
lieved that evil was a real and a positive force in the 
world. And he saw man as being wholly animated by self- 
love, rather than natural affection. As Hobbes, he be­
lieved that society existed to protect man from himself. 
His desire was not to practice virtue for the benefit of 
the Whole, but to exploit evil for the benefit of men, 
both as individuals and as members of society. Thus he 
attacked Shaftesbury for rejecting evil and for his altru­
istic use of virtue for the good of the Whole. His prag­
matic or cynical approach to morality represented one of 
the possible attacks on cosmic toryism. It was an easy
SGl b i d . , p. 355.
5 ? I b i d . , p. 369.
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attack, for it appealed to the baser instincts of man.
It was not original, since most of it could be found in 
Shaftesbury's primary antagonist, Hobbes. Nor was it a 
successful counter-argument, because Mandeville failed 
to address himself to the fundamental ideas set forth by 
Shaftesbury.
A reply to The Fable and partial defense of the 
Characteristics was given by Richard Fiddes in the pre­
face to his treatise Of Morality.^8 Fiddes was a church­
man, but he generally adhered to the tenets of natural 
theology fashionable in his day. His preface, which is 
the only part of his book that need concern us, indicates 
that he adopted much of his thought from Shaftesbury, 
although he does not appear to have been a thorough-going 
cosmic tory. He accepted and used aspects of the cosmic 
tory system but modified them with Lockean and Christian 
principles, yielding a most interesting melange of ideas.
Since Fiddes was primarily concerned to rebut 
Mandeville's "A Search into the Nature of Society," his 
preface parallels it and hence begins by arguing for im-
58Richard Fiddes, A General Treatise of Morality, 
Form'd upon the Principles of Natural Reason only witTT a 
Preface in Answer to two Essays lately published in the 
"Fable of the Bees." And some incidental REMARKS upon an 
^'Inquiry concerning Virtue," by the Right Honourable Afw 
thony Earl of Shaftesbury (London: 1724). The preface is 
144 pages long and contains a point-by-point reply to Man­
deville 's "A Search into the Nature of Society."
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mutable standards of virtue. "It is sufficient to estab­
lish the Truth of Morality, that Men, in all Ages, have 
agreed in the general Notion of it."59 indeed if the 
names virtue and vice can be transposed with regard to 
particular subjects, as Mandeville had done, this alone 
is sufficient demonstration of the reality of the two 
notions, "for what is not cannot be misapplied." So using 
the term virtue-to apply to certain vices does not prove 
that there is no real virtue, only that man is capable of 
mistaking the nature of things and of drawing false con­
clusions from true principles.GO
There are two degrees of morality according to the 
source of their obligation. The primary order of morality 
encompasses those things which come
from the immutable Reason and Order of Things, 
and do not depend even upon the Will of the 
Supreme Legislator, but are founded in those 
eternal and essential Perfections of his Nature, 
whereby his Will itself is regulated; and which, 
in the natural Order of our Ideas, are therefore 
antecedent to his Will; such Things as are not 
meerly good by Virtue of his Command, or of 
any Circumstances, wherein Man may accidently be 
placed; but such, as are commanded, because they 
are absolutely good, and, under all Circumstances, 
in their own Nature.G1
^^Fiddes, p. liv.
^^Ibid . , p. Iv.
Glfbid., pp. Iviii-lix.
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Hence pride, which is counted as a virtue in The Fable of 
the Bees, cannot be a virtue in man, who is rational, for 
it is contrary to reason and the nature of man. The se­
condary order includes those duties man has as a social 
creature and which are regulated by "good and proper Ends 
of Society," For example, marriage is necessary for the 
propagation of the species and thus polygamy would be 
moral if it were necessary to increase the population.
But if the population were sufficient or too great, then, 
in the interests of society, restraints would have to be 
placed upon this liberty and such marriages would become 
immoral. Generally humans have no opportunity to deter­
mine these duties for God modelled human society and in 
the process established man's obligations to it.62 Fiddes's 
concept of morality, then, generally conforms to Shaftes­
bury's, since it is based on the natural order of things, 
which establishes both immutable standards of virtue and 
allows the good of society to dictate individual morality.
As Mandeville, Fiddes then turned to the question 
of the immediate relations of man to society. Here he 
went beyond Shaftesbury in his defense of him and included 
notions from Locke and Christianity that Shaftesbury
G^Fiddes, pp. Ix-lxiii. The examples used by Fiddes 
both here and above were specific answers to examples used 
in "A Search into the Nature of Society."
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specifically rejected, but the cosmic tory foundation 
continued to show through. The problem of the conflict 
of public and private duties was of primary concern. It 
is an "acknowledged Truth" that God designed man to be a 
social creature; proof comes from the fact that nature, 
which does nothing in vain, has given man the "proper 
Capacities" and the"proper Dispositions" necessary for a 
social life. Society satisfies many of man’s wants and 
removes many ills that a solitary life could not. Thus 
it is clear that the social nature of man is part of God's 
design of the Whole, and that man's happiness is dependent 
on his public activities.^3 Yet man did not enter society 
immediately. A contract had to be formed first and man 
had to surrender certain of his individual liberties and 
accept those new obligations imposed on the whole commun­
ity. Only then could he be truly said to be s o c i a l . 64
Still there are times when a man's private interests 
will conflict with those of the public good and when he 
will suffer personal injustice if he adheres to the social 
interest.
The great Difficulty, which I shall not dis­
semble, relating to the Matter in question, 
has been thought to lie here. The End of Man, 
that for which God created him, and which he
63jbid., pp. Ixxii-lxxv. 
64ibid., pp. Ixxxvi-xc.
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invincibly desires and pursues, is Happi­
ness, Now it is said, the publick Good of 
Society often requires that Man should 
sacrifice his private Happiness to it. Here, 
therefore, seem to be two different Ends, 
both of them, by Confession, agreeable to 
divine appointment, and which yet directly 
interfere, and tend to destroy one another.
In this case, we are asked. What Method of 
Reconciliation can be proposed, that the 
Author of human Nature, and of human Govern­
ment, may appear to have acted according to 
his essential Characters of Wisdom and Good­
ness, in these two different Constitutions?
Since, according to these Attributes, he 
could not have so acted, if the respective 
Duties, or Interest of them should be found 
absolutely incompatible.^5
The answer, which is wholly contrary to Shaftesbury's 
arguments, is that public interests must prevail and that 
losses sustained by the individual will be rewarded by 
God in the future life.®® Shaftesbury, of course, follow­
ed the Stoic rather than the Christian tradition and argued 
that man must subordinate himself entirely to the good of 
the Whole regardless of the consequences to him as an in­
dividual. The only reward involved was that the interests 
of the Whole would be confirmed and that no harm could 
occur to the individual if he considered himself in terms 
of the Whole. Thus Fiddes's defense of Shaftesbury did 
not wholly conform to the master's beliefs. Nonetheless 
he provides a good example of how cosmic toryism came to
®®Ibid., pp. xcv-xcvi. 
66lbid., pp. xcvii-ciii.
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be used in the eighteenth century and how it quickly lost 
its purity.
In this chapter we have seen how the principles of 
cosmic toryism were reiterated, vilified, and defended. 
They underlay the philosophy espoused in the most renowned 
periodical ever published. The best-known philosophical 
poem in the English language was an exposition of the 
system. And one of the most controversial works of the 
period argued the antithetical position.
Cosmic toryism, then, occupied a significant posi­
tion in early eighteenth-century thought. It appealed to 
those who found the political, social and intellectual 
framework of the age satisfactory, because it provided a 
philosophical justification for their beliefs. Clearly 
Shaftesbury's was a conservative philosophy: he stood up
against the liberal notions of the "new philosophy and 
science." Moreover, he offered something that they did 
not, a formula for the betterment of society and for human 
happiness. It is little wonder, then, that the Character­
istics was so widely read and commented upon.
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